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ARTICLES
SEVEN PILLARS OF A NEW EVIDENTIARY
PARADIGM: THE FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC
ACT ENTERS THE GENOMIC ERA
Barbara J Evans*
To assess the impact of the March 2009 decision in Wyeth v. Levine,
it is crucial to understand that the Supreme Court ruled on actions that the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) took under a statutory scheme
that already had been amended by the time the case was decided. The Food
and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) transformed
drug regulation, adding significant new powers to develop evidence and
make new types of decisions in the postmarket period. This article explores
how the contours of drug regulation are likely to change after FDAAA, which
is the most profound reworking of the U.S. drug regulatory framework in half
a century.
FDAAA envisions heavy use, during the period after drugs are
approved, of evidence from large observational studies that rely on interoper-
able health data networks. Understanding what was wrong with FDA's old
evidentiary paradigm, which dates back to 1962, is essential to understand-
ing its new one. Parts II and III of this article discuss the evidentiary limita-
tions of premarket drug trials; important aspects of modern legal doctrine rest
on misconceptions about their evidentiary power. Part IV then explores how
scientific advances flowing from the Human Genome Project over the past
decade further undermined FDA's old evidentiary paradigm. FDAAA was
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Congress's response to these problems. Part V identifies seven pillars of the
new evidentiary paradigm: seven novel propositions that reject foundational
assumptions of twentieth-century drug regulation. Collapse of these assump-
tions sets off ripple effects in various doctrinal areas. Part VI provides two
examples, with the aim of opening a scholarly debate about these and other
impacts of FDA's new evidentiary paradigm.
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INTRODUCTION
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 20071
(FDAAA) transforms the evidentiary basis of medical product regula-
tion by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). FDAAA aug-
ments premarket clinical studies with new sources of evidence about
the risks and benefits of drugs. FDAAA envisions heavy use, during
I Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
21 U.S.C.).
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the postmarket period, of large observational studies that rely on
interoperable health data networks. This shift will affect diverse areas
of legal doctrine.
Product liability and medical malpractice are obvious candidates
for impact. Questions about the preemptive effect of FDA's drug reg-
ulation loom large after FDAAA, notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme
Court's March 2009 decision in Wyeth v. Levine.2 "The major doctrinal
question here is whether various forms of regulatory action by the
FDA have the effect of preempting suits brought pursuant to state tort
law."3 Wyeth v. Levine held that FDA's drug approval and labeling
decisions did not preempt a failure-to-warn suit against the drug's
manufacturer. That result seems fair, given that the evidence on
which FDA has been basing these decisions is severely limited in ways
this article explores.4 Congress enacted FDAAA to address these very
limitations. FDAAA expands FDA's postmarket evidence develop-
ment and empowers FDA to take new forms of regulatory action in
response to the new flows of evidence. Some of these new regulatory
actions may have the preemptive effect that the Court, in Wyeth v.
Levine, found lacking in FDA's pre-FDAAA approval and labeling deci-
sions. In assessing the impact of Wyeth v. Levine, it is crucial to under-
stand that the Supreme Court was ruling on actions taken under a
statutory scheme that had been substantially amended by the time the
case was decided.
FDAAA directs FDA to address certain matters that Congress pre-
viously regarded as state medical practice issues. There may be consti-
tutional questions as FDA flexes new powers to restrict clinical use of
drugs and does so in ways that deny seriously ill patients access to
FDA-approved pharmaceutical products-a problem that appears
already to be occurring. FDA-imposed use restrictions raise the spec-
ter that physicians, as well as manufacturers, might argue preemp-
tion-or its close cousin, the regulatory compliance defense 5-in
drug-injury malpractice suits. In other areas, FDAAA breathes new life
into classic infrastructure regulatory problems by requiring evidence
that can only be generated with a massive, networked informational
infrastructure that does not yet exist and will have to be financed,
2 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
3 Richard A. Nagareda, PDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative
State, I J. TORT L. art. 4, at 1 (2006), http://www.bepress.com/jtl/voll/iss1/art 4.
4 See discussion infra Part II (discussing the limitations of the evidence on which
FDA was relying prior to passage of FDAAA in 2007).
5 Robert L. Rabin, Poking Holes in the Fabric of Tort: A Comment, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
293, 300 (2007).
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built, and administered.6 The new forms of evidence, as they become
available, may reshape cultural and commercial norms that have
favored avid consumption of prescription drugs7 in recent decades,
and they may alter popular expectations of medical privacy.8 The new
research methodologies may require new structures for research over-
sight and new principles for the ethical conduct of biomedical
research. This article touches on these broader impacts to open a
scholarly dialogue about them. However, it focuses on how the broad,
conceptual contours of drug regulation have changed and why.
Understanding what was wrong with FDA's old evidentiary paradigm
is key to appreciating the promise and the perils of its new one.
FDAAA is a profound change in law. The Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act9 ("FDCA" or "1938 Act") has been amended more
than one hundred times10 since it became law in 1938. Most of these
amendments were "tweaks" but, occasionally, Congress fundamentally
altered the regulatory paradigm. FDAAA was a "sweeping overhaul of
both the FDCA and the Public Health Service Act."" Once called
6 See generally Barbara J. Evans, Congress' New Infrastructural Model of Medical Pri-
vacy, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 585 (2009) (discussing infrastructure regulatory aspects
of FDAAA).
7 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., New Efforts to
Help Improve Medical Products for Patient Safety and Quality of Medical Care (May
22, 2008) [hereinafter HHS, New Efforts], available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/
press/2008pres/05/20080522a.html (noting that Americans not on Medicare aver-
age thirteen prescriptions per year, while those on Medicare average about twenty-
eight per year). Those Medicare beneficiaries who consider themselves in poor
health receive about forty-five prescriptions per year. Id. (citing CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE CURRENT BENE-
FICIARY SURVEY (2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MCBS/Downloads/A04
%20Ric%201.pdf).
8 See Evans, supra note 6, at 610-22 (discussing privacy impacts of FDAAA).
9 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-399 (2006)).
10 See U.S.C.A. index (West Supp. 2009) (popular name table), Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) (Copeland Pure Food and Drugs Act) (Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act) (FFDCA) (Humphrey-Durham Act); see also Peter Barton Hutt,
The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 436, 467
tbl. 1 (2008) (counting statutes that directly affected FDA-including both amend-
ments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and other statutes that established duties
to be performed by FDA-and finding ninety-plus such statutes enacted between 1938
and 1987 and one hundred statutes after 1988).
11 David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to
Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 467 (2008).
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"the biggest reforms since at least 1997,"12 FDAAA is in fact the most
momentous shift in drug regulation in half a century. The 1962 Drug
Amendments13 sparked the last big shift by introducing the modern
concept of drug approval. Before 1962, new drugs were deemed
approved for sale unless FDA, within a limited period of time, found
grounds to keep them off the market. 14 Since 1962, drugs await
affirmative approval before they can be sold. 15 It was after 1962 that
"FDA became responsible for making benefit-risk decisions" about
drugs.16 Congress directed FDA, for the first time, to require "sub-
stantial evidence"' 7 of efficacy as well as safety.18 FDA interpreted19
this language to require the familiar three-phase clinical trial pro-
cess 20 through which drugs now pass before FDA approval.
12 Mark McClellan, Drug Safety Reform at the FDA-Pendulum Swing or Systematic
Improvement?, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1700, 1700 (2007) (describing FDAAA as "the
biggest reforms since at least 1997").
13 Drug Amendments of 1962 (Harris-Kefauver Act), Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat.
780 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
14 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009); Barry S. Roberts & David Z.
Bodenheimer, The Drug Amendments of 1962: The Anatomy of a Regulatory Failure, 1982
ARz. ST. L.J. 581, 585; see also S. REP. No. 87-1744, at 3-5 (1962), reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884, 2890-91 (describing the earlier premarket notification process
that the 1962 Drug Amendments replaced); Hutt, supra note 10, at 434 (noting that
the 1962 Drug Amendments replaced premarket notification for drugs with
premarket approval).
15 See Hutt, supra note 10, at 434-35.
16 INST. OF MED., UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PHARMACEUTICALS
48 (Leslie Pray rapporteur, 2007) [hereinafter IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS]
(reporting presentation of Peter Barton Hutt), available at http://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record-id=1 1910.
17 See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102, 76 Stat. at 781
(defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence consisting of adequate and well-con-
trolled investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly
and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it
purports or is represented to have").
18 See id. § 102, 76 Stat. at 781-82 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) to allow drug
applications to be denied for lack of substantial evidence of efficacy, and amending
21 U.S.C. § 355(e) to allow previously granted approvals to be withdrawn if new infor-
mation reveals that a drug does not have its claimed effects).
19 See Hearing Regulations and Regulations Describing Scientific Content of Ade-
quate and Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 7250, 7250 (May 8,
1970) (amending 21 C.F.R. §§ 130.12(a) (5), 130.14 to clarify the terms "substantial
evidence" and "adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation [s]").
20 See Investigational New Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2009); see also
Geoffrey M. Levitt et al., Human Drug Regulation, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND
REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS 159, 165-66 (David G.
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These requirements contributed to expansive growth of clinical
trial activity late in the twentieth century. Between 1962 and 1980, the
cost to develop a new drug rose from $6.5 million to $70 million,21
with much of the increase attributed to the cost of FDA's required
clinical studies. 2 2 In 2007, the Institute of Medicine reported various
estimates ranging from $500 million to $2 billion as the cost of devel-
oping one new drug.23 These data suggest a clear upward trend
although historical and recent figures are not strictly comparable. 24
Robert Califf traces how FDA's clinical trial requirements led to a
"complex maze of rules . . . and ultimately created an entirely new
industry: the contract research organization (CRO)" 25 to help drug
sponsors navigate FDA's premarket requirements. As of March 2008,
the CRO industry had estimated annual revenues of $17.8 billion,
employed 100,000 people worldwide, and was experiencing annual
revenue growth of 14-16%.26
In their day, the 1962 amendments marked the most significant
shift in regulatory philosophy not only since the 1938 Act, but since
the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act27 that had preceded it.28 Another
important shift was the 1976 Medical Device Amendments29 which
authorized FDA to regulate medical devices, a category that later has
Adams et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION]
(describing the three phases of clinical investigations FDA typically requires).
21 Roberts & Bodenheimer, supra note 14, at 606.
22 See id.; see also HENRY GRABOWSKI, DRUG REGULATION AND INNOVATION 36
(1976) (finding a rough doubling of costs by the early 1970s); SAM PELTZMAN, REGULA-
TION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 2 (1974) (same).
23 COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., INST. OF MED., THE
FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY 32 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IOM, FUTURE
OF DRUG SAFETY], available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=1 1750.
24 Methodologies for estimating drug development costs are subject to ongoing
controversy. See id. at 32. Recognizing that many drugs are abandoned for every one
drug that does reach the market, modern estimates of drug development costs may
include costs for drugs that were abandoned prior to FDA approval as part of the
average cost of developing the one successful drug that does reach the market. It is
unclear whether the figures reported for 1962 and 1980 reflect this same practice. See
Roberts & Bodenheimer, supra note 14, at 606.
25 Robert M. Califf, Clinical Trials Bureaucracy: Unintended Consequences of Well-
Intentioned Policy, 3 CLINICAL TRIALS 496, 497 (2006).
26 See Ass'n of Clinical Research Orgs., CRO Industry at a Glance, http://
www.acrohealth.org/industry-ataglance.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
27 Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
21 U.S.C.).
28 See Alan H. Kaplan, Fifty Years of Drug Amendments Revisited: In Easy-to-Swallow
Capsule Form, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 179, 181 (1995).
29 Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 55 (2006)
and scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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acquired significance in genomic medicine since it includes diagnos-
tic and genetic tests. FDAAA belongs in this class of paradigm-shifting
amendments.
If the 1962 amendments heralded the age of faith in clinical tri-
als, then FDAAA tolls its twilight. That, in a nutshell, is the shift of
regulatory philosophy now underway. It is important to qualify what
that statement means: Declaring the twilight of premarket clinical tri-
als is not the same thing as saying that the sun already has set, or will
ever set, on them. Clinical trials will still be performed and, indeed,
FDAAA expanded FDA's authority to require them in the postmarket
as well as the premarket period.30 Clinical trials will continue to be an
important-often, the primary-source of data about medical prod-
ucts. Yet FDAAA accepts that clinical trials have intrinsic limitations
and cannot, by themselves, ensure the safety and efficacy of FDA-
approved products. FDAAA is a response to this reality. Premarket
trials will continue as before, but there has been a pragmatic reassess-
ment of their evidentiary value. One might refer to this as the
nation's Trialddmmerung-its loss of faith in evidence from premarket
drug trials. Derived from "clinical trial" and the German word, Ddm-
merung (meaning "dimming" or "twilight"31), the term deliberately
alludes to G6tterdammerung with its sense of a "collapse (as of a . . .
regime) marked by catastrophic violence and disorder; broadly
DOWNFALL."32
The cataclysmic event, in this case, was a confluence of two
trends. First, deadly drug safety problems"" earlier this decade stirred
doubts whether FDA's old evidentiary paradigm was capable of pro-
tecting the public's health.34 Dating back to 1962, that paradigm
relied heavily on risk-benefit data from premarket clinical trials.35
The methodological limitations of clinical trials3 6 were never con-
cealed by FDA37 and had long been known to biomedical statisti-
30 See discussion infra Part V.A. 1.
31 Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary, G(tterd:1mmerung, http://merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/gotterdammerung (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
32 Id.
33 See discussion infra Part I.
34 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 11, at 468 (noting that aspects of FDAAA
suggest "that Congress did not share the FDA's view that it is capable of adequately
safeguarding the public health on its own").
35 See discussion infra Part I.
36 See discussion infra Part II.
37 See Kenneth L. Melmon, Attitudinal Factors that Influence the Utilization of Modern
Evaluative Methods, in INST. OF MED., MODERN METHODS OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATION
135, 142 (Annetine C. Gelijns, ed., 1990) [hereinafter IOM, MODERN METHODS],
available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=1550 (pointing out that
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cians,38 but they were not widely appreciated by the public, academics,
or the medical profession.39 Problems with the 1962 drug approval
framework already were apparent by the mid-1970s and a Joint Com-
mission on Prescription Drug Use was formed in 1976 with Dr. Ken-
neth L. Melmon as its chair.40 The Commission's voluminous 1980
report set out the limitations of clinical trial evidence41 and called for
a "comprehensive system of post-marketing drug surveillance" remark-
ably similar to what Congress authorized twenty-seven years later in
FDAAA.4 2 Drug safety scandals this decade displayed the problem in a
way even non-statisticians could grasp: "safe and effective" drugs were
killing people, lots of people. Widely held beliefs that FDA regulation
was "comprehensive"43 and involved "rigorous cost-benefit analysis
along the dimensions of safety and efficacy"4 4 seemed to support pre-
emption of tort suits but presumed FDA was using evidence that could
support rigorous analysis. This presumption was wrong.45
The second trend was a series of scientific advances flowing from
the Human Genome Project 46 which, as explored below, 47 exposed
FDA knows the limitations of premarket clinical trials and has made efforts to explain
their practical limitations).
38 See IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 29 (reporting presenta-
tion of Dr. Brian L. Strom).
39 See id.; Melmon, supra note 37, at 142.
40 SeeJoiNT COMM'N ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG USE, FINAL REPORT (1980).
41 See Brian L. Strom et al., Efficacy Research on Marketed Drugs: Issues of Validity, in
JOINT COMM'N ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG USE, supra note 40, at app. VII; see also William
L. Finkle, Sample Size Requirements for Detection ofDrug-Induced Disease, inJOINT COMM'N
ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG USE, supra note 40, at app. V. (describing intrinsic method-
ological limitations of clinical trial evidence on which FDA bases its drug approval
decisions).
42 JOINT COMM'N ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG USE, supra note 40, at 7-93 (describing
the Joint Commission's proposed postmarket surveillance system); id. at 94-108 (fore-
seeing, in 1980, that privacy and data security would be major concerns with such a
system).
43 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1219 (2009) (Alito J., dissenting); see also
Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron
Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, I J. TORT L. art. 5, at 3 (2006), http://
www.bepress.com/jtl/voll/issl/art5 ("I think the right rule in all cases should be
that, in light of comprehensive FDA regulation of new and existing drugs, these
actions should be preempted .... ); Rabin, supra note 5, at 304 ("FDA regulation is
comprehensive, at least as far as prescription drugs are concerned.").
44 Rabin, supra note 5, at 304.
45 See discussion infra Parts II-III.
46 For background on the Human Genome Project, see Nat'l Human Genome
Research Inst., All About the Human Genome Project (HGP), http://www.genome.
gov/10001772 (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
47 See discussion infra Part IV.
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flaws in FDA's approach to effectiveness as well as safety. These two
trends converged just as technological advances were starting to offer
practical alternatives to FDA's old evidentiary approach.48 This Arti-
cle explores these trends and speculates what the new paradigm-
which already has been authorized by Congress but which is still, very
much, in the early stages of implementation-may look like. Part V
outlines seven pillars of FDA's new evidentiary paradigm: seven novel
propositions that reject foundational assumptions of the drug regula-
tory framework in place since 1962. Collapse of these assumptions
sets off ripple effects in various doctrinal areas.
If fully implemented, FDAAA will change the way regulators man-
age-and the public thinks about-risks and benefits of the roughly
$230 billion 4 9 of prescription drugs Americans buy each year. It will
promote more realistic expectations of what can (and cannot) be
learned from the $60-$80 billion50 Americans invest each year in
drug-related research and it will shape policy on new types of research
to receive greater emphasis in the future. However, that "if' is a big
one: if fully implemented.5 1  In 2006, the Institute of Medicine
remarked on FDA's record of poor follow-through on proposed initia-
tives in recent years.52 FDAAA sketches out a blueprint for a bold new
regulatory framework, but implementation has only just begun.
I. THE 1962 EVIDENTIARY PARADIGM FOR DRUG REGULATION
This Part briefly surveys the track record of FDA's drug approval
process after 1962 and describes its evidentiary requirements, to lay
groundwork for exploring its limitations in Part II.
48 See discussion infra Parts I.C and V.A.2.
49 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
National Health Expenditures by Type of Service and Source of Funds (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/nhe2007.zip.
50 See Press Release, PhRMA, R&D Spending by U.S. Biopharmaceutical Compa-
nies Reaches Record Levels in 2008 Despite Economic Challenges (Mar. 10, 2009),
available at http://www.phrma.org/news-room/pressreleases/r&d-spending-by-u.
s._biopharmaceutical-companies reaches record-levels in_2008 despite-economic
chal (reporting private-sector investment in drug and vaccine development of $65.2
billion in 2008); see also OFFICE OF COMMC'NS & PUB. LIAISON, NAT'L. INSTS. OF
HEALTH, PUB. No. 08-05, NIH ALMANAc 2008-2009, at 401 (2008), available at http://
www.nih.gov/about/almanac/Almanac-2008-2009.pdf (showing NIH appropriations
of $28.5 billion in 2006 and $29 billion in 2007, figures which include various forms of
biomedical research not all of which are related to pharmaceuticals).
51 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 11, at 469 (noting that FDAAA is "dauntingly
complex" and expressing concern whether implementation is adequately resourced).
52 See IOM, FUTUlE OF DRUG SAFEIY, supra note 23, at 17-18.
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A. The Gap Between Perception and Performance
"Over time, a large segment of the public has developed the
belief that FDA-approved drugs carry no risk."5 3  Short of such
extreme credulity, many people know FDA-approved drugs carry some
risk but may overestimate the amount and quality of risk-benefit data
available at the time drugs are approved. The clinical trials on which
FDA relies "have inherent methodological limitations in the evalua-
tion of adverse effects." 5 4 The late Dr. Melmon decried the fact that
"academics and the medical profession shirk responsibility for under-
standing limitations of the regulatory process."55 "Shirking" may be
too strong a term. Limitations of the evidence FDA uses often are
described in statistical terminology that can thwart even sincere
attempts to grasp the impact.
Between 1969 and 2002-that is, well after the 1962 Drug
Amendments were in place but before the 2004 scandal with
rofecoxib (Vioxx)5 6-more than seventy-five drugs and drug products
were withdrawn from the market for safety reasons.57 Black-box warn-
ings had to be added to many other drugs.58 Other countries exper-
ienced similar problems. Between 1963 and 2004, Canada had forty-
one drug withdrawals that appear to have been safety-related.5 9 Drug
withdrawals are rare relative to the total number of drugs FDA
approves. Roughly 11,000 FDA-approved drugs are available in the
United States (including prescription and over-the-counter drugs).6o
53 IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 7; see also id. at 1 ("[M]any
individuals believe that drugs approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) carry no risks.").
54 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CLINICAL TRIALS 182 (3d ed.
1998).
55 Melmon, supra note 37, at 142.
56 See infra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
57 Diane K. Wysowski & Lynette Swartz, Adverse Drug Event Surveillance and Drug
Withdrawals in the United States, 1969-2002, 165 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 1363, 1363
(2005).
58 See Karen E. Lasser et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals for
Prescription Medications, 287JAMA 2215, 2216 (2002) (reporting that more than 10%
of new chemical entities approved between 1975 and 1999 were given black-box warn-
ings or withdrawn).
59 Joel Lexchin, Drug Withdrawals from the Canadian Market for Safety Reasons,
1963-2004, 172 CANADIAN MED. Ass'N J. 765, 765 (2005).
60 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009) (estimating the number of
drugs at 11,000); BENGT D. FURBERC & CURT D. FURBERG, EVALUATING CLINICAL
RESEARCH 115 (2d ed. 2007) (estimating the number of drugs at 10,000). But see Ctr.
for Drug Evaluation & Research (CDER), Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Prod-
ucts, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/Scripts/cder/DrugsatFDA (last visited Nov. 10,
2009) (listing approved products and reporting 5996 prescription and over-the-
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FDA approved 8076 new drug applications from 1938-1962 and an
additional 3638 from 1963-2006.61 Seventy-five safety-related with-
drawals, out of 3638 approvals granted after the 1962 Drug Amend-
ments, is roughly 2%. Pillans detected a recent increase in the rate of
drug withdrawals and notes that there are competing explanations,
such as laxer approval standards, higher overall levels of drug availa-
bility and consumption, or improved systems for detecting safety
problems.62 A current estimate is that 20% of all drugs receive a
black-box warning and about 4% are withdrawn for safety reasons.63
Consistent with an upward trend, the last ten years saw a spate of
incidents where serious risks came to light after drugs were
approved.64 Beyond the Vioxx problem, there was fulminant liver fail-
ure with troglitazone (Rezulin),65 suicidal ideation in youngsters tak-
ing antidepressants (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors or
SSRIs),66 rhabdomyolysis and kidney failure in people taking choles-
counter drugs and biologic therapies as of Nov. 10, 2009). The 5996 figure reportedly
includes most prescription and over-the-counter drugs and therapeutic biologics
approved for use in the United States since 1939 and excludes products that were not
approved through new drug applications (NDA) or biologic license applications
(BLA), drugs that failed to achieve FDA approval, drugs approved outside the United
States but not in the United States, and dietary supplements. See id. (follow link for
"FAQ" and scroll to questions three and four). The apparent discrepancy with higher
estimates is unexplained but likely reflects drugs that were approved through alterna-
tive pathways, including pre-1938 drugs that were generally recognized as safe and
roughly 4000 drugs approved 1938-1962 for safety alone, which subsequently went
through the Drug Efficacy Study Implementation (DESI) process to confirm efficacy.
See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE HISTORY
OF DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2006), available at http://www.fda.
gov/downloads/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/PromotingSafe
andEffectiveDrugsforl00Years/UCM1 14469.pdf.
61 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Summary of NDA Approvals & Receipts, 1938 to the
Present, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/
SummaryofNDAApprovalsReceiptsl938tothepresent/default.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2009).
62 Peter Ian Pillans, Clinical Perspectives in Drug Safety and Adverse Drug Reactions, 1
EXPERT REV. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 695, 700 (2008).
63 Mei Sheng Dub et al., The Role ofEpidemiology in Drug Safety Litigations, FOOD &
DRUG L. INST. UPDATE, Nov./Dec. 2007, at 31, 31.
64 See Alastair J.J. Wood et al., Making Medicines Safer-The Need for an Independent
Drug Safety Board, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1851 (1998).
65 See Gerald A. Faich & Richard H. Moseley, Troglitazone (Rezulin) and Hepatic
Injury, 10 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFEY 537 (2001); David Graham et al.,
Incidence of Idiopathic Acute Liver Failure and Hospitalized Liver Injury in Patients Treated
with Troglitazone, 98 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 175 (2003).
66 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Labeling Change Request Letter for Antidepres-
sant Medications, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/
ucm096352.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
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terol-lowering cerivastatin (Baycol), 67 QT prolongation and ventricu-
lar arrhythmias with the gastroesophageal reflux drug cisapride
(Propulsid),68 cardiac problems with the antihistamines astemizole
(Hismanal) and terfenadine (Seldane), 69 and a suite of health risks
for women using hormone replacement therapy (HRT).70 The Gov-
ernmental Accountability Office (GAO) counted ten safety-related
withdrawals between 2000 and March 2006.71 More recent problems
have included cardiovascular risks with diabetes drugs;72 reports of
esophageal cancer and necrotic jawbones in patients taking osteo-
porosis drugs;73 elevated blood pressure among patients taking popu-
lar hyperactivity drugs;74 this list is far from exhaustive. "It has been
estimated that as many as half of all new drugs have at least one seri-
ous adverse effect that is unknown at the time of drug approval."75
67 See FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 118 (noting differences in rates of
rhabdomyolysis between cerivastatin and other marketed statins); Judy Staffa et al.,
Cerivastatin and Reports of Fatal Rhabdomyolysis, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 539, 539-40
(2002); see also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Public Health Advisory For Crestor
(Rosuvastatin) (Mar. 2, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/
PublicHealthAdvisories/ucm05l756.htm (reviewing potential safety issues with the
cholesterol-lowering drug Crestor).
68 See Diane Wysowski et al., Postmarketing Reports of QT Prolongation and Ventricular
Arrhythmia in Association with Cisapride and Food and Drug Administration Regulatory
Actions, 96 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 1698 (2001).
69 See Amalia M. Issa, Clinical Applications of Pharmacogenomics to Adverse Drug Reac-
tions, 1 EXPERT REV. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 251, 253 (2008).
70 See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Updates Hormone Therapy
Information for Post Menopausal Women (Feb. 10, 2004), available at http://
www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004.ucml 08243.htm.
71 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Doc. No. GAO-06-402, DRUG SAFETY:
IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA's PosTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT
PROCESSES 10 (2006) [hereinafter GAO, DRUG SAFETY], available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d06402.pdf.
72 CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUI
DANCE FOR INDUSTRY: DIABETES MELLITUs-EVALUATING CARDIOVASCULAR RISK IN NEW
ANTIDIABETIC THERAPIES TO TREAT TYPE 2 DIABETES (2008) [hereinafter FDA, DIABETES
MELLITUS], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucm07l627.pdf.
73 Jill U. Adams, Osteoporosis Drug Fosamax Linked to Serious Diseases, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/1 2/health/he-closerl 2.
74 See Meeting Transcript of Feb. 9, 2006, Drug Safety & Risk Mgmt. Advisory
Comm., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, at 35-40, 220-26, available at http://
www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4202tl.pdf (statements of Drs.
Kate Gelperin & Steve Nissen).
75 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 8.
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David Slavin has remarked that high public trust is typically asso-
ciated with low perceived risk and vice versa.7 6 Late-discovered risks
and drug withdrawals both tend to be seen as regulatory failures, as
evidence that regulators made mistakes." Public confidence in FDA
fell from 80% in the 1970s to 61% in 2000; 56% in 2004; and 36% in
2006.78 Certainly, there have been instances where premarket studies
(or early clinical experience in the postmarket period) gave early sig-
nals of a safety problem on which regulators failed to press. Such alle-
gations were voiced in connection with Vioxx. 7 9 Obviously, if safety
signals exist but elicit a flaccid regulatory response, then that is a
problem that needs to be corrected. However, too much focus on
regulator fault obscures a deeper problem: "In reality, almost all
postmarketing safety issues involve rare adverse events that could not
have been detected prior to marketing."80 The problem may not be
failure of the regulator; it may be failure of the evidentiary paradigm.
B. The Role of Randomized, Controlled Trials
FDA's post-1962 evidentiary paradigm concentrated research and
regulatory effort in the premarket period, before products are
approved.81 Congress gave FDA little power to require ongoing stud-
ies past the point of drug approval,82 and the agency was given few
76 IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 29 (reporting presentation of
Dr. David E. Slavin).
77 IOM, FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 23, at 2; see also IOM, UNDERSTAND-
ING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 29 (noting that the "public misunderstands drug
safety, believing that postmarketing discovery of adverse drug reactions means 'some-
body messed up'").
78 Hutt, supra note 10, at 443 (citing Harris Poll survey results reported by Bill
Hubbard and Steven Grossman, April 11, 2007).
79 See, e.g., Richard Horton, Vioxx, the Implosion of Merck, and Aftershocks at the FDA,
364 LANCET 1995 (2004); Pillans, supra note 62, at 700; EricJ. Topol, Failing the Public
Health-Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1707 (2004).
80 IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 29 (reporting presentation of
Dr. Brian L. Strom); see also SALLY ROBINSON ET AL., INST. OF MED., EMERGING SAFETY
SCIENCE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 2 (2008) [hereinafter IOM, EMERGING SAFETY SCIENCE],
available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=11975 ("With current
methods, it is unlikely that rare safety problems will be identified prior to approval.").
81 BarbaraJ. Evans & David A. Flockhart, The Unfinished Business of U.S. Drug Safety
Regulation, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 53-54 (2006); see also Kessler & Vladeck, supra
note 11, at 485 (citing FDA's relative staffing of pre- and postmarket functions to
demonstrate the agency's heavy historical emphasis on premarket regulation).
82 See generally GAO, DRUG SAFETY, supra note 71 (evaluating the weakness of
FDA's powers during the postmarket period and proposing reforms); see also discus-
sion infra Part V.A.1 (describing FDA's limited powers during the postmarket period
prior to passage of FDAAA).
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tools-other than the "blunt instrument" 3 of revoking a previously
granted approval-with which to manage late-emerging risks. By
2005, FDA was employing 1000 people to review approval applications
for a few dozen new drugs each year, but only had 100 professional
employees engaged in postmarket monitoring of 3000 approved pre-
scription drugs plus about 8000 over-the-counter medications.84 This
front-loaded paradigm rested on a conceit that premarket studies can
identify a drug's material risks and benefits before it goes on the mar-
ket. This is now known not to be the case. "At the time of approval,
the benefit-risk profile of a typical drug is not fully understood. It is
only after approval and widespread use that the profile will become
fully understood."85 If approval is a necessary step tb discover a drug's
risks, then risks will not be known at the time of approval. That is the
intrinsic flaw in the 1962 evidentiary paradigm.
Randomized, controlled clinical trials86 (RCTs) occupy a central
position in that paradigm.87 When FDA was implementing the 1962
Drug Amendments, RCTs had only recently emerged as the preferred
method for evaluating medical treatments. The first modern, mul-
ticenter randomized, controlled clinical trial was reported in 1948.88
83 IOM, FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 23, at 153; see also discussion infra
Part V.G (discussing FDA's lack of authority, prior to FDAAA, to require labeling
changes to manage new risks discovered during the postmarket period).
84 Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 11, at 485.
85 IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 4.
86 The term "clinical trial" is variously defined but the common elements of most
definitions are as follows: The study is prospective, following study subjects forward in
time from a defined baseline point. FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 2; FURBERG &
FURBERG, supra note 60, at 11. The baseline point need not correspond to a particu-
lar calendar date but might be defined as a stage of illness that all subjects exhibit on
whichever dates they enter the study. FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 2. Concur-
rent groups of study subjects receive either an intervention (one or more treatments
that are under study) or a control (either a placebo or an alternative treatment with
which the intervention is being compared). If a clinical trial is randomized, subjects
are assigned randomly to receive either the intervention or the control. Id. at 2;
FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 11. There is a predefined primary question to
be answered and, at most, a limited number of predefined secondary questions that
are related to the primary question. FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 16-17.
87 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(ii) (2009) (calling for data from controlled
clinical studies in new drug applications).
88 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 1 (citing Streptomycin in Tuberculosis Trials
Comm., Med. Research Council, Streptomycin Treatment of Pulmonary Tuberculosis, 2
BRIT. MED. J. 768, 769-78 (1948)); Califf, supra note 25, at 496 (same). But see FRIED-
MAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 1 (noting the use of randomization via coin toss in a 1931
clinical trial, J.B. Amberson et al., A Clinical Trial of Sanocrysin in Pulmonary Tuberculo-
sis, 25 Am. REV. TUBERCULOSIS 401 (1931), which also was the first reported study to
use blinding).
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Until FDA began requiring RCTs, it was not uncommon to assess effi-
cacy by comparing people treated with a drug to historical controls-
that is, to people treated in earlier years with the then-standard care. 9
Safety data were not well standardized and sometimes consisted only
of laboratory and animal studies.90 Efficacy studies can be biased
when they rely on historical controls. For example, patients on a
newer drug may get well because of unrelated changes in patient care,
or their improvement may reflect unexplained trends in the preva-
lence and severity of disease.91 RCTs, which include contemporane-
ous control subjects, avoid these historical biases.
Randomization92 eliminates additional types of bias, such as allo-
cation bias that might arise if investigators picked people to receive
the intervention instead of the control and subliminally assigned
healthier-looking subjects to receive the intervention.93 Double-blind-
ing is an additional enhancement that eliminates ascertainment bias
(the tendency to perceive improvement in patients known to be
receiving the intervention) by keeping the investigators and subjects
unaware of their treatment assignments. 94 A trial can be an RCT with-
out being blinded. For example, blinding may be impossible in a trial
where patients are randomly assigned to receive psychoanalysis versus
a drug to treat their depression; people will know which one they
received.95 Blinding is feasible in most clinical drug trials, which typi-
cally compare one pill to another. Thus, in FDA drug studies, "RCT"
generally means a double-blinded RCT.
89 See generally Henry Sacks et al., Randomized Versus Historical Controls for Clinical
Trials, 72 Am. J. MED. 233 (1982) (providing a meta-analysis of results from RCTs and
trials that had used historical controls in contexts where both had been performed).
90 Lynne Kessler Lechter, Regulatory Overkill and the AIDS Patient, 1 ALB. L.J. Sci. &
TECH. 131, 145-46 (1991) (discussing deficiencies of premarket safety data in the
period after the 1938 Act but before the 1962 amendments).
91 See FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 48-49 (discussing an unexplained
decline in coronary heart disease in the general population over the past twenty years,
which could create a false appearance that new treatments are effective if they were
compared to historical controls).
92 For a definition of randomization, see supra note 86.
93 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 14-15.
94 Id. at 15.
95 Cf Harlan Weisman et al., Broader Post-Marketing Surveillance for Insights on Risk
and Effectiveness, in ROUNDTABLE ON EVIDENCE-BASED MED., INST. OF MED., THE LEARN-
ING HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 128, 130 (LeighAnne Olsen et al. eds.,
2007) [hereinafter IOM, LEARNING HEALTHCARE], available at http://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?recordid=11903 (noting the inherent difficulty in blinding certain
types of clinical trials).
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FDA's premarket evidentiary requirements for drugs include
preclinical investigations (laboratory and animal studies)96 followed
by three phases of clinical studies in humans. The required phase I
and phase II studies,97 though often referred to as "trials," are not
actually RCTs in a strict sense.98 Phase III drug trials truly are RCTs.99
FDA also may require RCTs for a subset of medical devices which, due
to their novelty and/or significant risk, fall under FDA's premarket
approval (PMA) requirements. 100 Devices that are less novel and risky
pass through a less-rigorous clearance process' 01 that generally does
not require full-fledged clinical trials, but does require premarket
research to support the risk classification and to validate any analytical
or clinical claims their sponsors plan to make about them.
Califf notes that "it was only in the 1970s that the clinical trial
became a widely-accepted tool for the biomedical enterprise."' 0 2 The
fact that FDA interpreted the 1962 amendments as requiring their
widespread use may have contributed to this growing acceptance in
the 1970s. Today, RCTs are regarded by many as the "gold stan-
dard"103 for evaluating new drugs. However, this statement is subject
96 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a) (8) (2009); see also Levitt et al., supra note 20, at 160.
97 See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING &. PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS, INST. OF MED.,
PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS 55-56 (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter
IOM, PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS], available at http://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?recordid=11623 (describing phase I and phase II studies); FRIEDMAN
ET AL., supra note 54, at 3-6 (describing and distinguishing the various phases of
clinical investigations).
98 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 3-5; see also supra note 86 (defining RCT).
99 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 5; IOM, PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS,
supra note 97, at 56.
100 See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2006); 21 C.F.R. §§ 814, 860.7 (2009); see also Howard M.
Holstein & Edward C. Wilson, Developments in Medical Device Regulation, in 2 FUNDA-
MENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 20, at 257, 282 (noting that evidentiary
standards for devices subject to premarket approval are potentially less rigorous than
for drugs, but that FDA often requires RCTs).
101 See FDCA §510(k), 21 U.S.C. § 360(k); 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.81-807.100; see also
Nagareda, supra note 3, at 8-12 (comparing and contrasting the evidentiary require-
ments for 510(k) and PMA devices).
102 Califf, supra note 25, at 496.
103 See, e.g., Weisman et al., supra note 95, at 130 ("Randomized clinical trials with
blinding are the gold standard for drug evaluations of safety and efficacy but may not
be possible in device studies."); Califf, supra note 25, at 496 ("As randomized con-
trolled trials have become the 'gold standard' for medical research, a complex regula-
tory structure for the conduct of clinical trials has emerged."); Jonathan B. Perlin &
Joel Kupersmith, Information Technology and the Inferential Gap, 26 HEALTH AFF. 192,
192 (2007) (noting that "[r]andomized controlled trials are the current gold stan-
dard of evidence development" but discussing limits to their generalizability to real-
world patient care); T. Pincus, Limitations of Randomized Controlled Clinical Trials to
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to certain qualifications. Because RCTs eliminate biases to the inter-
nal validity of study results (such as the allocation, ascertainment, and
historical biases mentioned earlier) they are correctly regarded as the
highest-quality evidence of drug efficacy.10 4 However, the same may
not be true with respect to drug safety,10 5 and it is increasingly clear
that RCTs may not provide a complete picture of a drug's effective-
ness.106 Efficacy (how well a drug works for carefully chosen trial sub-
jects in the ideal setting of a clinical trial) and effectiveness (how well
it works in real patients in the actual health-care setting) can be two
different things.107
C. Evidentiary Paths Not Taken in 1962
The perceived strength of medical evidence varies depending on
the study design. 08 Efforts to define a hierarchy of evidence generally
accord the highest ranking to RCTs and properly performed meta-
analyses of multiple RCTs.109 Just below this is evidence from well-
Depict Accurately Long-Term Outcomes in Rheumatoid Arthritis, 57 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR RHEU-
MATOLOGIE 46, 46 (1998) (noting that RCTs are regarded as the "gold standard" but
criticizing their limitations); David L. Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is
and What It Isn't, 312 BRIT. MED.J. 71, 72 (1996) (noting that while RCTs are the "gold
standard," some questions about therapy can be answered by other methods or may
be too time-sensitive to await trial results (internal quotation marks omitted)).
104 IOM, PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS, supra note 97, at 57 ("While random-
ized controlled trials are considered the gold standard for assessing efficacy, they
rarely provide all the information needed in clinical practice."); John Concato et al.,
Randomized, Controlled Trials, Observational Studies, and the Hierarchy of Research Designs,
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1887, 1887 (2000) ("Randomized, controlled trials ... have
become the gold standard for assessing the effectiveness of therapeutic agents.");
FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 17 ("[R]andomized controlled trials are the
gold standard for evaluating the efficacy of medical interventions.").
105 See infra Part II.
106 See infta Part IV.
107 Leslie L. Roos et al., Strengths and Weaknesses of Health Insurance Data Systems for
Assessing Outcomes, in IOM, MODERN METHODS, supra note 37, at 47, 50-51; see also
Pillans, supra note 62, at 700 (noting that real-world practice is "far removed from the
premarketing clinical trial conditions").
108 See U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE, GUIDE TO CLINICAL PREVENTrIvE SER
VICES (2d ed. 1996) (comparing the quality of evidence produced by various types of
study design); Evidence-Based Med. Working Group, Evidence-Based Medicine: A New
Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420, 2420-25 (1992) (same);
Sylvan B. Green & David P. Byar, Using Observational Data from Registries to Compare
Treatments: The Fallacy of Omnimetrics, 3 STAT. MED. 361, 361 (1984) (same).
109 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 42; Concato et al., supra note 104, at 1888.
But see Duh et al., supra note 63, at 32-33 (discussing potential flaws if meta-analyses
are not carefully conducted).
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designed controlled trials that lack randomization. 0 Farther down
in the rankings are various study designs"' that, collectively, are
called "observational studies." 112 These include individual case
reports (lowest in the hierarchy of evidence) describing, for example,
what happened to one patient who took a particular drug; case series
that compile multiple such reports; and uncontrolled experiments
that produce results too dramatic to be the product of chance (for
example, early uses of penicillin to treat bacterial disease). They also
include cross-sectional studies, case-control studies, cohort and regis-
try studies,' 13 which enjoy intermediate positions in the hierarchy of
evidence. The term "outcomes research" also is used to refer to obser-
vational studies that follow groups of patients over time to observe
their health outcomes or analyze (prospectively or retrospectively) fac-
tors that may contribute to those outcomes.11 4 Evidence from large,
well-designed cohort or case-control studies enjoys a fairly high rank-
ing, just below controlled trials that lack randomization.15
Concato et al. credit a landmark 1982 study' 1 6 with bolstering the
perceived superiority of RCTs." 7 That study identified a group of
observational studies that had overstated the effectiveness of drugs rel-
ative to results from RCTs. However, those observational studies had
110 See Concato et al., supra note 104, at 1888; supra note 108.
111 Concato et al., supra note 104, at 1888.
112 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 29.
113 For definitions of these terms, see Concato et al., supra note 104, at 1888;
FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 29-33. Cross-sectional studies examine a group
of patients at a single point in time without follow-up (for example, examining long-
term users of a particular drug and well-matched nonusers to measure differences in
their current health condition). Retrospective case-control studies compare "cases"
(people who now have a medical condition) and "controls" (people without the con-
dition), to explore whether differences in their past drug exposures or behaviors may
help explain their current health differences. Prospective cohort studies track groups
of people-sometimes very large groups-forward through time, recording data
about their characteristics, behaviors, exposures, and eventual health outcomes.
FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 29-33. Registry studies are similar to cohort
studies in that they are prospective studies, often using large electronic databases, of
patients diagnosed with a particular disease or who received a particular treatment, to
observe their eventual outcomes over the course of time. Id. at 33. Qualitative meth-
ods, such as surveys of patients' perception of their well-being after treatment, also are
used in observational research. Id.
114 Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, Outcomes Research Fact Sheet
(2000) [hereinafter AHRQ Fact Sheet], available at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/
outfact.htm.
115 Concato et al., supra note 104, at 1888 (citing U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK
FORCE, supra note 108).
116 Sacks et al., supra note 89, at 233-34.
117 Concato et al., supra note 104, at 1887.
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relied on historical controls.118 Well-designed observational studies
using contemporaneous control subjects can produce average results
that are "remarkably similar" to RCTs."t 9 Still, observational studies
can have problems, even when historical controls are not an issue.120
For example, retrospective studies that inquire into past events or
health conditions are subject to errors of recall, though this is not a
problem in prospective observational studies. 121 There can be alloca-
tion bias in observational studies that follow outcomes in patients who
were treated with a particular drug, since the choice of therapy was
not randomized.122 Patients and their doctors decide which drug to
take or whether to take a drug at all, and patients with particular prog-
nostic factors may disproportionately select that particular drug.'12 A
related issue is indication bias, in which doctors vary the choice of
drug depending on the severity of a patient's illness.124 This can
cause the drugs used in more severe cases to appear less effective.
Alternatively, there can be a "healthy patient" bias-a tendency of
insured, better-educated, and healthier people to take particular
drugs. The appearance, based on observational studies, that HRT
reduces heart-attack risk turned out simply to reflect the fact that
healthier, wealthier women (who have a lower risk of heart disease
than other women) were the ones who had access to doctors and
HRT.125 Careful study design (for example, making sure observa-
118 Sacks et al., supra note 89; Concato et al., supra note 104, at 1887.
119 Concato et al., supra note 104, at 1887, 1890, 1892 (basing conclusion on
ninety-nine studies in five treatment areas).
120 Allocation bias is an issue since patients in observational studies have not been
randomly assigned to receive the treatment under study; patients and their doctors
made the choice of which drug to take or whether to take a drug at all, and patients
with particular prognostic factors may disproportionately have chosen a particular
drug. FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 15, 35. A related issue is indication bias,
in which, among patients with a given disease, different drugs are prescribed depend-
ing on the severity of illness. This can cause the drugs used in more severe cases to
appear less effective. Id. at 35. However, there also can be a countervailing "healthy
patient" bias-a tendency of insured, healthier people to take particular drugs. Thus,
the appearance that hormone replacement therapy (HRT) reduced heart-attack risk
turned out simply to reflect the fact that healthier, wealthier women (who have a
lower risk of heart disease than other women) were the ones who had access to doc-
tors and HRT. Id. at 35.
121 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 35.
122 Id. at 15, 35.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 35.
125 Id. A similar bias created a false appearance that statins reduce the rate of
Alzheimer's disease; both phenomena (the use of statins and resistance to dementia)
are tied to higher education and wealth. Id.
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tional groups are well matched in terms of severity of disease, income,
and other prognostic factors) can help correct these problems. How-
ever, observational studies, even when well designed, can spot associa-
tions between events and outcomes but are not a good tool for
proving causation.126 Thus, they are useful for generating hypotheses
about what may be causing what,'27 but confirming these hypotheses
typically requires an RCT.
FDA's 1962 evidentiary paradigm, with its heavy reliance on
premarket RCTs, was influenced by these concerns, but it also can be
viewed as a response to the primitive state of 1960s information tech-
nology.128 Premarket RCTs may indeed have been the best way to
assess the risk-benefit characteristics of drugs under the technological
constraints of that day. "However, recent advances in information
technology have . . . fuel[ed] increased interest in the question of
whether alternative analytical methods might offer sufficient validity
to elevate observational analysis in the hierarchy of medical
knowledge."129
Observational research flowered after 1980 in response to several
stimuli. One was concern about regional disparities in healthcare
practices and outcomes in the United States.130 Another was adoption
of outcome-oriented accreditation standards by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations.' 3 ' The most signifi-
cant factor was improved information technology and "an era of large
volumes of data on platforms conducive to analyses."' 32 Modern
cohort and registry studies often rely on large administrative
databases, such as claims databases maintained by health insurers, and
large clinical databases. 33 Expanded availability and improved qual-
126 Id. at 36; see also Robert M. Califf, Evolving Methods: Alternatives to Large Random-
ized Control Trials, in IOM, LEARNING HEALTHCARE, supra note 95, at 84, 84-85 (dis-
cussing observational analysis of prospective clinical databases but noting, "no
amount of statistical analysis can substitute for randomization . . . when comparing
alternative approaches to diagnosis or treatment"); Duh et al., supra note 63, at 34
(discussing difficulties establishing causation in the association between HRT and
breast cancer).
127 Duh et al., supra note 63, at 34.
128 Evans & Flockhart, supra note 81, at 47.
129 Califf, supra note 126, at 84-85.
130 AHRQ, Fact sheet, supra note 114.
131 Fred D. Brenneman et al., Outcomes Research in Surgery, 23 WORLD J. SURGERY
1220 (1999).
132 Califf, supra note 126, at 95.
133 Brenneman et al., supra note 131, at 1220; see also PANEL ON PERFORMANCE
MEASUREs & DATA FOR PUB. HEALTH PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP GRANTS, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, HEALTH PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
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ity of these databases 134 fostered new approaches that can help reduce
the problems seen in historical-control studies.135 FDAAA calls for
observational studies to play an expanded role in FDA's regulatory
processes.136 This shift requires advanced information technology 37
that simply was not available when FDA was developing its 1962 evi-
dentiary paradigm.
II. LIMITATIONS OF THE OLD EVIDENTIARY PARADIGM
If RCTs are viewed as the "gold standard,"138 then greater use of
observational studies seemingly would weaken the evidence on which
FDA relies. This appearance is false. The clinical trial evidence on
which FDA has been basing its decisions is far weaker than many of us
understood. Much of what the public thought FDA was doing for the
past several decades, as it turns out, simply could not be done. FDA's
regulation of drugs was comprehensive only in the public's hopes and
imaginations. Expanding FDA's reliance on other forms of data will
strengthen, rather than weaken, the evidentiary basis for FDA's
decisions.
A. The Myth of the Premarket Safety Trial
One of the most common misconceptions about U.S. drug regu-
lation is the belief that FDA requires RCTs to confirm the safety and
efficacy of new drugs. This is almost never the case. Before FDA
approves a drug, the agency requires rigorous, hypothesis-driven
RCTs of efficacy, but not of safety. " [T] rials are generally not designed
for the purpose of assessing adverse effects. The scientific standards
that are used in evaluating an intervention for efficacy are rarely
employed when evaluating possible adverse effects."139
83-94 (Edward B. Perrin et al. eds., 1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?isbn=0309064368 (discussing administrative databases and their use in
observational research); Jed Weissberg, Use of Large System Databases, in IOM, LEARN-
ING HEALTHCARE, supra note 95, at 46 (describing observational research with a large
HMO clinical database).
134 Pillans, supra note 62, at 697.
135 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 50.
136 See discussion infra Part V.A.
137 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SENTI-
NEL INITIATIVE 6-7 (2008) [hereinafter FDA, SENTINEL INITIATIVE], available at http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/FDAsSentinellnitiative/UCM124701.pdf (noting that
information technology is key to modernizing FDA's drug safety framework).
138 See supra notes 103-04.
139 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 170-71.
20101
440 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:2
In 1983, FDA assessed the premarket studies of various drugs that
had accounted for 30% of FDA approvals between 1975 and 1981.140
The studies had taken an average of 8.2 years. Phase I and II studies
consumed roughly half that time and provided essentially all the infor-
mation that would be discovered about adverse effects before drug
approval. No additional adverse reactions were detected in phase III
studies, which were aimed at assessing efficacy.14 1 In subsequent
years, FDA took various steps to improve reporting of adverse events
during phase III trials. 14 2 Thus it has become common, in recent
years, to see attrition of promising new drug candidates after unex-
pected safety problems come to light during phase III trials. 14 3 Phase
III trials now play an important role in safety assessment even though
their primary focus is, and was intended to be, efficacy. Perhaps for
this reason, many people believe phase III trials are RCTs of safety as
well as efficacy.
A better description of a phase III drug trial is that it is an RCT of
drug efficacy, accompanied by a small observational study of adverse
events within the clinical trial population. Essential to the definition
of an RCT is that there is a predefined primary question to be
answered.144 The question often is framed as a testable hypothesis
(for example, that people who receive the interventional drug will
140 Melmon, supra note 37, at 143 (discussing FDA's 1983 survey).
141 Id.
142 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(vi) (2009) (describing safety information to be
included in a new drug application); see also CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REVIEWER GUIDANCE: CONDUCTING A CLINICAL SAFETY
REVIEW OF A NEW PRODUCT APPLICATION AND PREPARING A REPORT ON THE REVIEW
(2005) [hereinafter FDA, CONDUCTING A CLINICAL SAFETY REVIEW], available at http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guid-
ances/ucm072974.pdf (detailing how safety data and adverse event reports from
clinical trials are used and reported during FDA's review of a new drug application).
143 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INNOVA-
TION OR STAGNATION: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW
MEDICAL PRODUCTS, at ii (2004) [hereinafter FDA, INNOVATION OR STAGNATION],
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/Critical
PathIlnitiative/CriticalPathOpportunitiesReports/ucm 113411 .pdf; see also Robert M.
Califf, A Broad Perspective, in ROUNDTABLE ON TRANSLATING GENOMIC-BASED RESEARCH
FOR HEALTH, INST. OF MED., DIFFUSION AND USE OF GENOMIC INNOVATIONS IN HEALTH
AND MEDICINE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 3, 9 (Lyla M. Hernandez rapporteur, 2008) [here-
inafter IOM, DIFFUSION & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS], available at littp://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?recordid=12148 (discussing abandonment of torcetrapib during
phase III trials).
144 FRIEDMAN ET AL., sup-a note 54, at 16; see also FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note
60, at 108 (defining "statistical power" as the ability to detect prespecified interven-
tion effects).
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have a lower heart-attack rate than those receiving the control drug).
A predefined question is essential if a trial is to produce statistically
significant 45 results. The perils of post hoc analysis of trial data were
nicely demonstrated by investigators who went back and analyzed vari-
ous subgroups of patients within an old clinical trial data set. They
waggishly announced their "discovery" that patients born under the
sun signs Libra and Gemini had a higher risk of death when taking
the interventional drug, whereas other sun signs got a distinct benefit
from the drug.146 When a trial is not designed to study a question,
apparent answers may be spurious.
In addition to its primary question, an RCT also may address a
limited number of predefined secondary questions (for example,
whether the intervention reduces strokes as well as heart attacks, or
whether it reduces heart attacks not only in all subjects tested but also
among the female subjects) '4 7 The primary question is almost always
a question about drug efficacy.148 The same is generally true of the
secondary questions in phase III drug trials.14 9 In many cases, it would
be impossible to define specific, testable hypotheses about drug safety
in advance, since a given drug may produce many different types of
adverse events, many of which are unforeseeable.150 Evaluating safety
risks "requires knowledge, or at least tentative ideas, about what
effects might occur."' 5 ' Without testable safety hypotheses, there can
be no RCT of safety.
Dexfenfluramine, part of the "fen-phen" combination used in
treating obesity, produced reports of heart-valve abnormalities within
a year of its FDA approval and eventually was withdrawn 5 2 after mil-
lions of patients had taken it.'15 Premarket trials had not caught this
problem. With no expectation of heart-valve impacts, the trials had
not included echocardiography that might have detected them.154
145 If results are not statistically significant, it means that the observed difference
between people in the intervention and control groups could have arisen by chance.
FURBERC & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 107.
146 Id. at 112.
147 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 17.
148 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 70 ("Clinical trials are not often con-
ducted with the primary purpose of determining treatment safety.").
149 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 172 (noting that adverse events are seen as
secondary or even tertiary response variables).
150 Id. at 18, 171.
151 Id. at 132.
152 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 19-20.
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Even if FDA required RCTs of safety, it is unlikely the revealing
hypothesis would have been put forward in this instance. Even when
adverse effects are foreseen, the fact that one drug can have many
potential risks means that premarket RCTs of safety would need to test
a whole array of hypotheses (for example, hypotheses related to kid-
ney function, liver function, heart-valve status, impact on eyesight,
blood-clot risk, etc.).155 RCTs that attempt to test multiple hypotheses
may fail to yield statistically significant results unless they involve very
large numbers of research subjects. 15 6 This is why RCTs can address
only a limited number of primary and secondary questions.
Another problem concerns the ethics of safety-related RCTs. If
the suspicion of a particular drug-related risk is strong enough to gen-
erate a testable hypothesis, an RCT may well be unethical. 15 7 When
an important safety problem is suspected, such a trial would involve
deliberately exposing test subjects to possible harm. Its ethical accept-
ability would depend on the expected balance of benefits and
harms.15 8 In a recent guidance document, 15 9 FDA called for phase II
and III studies of type-2 diabetes drugs to examine specific safety-
related variables bearing on cardiovascular risk.160 The guidance rec-
ommends lengthening these trials from the typical three to six
months to a minimum of two years to improve detection of such
risks.161 It also calls for including subjects, such as elderly patients
and patients with kidney impairment, who are at higher risk of exper-
iencing cardiovascular events.162 "Until now, manufacturers had only
to show that their drugs reduced blood sugar levels."s63 That is, they
only tested efficacy hypotheses.
155 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 18.
156 See id. at 21, 123-25, 171, 307-08, 318; FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at
110.
157 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 18; FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 21.
158 See FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 18 (commenting that "rigorous, convinc-
ing demonstration of serious toxicity is usually not achieved because it is generally
thought unethical to continue a study to the point at which a drug has been conclu-
sively shown to be more harmful than beneficial"); see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2009)
and related FDA regulations at 21 C.F.R. § 56.111 (2009) (requiring minimal risks to
subjects and a reasonable relation of risks to anticipated benefits of the research).
159 FDA, DIABETEs MELLITUS, supra note 72.
160 Id. at 3.
161 Id. at 4.
162 Id. at 3.
163 Susan J. Landers, FDA Wants Closer Scrutiny of New Diabetes Drugs, AM. MED.
NEWS, Jan. 19, 2009, at 17, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009/
01/12/hlsa0l 12.htm.
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Ethics of this new guidance are delicate. In general, "any partici-
pant for whom the intervention is known to be harmful should not be
admitted to the trial."164 In this instance, it may be justifiable to
include high-risk patients and lengthen their exposure to experimen-
tal therapies, since the suspicion of cardiovascular risk is based on
experience with the broader class of diabetes drugs 65 rather than
being a particularized suspicion about the test drugs themselves.
Moreover, the at-risk patients in the trial have a potential for direct,
personal benefit as new therapies become available, since their disease
is chronic in nature and will require ongoing treatment after the trial
concludes.166
As a general matter, FDA's premarket studies do not include rig-
orous hypothesis-testing RCTs of drug safety. Instead, FDA requires
what amount to small, premarket observational studies of adverse
events among the people who participate in trials. FDA requires
reporting of adverse events seen in the trial subjects.16 7 All serious
events, like deaths or hospitalizations, must be reported whether or
not they are thought to be drug-related; the goal is to spot unknown
or unexpected associations as well as those that were anticipated.16
This inclusiveness makes sense, given the unpredictable nature of
adverse events, but it generates a large flow of data, making it hard to
spot associations that really may be drug-related.169 Confirming causa-
tion would require an RCT. The trial population is too small to pro-
vide even high-quality observational evidence of safety.170
The best available estimate of drug-related risks, at the time a
drug is approved, may be the difference in reported adverse events
between the control group and the intervention group in the phase
III trial. 171 Such estimates generally lack statistical significance and
are subject to various confounding factors. For example, in one beta-
blocker trial, 66% of the group receiving the placebo reported shortness
of breath, even though only 6% of those people had any prior history
164 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 35.
165 See Steven E. Nissen & Kathy Wolski, Effect of Rosiglitazone on the Risk of Myocar-
dial Infarction and Death from Cardiovascular Causes, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2457, 2458
(2007) (discussing cardiovascular risks of the diabetes drug Avandia).
166 See FDA, DIABETES MELLITUS, supra note 72, at 2.
167 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 180.
168 FURBERG& FURBERG, supra note 60, at 69.
169 Id. at 69-70.
170 See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
171 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 70.
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of this problem.' 72 Such results can cast doubt on the reliability of
events reported by the people who actually were taking the drug. Ask-
ing trial subjects questions about adverse events may bias their percep-
tions of whether events occurred. 73 Adverse event reports tend to be
unsystematic, without consistent classifications and often lacking data
on the severity (as opposed to the frequency) of events.174 Intrastudy
inconsistencies are not uncommon.175 When publishing trial results,
there is a tendency to downplay or even to fail to report adverse event
rates.176 The fact that safety findings tend to be of low evidentiary
quality may contribute to this underreporting. Data on why subjects
terminated their participation in a trial also are poorly reported. 77
Thus, it may be unknown whether people who quit a study did so
because of side effects that did not rise to the level of a reportable
adverse event.
B. Methodological Limitations of Premarket Safety Studies
Key methodological limitations of premarket safety studies
include inadequate size, inadequate duration, and problems with the
generalizability of results.178 FDA has not concealed these limita-
tions179 but they remain poorly understood by the public, physicians,
and academics.
1. Trial Size
Premarket drug trials are simply too small to detect rare adverse
events, yet even rare risks can generate large numbers of casualties
once a drug is marketed to millions of people.180 The sample size for
a clinical trial-how many subjects need to be included in the study to
172 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 171 (citing Robert P. Byington, Beta-Blocker
Heart Attack Trial Research Group, Beta-Blocker Heart Attack Trial: Design, Methods, and
Baseline Results, 5 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 382 (1984)).
173 Id. at 172-76 (discussing difficulties in ascertaining the rate of adverse events
in a trial).
174 NAT'L CANCER POLICY FORUM, INST. OF MED., DEVELOPING BIOMARKER-BASED
TOOLS FOR CANCER SCREENING, DIAGNOSIS, AND TREATMENT: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 54
(Margie Patlak & Sharyl Nass rapporteurs, 2006) [hereinafter IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED
Toots], available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=11768 (report-
ing presentation of Dr. Naomi Aronson).
175 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 172.
176 Id. at 171; see also FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 70 (discussing studies
that show underreporting of adverse events in publications resulting from trials).
177 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 70.
178 See FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 182; Pillans, supra note 62, at 700.
179 Melmon, supra note 37, at 142.
180 IOM, FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 23, at 37-38.
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produce statistically significant results-is based on the primary ques-
tion181 which, in a phase III drug trial, is a question about drug effi-
cacy. It typically requires a larger sample size to answer questions
about safety than it takes to answer questions about a drug's efficacy.
Thus premarket trials, which are designed to provide statistically sig-
nificant results about efficacy, may fail to shed much light on safety.
The required sample size for a clinical trial depends on several
factors. One of the most important factors is the underlying event
rate.' 82 Suppose the primary question is whether the interventional
drug reduces the rate of heart attacks. The event rate is how often
people in the study would be expected to have a heart attack under
ordinary circumstances (that is, in the absence of taking the interven-
tional drug). It requires a larger sample size to study a rare event than
a common one, since the question can only be studied as the event
actually occurs.183 The sample size also depends on how dramatically
the interventional drug is expected to change the underlying event
rate.' 84 Fewer test subjects are needed if the interventional drug is
expected to cut heart-attack rates in half, than if it is expected to cut
heart-attack rates by 5%. This is simple common sense: it is harder-
it requires more subjects-to be sure of a minor change than a dra-
matic one.
Sample size is extremely sensitive to these two variables: the
underlying event rate and the expected change caused by taking the
interventional drug. Here is the problem with safety evaluations: the
underlying event rate for the primary efficacy question in a trial (for
example, the heart-attack rate) may be quite different from the rate of
possible drug-related adverse events (for example, drug-related kidney
failure). Study subjects likely would be chosen to be in the trial
because of their high risk of heart disease and might, for example,
have an expected heart-attack rate of 20% (1-in-5) over the duration
of the trial. The potential rate of drug-related kidney failure might be
much lower, for example 1-in-10,000 or even 1-in-100,000. One or two
thousand subjects may well be enough to give statistically significant
answers to the efficacy question. If an adverse event has a 1-in-10,000
incidence rate, around 30,000 interventional subjects would be
needed to have a 95% probability of spotting even one case of it;
181 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 16; see also id. at 174-75 ("[I]nvestigators
calculate sample sizes on the basis of primary response variables, not as a result of
estimates of adverse effect frequency.").
182 Id. at 103 fig. 7-2.
183 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 108.
184 Id.
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65,000 would be needed to spot three cases. 1 85 Including control sub-
jects, a safety trial would need to be much larger than the usual phase
III trial, which typically includes 600-3000 subjects.186 To detect the
1-in-20,000 chance of serious liver toxicity in bromfenac, an NSAID
that stayed on the market for less than a year in 1997-1998, an esti-
mated 60,000 subjects would need to have been exposed to the drug
in trials.18 7 By one estimate, three million trial subjects would have
been required to detect the risk of aplastic anemia with the antibacter-
ial drug chloramphenicol.' 88 "Even if assessment of adverse effects is
a major objective of the study, a trial's size will not generally be
increased in an effort to improve the likelihood of reliably detecting
such effects."18 9
2. Trial Duration
Clinical trials are poor instruments for detecting long-term
risks.190 Phase III trials typically last one to four years and may include
1000 to 10,000 patients of whom only a few hundred patients typically
receive the new drug for more than three to six months.19' "[O]nly
the most profound and overt risks and side effects that occur immedi-
ately after taking a drug can be detected" (and then only if the side
effect occurs fairly frequently, such as once in one hundred times the
drug is taken).192 FDA increasingly is required to assess products
intended for long-term use as America's disease burden shifts from
acute, infectious diseases toward chronic health conditions. Tens of
millions of Americans regularly consume drugs for chronic conditions
like depression, arthritis, diabetes, high cholesterol, and osteo-
porosis.193 Yet very few clinical trials last more than four or five
185 Melmon, supra note 37, at 142; accord FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 17.
186 IOM, FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 23, at 36.
187 Id. at 38.
188 Melmon, supra note 37, at 142; see also The Merck Manuals Online Medical
Library, Chloramphenicol, http://www.merck.com/mmpe/secl4/chl70/ch170d.
html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) (characterizing the risk of irreversible idiosyncratic
aplastic anemia as less than 1:25,000 and noting that due to these effects, chloram-
phenicol is no longer the drug of choice except in serious infections caused by a few
multidrug-resistant pathogens that still respond to this drug).
189 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 175; FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at
18.
190 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 19.
191 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 181; IOM, PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRoRS,
supra note 97, at 56.
192 IOM, PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRoRs, supra note 97, at 56.
193 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 19; Duh et al., supra note 63, at 31.
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years.194 A short-duration trial obviously cannot assess risks and bene-
fits, thirty or forty years hence, of giving cholesterol-lowering statins to
eight-year-olds, as recommended in a recent set of clinical guide-
lines.19 5 Assessing safety via RCT would require a multi-decade trial.
Americans have never been patient about long regulatory delays
in getting new medical products approved. The average time from
drug creation to FDA approval was two-and-a-half years before the
1962 amendments. 19 6 By 1980, the lag had increased to seven to thir-
teen years197 and a series of governmental studies attributed the delay
largely to the 1962 amendments.' 9 In 1984, Congress passed the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments' 99 to mitigate the impact these long
delays were having on drug patent life. Between 1987 and 1992, FDA
implemented several policies aimed at reducing delays that were alleg-
edly hindering access to promising new drugs for AIDS and cancer. 200
Recent years have seen patients pressing federal courts for relief when
FDA's clinical trial process delays access to desired, unapproved thera-
pies. 201 Clinical trials are too short to answer questions about long-
term risks, but they already seem too long to patients desperate for
new therapeutic options.202
194 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 19.
195 Alan Zarembo, Use of Statins in Children Debated, L.A. TIMES,July 9, 2008, at A13.
196 Lechter, supra note 90, at 157-58.
197 Roberts & Bodenheimer, supra note 14, at 586 (citing H. SUBCOMM. ON Sa.,
RESEARciH & TECH. OF THE COMM. ON Sc. & TECH., 96TH CONG., REPORT ON THE FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION PROCESS FOR APPROVING NEW DRUGS 3 (Comm. Print
1980)).
198 See Lechter, supra note 90, at 158; Roberts & Bodenheimer, supra note 14, at
589-96.
199 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
200 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (2009) (addressing the treatment IND mechanism); New
Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated Approval, 57
Fed. Reg. 58,942 (Dec. 11, 1992); Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs
Through a Parallel Track Mechanism for People With AIDS and Other HIV-Related
Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250 (Apr. 15, 1992).
201 See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Gunvalson v. PTC Therapeutics, Inc., No.
08-3559, 2008 WL 4003377 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2008).
202 See generally IOM, FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 23, at 122 (discussing the
view that patients, particularly those with fatal diseases, should not be hindered in
accessing drugs they wish to try).
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3. Generalizability
Clinical trial results often are not generalizable to the larger pop-
ulation that will consume a drug once it is approved. 2 0 3 Real patients
may be younger, older, healthier, sicker, or more or less at risk than
the carefully chosen trial subjects on whom new drugs are tested. If a
treatment depends on the skill with which it is administered (for
example, an implantable medical device where outcomes vary
depending on the surgeon's skill) or on follow-up care (such as close
monitoring to detect adverse events before they inflict serious injury),
clinical trials may give unduly rosy assessments of its performance in
routine clinical settings.
David Eddy points out that all study designs, including RCTs,
have biases; the biases are simply different for different study
designs.204 RCTs reduce biases to the internal validity of a study-
biases that might make the interventional drug look better than it
actually is in the setting of the clinical trial.205 Internal biases include
the allocation and ascertainment biases discussed earlier, which
randomization and blinding help eliminate. 206 In contrast, general-
izability goes to the external validity of study results-whether condi-
tions in the trial are biased relative to the external clinical setting
where patients, medical techniques, and other factors may be differ-
ent.207 Certain observational study designs, such as large cohort or
case-control studies that sample data from a large number of patients
in various healthcare settings, are superior to RCTs in avoiding biases
to external validity.2 08 Large prospective registries that track people
who take a drug once it is approved are more representative of the
real population than limited-eligibility RCTs.209 The notion that
RCTs have fewer biases than observational studies is inaccurate; they
reduce internal biases.
Clinical trials admit subjects who are, on average, less likely to
suffer adverse events than other people.2 10 High-risk patients are
deliberately excluded from trials 211 both for commercial reasons (to
203 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 37.
204 David M. Eddy, Should We Change the Rules for Evaluating Medical Technologies?,
in IOM, MODERN METHODS, supfa note 37, at 117, 124-26.
205 Id. at 124.
206 See discussion supra Part I.
207 Eddy, supra note 204, at 124.
208 Id. at 125.
209 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supTa note 54, at 50.
210 Id. at 37; see also id. at 181 ("People most likely to develop adverse effects are
generally excluded from clinical trials.").
211 Id.
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make the interventional drug look good) and for ethical reasons (to
minimize risks to research subjects). A Finnish study looked at 400
patients hospitalized for gastric ulcer and asked which of the patients
would have met eligibility criteria to participate in a typical prospec-
tive drug trial.212 Seventy-one per cent of the highest-risk patients
(defined as those who, over a five to seven year period, eventually died
or experienced serious complications from their ulcers) would have
been excluded from the typical clinical drug trial.21 3 FDA's recent
guidance calling for higher-risk subjects to be included in diabetes
drug trials214 is an exception to the usual rule, which is that drugs are
approved based on small observational safety studies (clinical trial
adverse event statistics) in a carefully selected population of low-risk
patients.
A related point is that FDA conceives drug safety215 as a benefit-
risk ratio: a drug is "safe" if its benefits compare favorably to its
risks.216 If the trial subjects are more likely than other patients to
experience benefits from taking the drug, then its benefit-risk ratio will
be overstated and so will be its safety.21 7 Suppose a drug is expected
to reduce rate of heart attacks by 20%. The trial eligibility criteria
212 See I. Kidridinen et al., What Fraction of Hospital Ulcer Patients Is Eligible for Pro-
spective Drug Thals?, 186 SCANDINAVIAN J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 73 (1991).
213 Id. at 75.
214 FDA, DIABETES MELLITUS, supra note 72; see discussion supra Part II.A.
215 SeeFDCA § 505(d), 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006) (requiring a drug to be "safe for
use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed
labeling thereof').
216 D. Throckmorton, Acting Deputy Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research,
Presentation, Efficacy Biomarkers: Efficacy/Risk Assessment, at slide 4 (Oct. 6, 2005) (on
file with author); see also CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E2E PHARMACOVICILANCE PLANNING 2 (2005), availa-
ble at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnfor-
mation/Guidances/ucm073107.pdf ("The decision to approve a drug is based on its
having a satisfactory balance of benefits and risks within the conditions specified in
the product labeling."); CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 6010.3, at § 1 (2004), [hereinafter
CDER, MAPP 6010.3] available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
ReportsManualsForms/StaffPoliciesandProcedures/ucm08Ol21.pdf7; INT'L CONFER-
ENCE ON HARMONISATION OF TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF PHARM.
FOR HUMAN USE, Doc. No. ICH E3, GUIDELINE FOR INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE AND CON-
TENT OF CLINICAL STUDY REPORTS 35 (1996), available at http://www.emea.europa.eu/
pdfs/human/ich/013795en.pdf (stating that "the relationship of risks and benefits
should be briefly summarized and discussed" when making conclusions about a
drug's efficacy and safety).
217 See David M. Kent & Rodney A. Hayward, Limitations ofApplying Summary Results
of Clinical Trials to Individual Patients: The Need for Risk Stratification, 298 JAMA 1209,
1209 (2007) ("There is growing awareness that the results of randomized clinical tri-
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select subjects who are at high risk of heart attack (for example, a 40%
annual risk of suffering a heart attack). For these people, the drug
offers an eight-percentage-point reduction (20% x 40%) in heart-
attack risk. This eight-point reduction is a large benefit and compares
favorably to the drug's small risk of adverse events, so the drug is
deemed safe. It may not be safe for patients at lower risk of having a
heart attack. A patient with a 5% heart-attack risk can only expect to
get a one-point reduction in that risk (20% x 5%). This one-point
benefit may not compare favorably to the drug's risks. Drug safety
depends not only on a patient's level of risk for adverse effects, but on
the patient's level of risk for the condition the drug is intended to
treat.218 Trial subjects tend to differ from other patients in both these
risk factors.
The generalizability of trial results can be improved by making
certain changes to the trial design.219 However, when the purpose of
a trial is to generate data to support an application for FDA approval,
there are limits to how much generalizability can be attained. Exclu-
sion criteria for a phase III drug trial serve various objectives of which
generalizability is only one. Other objectives include complying with
FDA's ethical requirement that risks to research subjects be mini-
mized, 220 and selecting subjects in whom efficacy can be tested clearly
and expeditiously. As a result, phase III drug trials are susceptible to
problems with generalizability.
III. THE OLD PARADIGM: REPAIR OR REPLACE?
Even today, faith in the old paradigm runs deep. There is a ten-
dency to assume that more evidence development means more
premarket evidence development-as if that were the only methodolog-
ical possibility.221 In response to drug safety problems one often hears
calls for more premarket clinical trials, longer trials, and tighter regu-
latory scrutiny of trial data before new products go on the market-
als might not apply in a straightforward way to individual patients, even those within
the trial.").
218 Id. at 1209.
219 See FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 19-20 (discussing large simple trials in
which characterization of research subjects at entry is done according to broader, less
detailed criteria); Califf, supra note 126, at 85-86 (discussing practical clinical trials).
220 21 C.F.R. § 56.111 (2009).
221 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 43, at 3 (discussing a "call for further information
(and further delay) in the FDA process as a precondition for federal preemption").
Generating further information entails delay only under a presumption that the infor-
mation is generated prior to approval. Postmarket evidence development would not
delay consumer access to new products.
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that is, to keep the same paradigm but apply it more thoroughly.
Conducting more and longer clinical trials might be the solution, if
the problem were simply a lack of trial data. Two cases that may fit
this description are: (1) off-label use of drugs,222 and (2) laboratory-
developed tests (LDTs) that are not subject to FDA's device clearance
or PMA processes.223 In both cases, there are genuine gaps in data
and it is at least plausible to call for additional premarket trials as a
way to improve patient safety (although, frankly, it is not clear off-
label use injures patients at a rate disproportionate to its share of over-
all prescriptions written,224 nor are there data substantiating that
222 Pillans, supra note 62, at 700 (noting lack of trial data on off-label use). Off-
label use involves prescribing FDA-approved products for novel indications (or to new
patient subpopulations) that were not tested in the trials that served as the basis for
product labeling and approval. See FDA, SENTINEL INITIATIVE, supra note 137, at 5;
IOM, FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 23, at 39, 122; see also Rebecca Dresser, The
Curious Case of Off Label Use, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May/June 2007, at 9, 9 (providing an
overview and statistics on off-label use); BarbaraJ. Evans, What Will It Take to Reap the
Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 753, 783-85 (2006) (dis-
cussing special problems of off-label use of drugs and diagnostic tests designed for use
together); Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label
Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 969-71 (2007) (discussing
risks and calling for informed consent when drugs are used off-label); David C. Radley
et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED.
1021 (2006) (providing empirical data on off-label prescribing).
223 Naomi Aronson, Assessing Technology for Use in Health and Medicine, in IOM,
DIFFUSION & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 29, 30-31 (noting that clinical
trials are not the norm in evaluating diagnostic tests). Laboratory-developed tests
(formerly called "home-brew" tests) are regulated under the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263(a) (2006)); see also 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 (1995)
(CLIA regulations). Most LDTs are not subject to FDA regulation and, though they
receive some internal validation by the laboratories that offer them, are not required
to submit data on safety and effectiveness for prior review by an external regulator.
See SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
ENHANCING THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTS 10-11 (2000) [hereinafter SACGT,
ENHANCING OVERSIGHT], available at http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/sacgt/reports/
oversight report.pdf; SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SoC'v,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TEST-
ING 65-67 (2008) [hereinafter SACGHS, U.S. OVERSIGHT], available at http://
oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/reports/SACGHS-oversight-report.pdf; TASK FORCE
ON GENETIC TESTING,JOINT NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH-DEP'T OF ENERGY WORKING GROUP
ON ETHICAL, LEGAL, & SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH, PROMOTING
SAFE AND EFFECTIVE GENETIC TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES, at ch. 2 (Neil A. Holtz-
man & Michael S. Watson eds., 1997) [hereinafter NIH-DOE, SAFE GENE TESTING],
available at http://www.genome.gov/10001733.
224 Concern about off-label use ultimately rests on a presumption that on-label
uses (which have been tested in clinical trials) offer a superior risk-benefit ratio to off-
label uses (which have not been so tested). However, a 2003 study found that the risk-
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LDTs are causing diagnostic errors or patient injuries).225 Another
example was FDA's recent guidance on diabetes drug trials.226 In that
case, there was a specific, identifiable gap in trial data that could be
addressed through relatively small changes to the size, length, and
exclusion criteria of clinical trials; these changes appear to be ethically
justifiable. Beyond special cases such as these, it is problematic to
require more, bigger, and longer premarket trials.
A new meningococcal conjugate vaccine, approved by FDA in
2005, suggests how big trials might have to be to detect safety
problems. Given the devastating consequences of contracting menin-
gitis, which can cause death or serious and permanent disability, vacci-
nation of all adolescents was recommended and 5.7 million doses of
the new vaccine were distributed during the first fifteen months after
approval.227 In that same period, there were fifteen spontaneous
reports of Guillain-Barr6 syndrome, which can cause paralysis or
benefit ratio for untested therapies entering phase I oncology studies was not clearly
worse than the risk-benefit ratios of many FDA-approved chemotherapeutic agents.
These wholly untested chemotherapies, in many instances, were just as safe and effec-
tive as FDA-approved therapies that had successfully passed through all three phases
of clinical trials. Manish Agrawal & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Ethics of Phase I Oncology Stud-
ies: Reexamining the Arguments and Data, 290 JAMA 1075, 1077 (2003). A recent study
estimated that 21% of the 725 million annual prescriptions written in the United
States were for off-label use. IOM, FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 23, at 39. A
2006 study found just over 20% of prescriptions were off-label with statistics varying
significantly depending on the class of drug. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-08-835, PRESCRIPTION DRUCS: FDA's OVERSIGHT OF THE PROMOTION OF DRUGS
FOR OFF-LABEL USES 2 (2008) (citing Radley et al., supra note 222). Only 15% of off-
label uses actually lack any supporting data. Radley et al., supra note 222, at 1023.
For all uses of FDA-approved drugs (on- and off-label), it is estimated that only 60% of
prescriptions written deliver their desired therapeutic benefits. Tim Peakman & Steve
Arlington, Putting the Code to Work: The Promise of Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacoge-
nomics, 2 DRUc DISCOVERY WORLD 35, 36 (2001) (stating a weighted average across
various classes of drugs). Seven percent produce serious drug-related injuries or
death. Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized Patients: A
Meta-Analysis of Prospective Studies, 279 JAMA 1200, 1202 (1998). The remaining third
(that is the total drugs prescribed, minus the 60% that produce benefits, minus the
7% that produce harms) reflect non-response. There are no comparable statistics
relating specifically to unsubstantiated off-label uses, so it is not known whether off-
label uses account for a disproportionate share of overall drug-related injuries and
deaths.
225 SACGHS, U.S. OVERSIGHT, supra note 223, at 32. Note, however, that CLIA
does not require reporting of adverse events with LDTs. Absence of reports may
imply a lack of adverse events, or it may simply mean that events are not being
reported. Id.
226 FDA, DIABETES MELLITUS, supra note 72.
227 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Proceedings,
Sentinel Network Public Meeting 67-68 (Mar. 7, 2007) (statement of Dr. Richard
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death. 2 28 In 2007, FDA heard testimony that available postmarket
databases were simply too small to answer whether there may be a
causal connection between the vaccine and Guillain-Barre syndrome.
Those databases allowed study of 100,000 patients who had taken the
vaccine after its approval. In that 100,000-person population, not a
single case of Guillain-Barr6 had been observed. 229 Yet, obviously,
100,000 interventional subjects is a larger population than could have
been included in a premarket drug trial.
A clinical trial that administered 100,000 doses presumably would
have had to involve twice that many participants, some receiving the
new product and some serving as controls. Enrolling 200,000 people
in a clinical trial would entail major costs and delays. More problem-
atic, it might require a whole new ethic of compulsory research partic-
ipation, since this level of trial enrollment may be unachievable under
current ethical norms of voluntary consent. Even if 200,000 partici-
pants could have been recruited, the trial might not have detected any
instances of Guillain-Barr6; had it done so, it likely would have only
detected one or two events-too few to suggest whether the Guillain-
Barr6 was vaccine-related or just a background occurrence of this very
rare disorder. 230 Even when investigators are "fortunate" enough to
observe a serious adverse event, they may dismiss it as a fluke.231 Both
the scale and the ethics of today's clinical trials leave them inherently
unable to wield rare risks. "Generally, drugs cannot confidently be
linked to safety problems until they have been tested in tens of
thousands to hundreds of thousands of people."23 2 In practical terms,
this means many risks will be detected only in the postmarket
period.233
Extending the length of phase III trials also poses problems, other
than the obvious one of delaying access to new therapies. FDA consid-
ered lengthening phase III trials after its 1983 survey.234 Data showed
premarket studies were exaggerating adverse events associated with




230 IOM, FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 23, at 106 (noting that, during
clinical trials, "rare events may not surface at all [and] if they do, it is at a rate so low
that one cannot distinguish a drug-caused event from one expected by chance").
231 See FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 174.
232 IOM, EMERGING SAFETY SCIENCE, supra note 80, at 2.
233 See IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 12 (reporting presenta-
tion of Dr. Steven Galson) (noting that safety knowledge has "exponential growth" in
the postmarket period when sample size increases and more data becomes available).
234 See Melmon, supra note 37, at 143 (discussing FDA's 1983 survey).
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short-term drug use and underestimating risks of long-term use.235
FDA concluded that phase III trials should be lengthened. Melmon
has noted that "this conclusion was invalidated by their own data."2 36
FDA's data showed that phase III trials suffer high drop-out rates,
above 30% in trials lasting more than twelve to eighteen months. The
people most likely to drop out of a study, naturally, would tend to be
those experiencing unpleasant side effects. Extending a trial could
have the effect of winnowing out the subjects in whom adverse events
are most likely to appear.237 Ironically, long clinical trials may give
false comfort about safety by assessing long-term risks in the subgroup
of subjects most resistant to adverse effects. Based on this, Melmon
recommended postmarket surveillance (rather than longer premarket
trials) employing a combination of methodologies that would include
observational studies.238 This is the approach FDAAA embraced239
after many years' delay.
Lengthening trials to confirm safety also raises ethical concerns.
Is it ethical to continue a clinical trial to gather additional safety obser-
vations, past the point when efficacy has been shown?240 Even at the
start of a trial, when it is not known whether the intervention or con-
trol is more effective, many clinicians regard it as ethically problem-
atic to assign trial subjects at random to receive the control drug.241
Once there is clear evidence that the interventional drug is more
effective than the control, it would be highly questionable to continue
235 Id.
236 Id. at 144.
237 Id.
238 Id.; see alsoJoiNr COMM'N ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG USE, supra note 40 (making
similar recommendations in 1980).
239 See discussion infra Part V.A.
240 This discussion presumes that efficacy has been proved based on clinically
meaningful endpoints. New drugs often are approved based on surrogate endpoints
for efficacy. For example, a drug might be shown to reduce cholesterol readings (a
surrogate endpoint) without showing that it actually improves clinically meaningful
health outcomes (such as the number of heart attacks, strokes, or deaths). See
FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 61-64. When efficacy is established relative to a
surrogate endpoint, there are ongoing questions about the drug's true efficacy. See
id. at 63-64 (discussing an osteoporosis drug that improved bone density (the surro-
gate endpoint), but actually caused a significantly higher risk of fractures (the true
endpoint) when taken for three years). Such questions could justify extending the
clinical trial to confirm efficacy, in which case it would be ethically acceptable to con-
tinue studying safety while efficacy was being confirmed.
241 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 48.
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subjecting control subjects to the less-effective control drug.2 4 2 A
clear finding of effectiveness typically is grounds to halt a trial or con-
vert all subjects over to the more effective treatment. Control subjects
likely would drop out of the study if informed of the efficacy differ-
ence, 243 yet failing to inform them would violate informed consent.
Once control subjects are switched over to the interventional drug (or
if they drop out after being told about the efficacy difference), it no
longer would be possible to gather comparative statistics on adverse
events in the intervention versus control groups. The resulting safety
data would be equivalent to a small, uncontrolled observational study
of subjects taking the interventional drug. Even if informed control
subjects did not drop out of the trial, subsequent safety comparisons
would be of dubious quality since their adverse event reports no
longer would be double-blind.
There are two main alternatives for studying the rare risks that
remain undetected at the point when a phase III trial has established
efficacy. The first approach, just discussed, is to conduct further
clinical trials (either by delaying approval and extending phase III
premarket trials, or as a phase IV clinical trial after the product is
approved). The second approach is to go ahead and approve the
drug and conduct postmarket surveillance (observational studies of
adverse events in patients who actually take the drug). FDAAA calls
for the creation of a large health data network to support this latter
approach. 244
An example suggests the power of this new approach. Prior to
FDAAA, FDA had been using a very weak form of postmarket observa-
tional study.24 5 This approach, which will continue in use after
FDAAA but be supplemented with additional methods, relies on
largely voluntary246 mechanisms247 for reporting new safety problems
242 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 29 (discussing the view that withholding
a "proven beneficial" intervention may violate the research ethical standards of the
Declaration of Helsinki).
243 John E. Wennberg, What is Outcomes Research?, in IOM, MODERN METHODS,
supra note 37, at 33, 39 (noting "the unwillingness of informed patients to accept
randomization"); see also Weisman et al., supra note 95, at 132 (commenting on sub-
jects' unwillingness to accept randomization as causing problems with enrollment in
postmarket drug trials which involve clinically available drugs).
244 See infra Part V.A.2.
245 See IOM, EMERGING SAFETY SCIENCE, supra note 80, at 74-75 (reporting presen-
tation of Dr.June S. Almenoff); Duh et al., supra note 63, at 31; Pillans, supra note 62,
at 696-98 (discussing FDA's pre-FDAAA postmarket safety reporting systems and
weaknesses of the data they provide).
246 Wood et al., supra note 64, at 1851.
247 21 C.F.R. § 314.80-.81 (2009).
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seen in patients taking approved drugs. This approach is estimated to
detect only 1-10% of all adverse drug reactions248 and may detect
them with long delays. Vioxx was approved in May 1999 and was vol-
untarily removed from the market by its manufacturer sixty-five
months later, in September 2004.249 In 2007, FDA heard testimony
that the Vioxx problem could have been detected much sooner if
more systematic surveillance had been conducted using modern
database technology.2 5 0 Observational studies in an insurance claims
database (which included seven million persons, some of whom hap-
pened to be taking Vioxx) showed that it would have been possible to
detect the drug's cardiovascular risks thirty-four months after sales
began. With claims data for 100 million people, the problem could
have been spotted in fewer than three months.251 If FDA had had the
necessary data networks in place to do large-scale observational stud-
ies in 1999, all of the people killed or injured by Cox-2 painkillers
after August 1999 (i.e., three months after Vioxx went on sale) might
have been spared. This is much faster than a phase III or phase IV
clinical trial-even a very large one-could have detected the risk.
Relying on postmarket observational studies to detect rare risks
may be efficient, but is it ethical? It entails approving drugs after ordi-
nary phase III trials, knowing that patients who subsequently take the
drug may be exposed to rare, as-yet-undetected risks. That seems
wrong, until one considers the alternative, which is to extend phase III
trials in hope of detecting these risks before products go on the mar-
ket. Either way, human beings are going to be exposed to rare, unde-
tected risks. It is merely a question of who will be exposed: will it be
patients (who have voluntarily chosen to be treated with an effective
drug in the expectation of receiving personal therapeutic benefits) or
will it be test subjects (who altruistically expose themselves to risks to
promote the safety of future patients other than themselves)? Relying
on postmarket observational studies actually seems the more ethical
choice since it internalizes the remaining, unknown risks to the peo-
248 Frontline Interview with Paul Seligman, Dir., Office for Drug Safety, Ctr. for
Drug. Evaluation & Research (PBS television broadcast Nov. 4, 2002), transcript availa-
ble at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/prescription/interviews/
seligman.html (citing the 1-10% figure for all adverse events (serious and nonseri-
ous), but noting that the system was estimated to detect a higher percentage (between
one-third and one-half) of all serious adverse events).
249 Jennifer Wolsing, The Vioxx Litigation: Disincentivizing Patient Safety Through Mis-
directed Tort Rules, 75 DEF. COUNs. J. 209, 210-11 (2008).
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ple who avail themselves of a drug's benefits. Today's phase III trials
can establish efficacy and some basic level of safety, but they may not
detect risks that are rare, unexpected, or slow to emerge. Calls for
extended premarket safety testing of drugs to detect those latter risks
are endorsing an interpersonal tradeoff that subordinates the safety of
research subjects to the safety of patients.
Practically and ethically, there is no way to change premarket tri-
als that will make them as informative as the public wishes they would
be. The notion that a drug can be declared "safe and effective" based
on small, short-duration premarket studies was a conceit, but it was a
comforting conceit to which the public willingly subscribed after 1962.
It is beyond the scope here to explore broader impacts this conceit
has had on popular and legal culture since it found expression in the
1962 Drug Amendments. For example, the expansion of medical
product liability after 1962 owes much to this conceit.25 2 Treating
late-emerging risks as blameworthy reflects a popular expectation that
risks should have been discovered before the product went on
sale 25 -an unreasonable expectation in many cases, once the limita-
tions of premarket studies are understood. Conversely, the notion
that an FDA approval should preempt state tort actions254 seems dubi-
ous once the frailty of FDA's 1962 evidentiary paradigm is taken into
account. Drug safety problems earlier this decade laid bare that the
conceit was a conceit. According to current thinking, "[t] he benefit-
risk profiles of pharmaceuticals are constantly evolving as new data are
collected throughout the life cycle of a drug."255 How this view will
affect our broader legal culture is still unknown, but its impact on
medical product regulation is clear: FDA's 1962 evidentiary paradigm,
252 It should be noted that the vast expansion of drug-injury liability after 1960
reflects other factors as well, such as publication of the Second Restatement of Torts in
1965. Epstein, supra note 43, at 5. See id. at 5-7 for discussion of additional contrib-
uting factors.
253 See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 5, at 304 ("In some cases, drugs have side effects that
were unanticipated by the agency when they were approved for sale, even if they
should have been anticipated by the drug manufacturer.").
254 For discussions favoring preemptive effect of FDA's drug approval and labeling
decisions, see Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1219-21 (2009) (Alito,J., dissenting)
and Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933-36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (discussing, in
the preamble to a proposed regulation, whether drug labeling decisions by FDA pre-
empt state failure-to-warn claims); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999,
1006-07 (2008) (holding, in a medical device case, that state personal injury action is
preempted for devices subject to FDA's premarket approval process, but not for
devices subject to 510(k) clearance).
255 IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 1.
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with its heavy reliance on data from premarket trials, is broken
beyond repair. It needs to be replaced, and that is what FDAAA sets
out to do.
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF GENOMIC MEDICINE
The recent drug safety problems, though serious, might not have
given impetus to fundamental reforms had there not been an addi-
tional factor at work. By the middle of this decade, the Human Gen-
ome Project was starting to bear fruit. Genomic discoveries were
being translated into clinically useful products at a mere trickle 25 6 but
these early examples made clear that future therapies may look quite
different from those of the past.2 57 Without a new evidentiary para-
digm, FDA soon would find itself "using 20th-century tools to evaluate
21st-century advances."258 Moreover, even if the products stayed the
same, the science for evaluating them is changing.259 Conceived in
the 1960s, FDA's premarket study requirements fail to take advantage
of later-developed technologies for assessing risks and benefits. 2 6 0
The relevant technologies are in two main areas2 6 1 : (1) basic scientific
approaches that can help predict safety262 and effectiveness263 earlier
in the drug-development process, perhaps even before drugs are first
taken by human beings in clinical trials 2 6 4 and (2) new analytical tools
to glean risk-benefit information from large databases during the
postmarket period.265 FDA's premarket study requirements ignore
evidentiary opportunities at either end, "both before and after an
256 Evans, supra note 222, at 753 (discussing the slow pace of clinical translation of
genomic discoveries).
257 See infra Part IV.A (discussing post-genomic predictive and preventive products
and how they differ from traditional medical products of the twentieth century).
258 IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED TooLs, supra note 174, at 30 (reporting presentation
of Dr. Janet Woodcock); see also FDA, INNOVATION OR STAGNATION, supra note 143, at
ii (noting a need to develop new tools for evaluating the safety and effectiveness of
medical products).
259 See FDA, INNOVATION OR STAGNATION, supra note 143, at 16-20 (discussing new
scientific techniques for assessing safety); id. at 20-25 (discussing new scientific tech-
niques for assessing efficacy). See generally IOM, EMERGING SAFEw SCIENCE, supra note
80 (discussing emerging techniques for assessing drug safety).
260 Evans & Flockhart, supra note 81, at 47, 53-54; see also FDA, March 7 Proceed-
ings, supra note 227, at 4 (statement of Dr. Andrew von Eschenbach) (discussing the
availability of new tools and technology for clinical trials and the need for further
progress).
261 IOM, EMERGING SAFETY SCIENCE, supra note 80, at 2.
262 Id. at 3, 13.
263 FDA, INNOVATION OR STAGNATION, supra note 143, at 20-25.
264 IOM, EMERGING SAFETY SCIENCE, supra note 80, at 13.
265 Id. at 2.
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RCT."2 6 6 Taking advantage of these opportunities requires a whole
new paradigm. This section discusses two things: the impact of new
products and the impact of new analytical capabilities. A common
theme emerges from both discussions. FDA's old evidentiary para-
digm not only has problems with safety; it has problems evaluating
efficacy as well.
A. The Challenge of Predictive and Preventive Medical Technologies
FDAAA grants FDA important new powers which, if skillfully exer-
cised, can reshape regulation to unlock the promise of genomic
medicine. What, precisely, is that promise? Many people grope for
words when asked to state, succinctly, what genomic medicine is and
how it is likely to change the field of medicine. The question some-
times elicits a cryptic, one-word answer: Herceptin. Herceptin (tras-
tuzumab) is a biologic therapy that has a favorable risk-benefit ratio in
a subgroup of breast cancer patients whose tumors, when tested, dis-
play certain genetic characteristics. 267 It exemplifies the potential for
pharmacogenomics to predict variations in drug response before a
patient takes the drug. However, it grossly understates the promise of
genomic medicine to equate genomic medicine with pharmacogen-
omics.
Genomic medicine has the potential to usher in a whole new
model of medicine. If it succeeds, this will mark the second time in
the history of western medicine that a new model has emerged. The
eventual impact of this shift will be to restore prognosis to a place of
legitimacy among the three traditional branches of medicine (diagno-
sis, treatment, and prognosis). Prognosis occupied a central role in
clinical medicine from the time of Hippocrates until late in the nine-
teenth century.268 With treatment stymied by lack of effective thera-
pies, patients looked to doctors to diagnose illness, supply information
about the likely course of their ineptly treated diseases, and recom-
266 Sheldon Greenfield & Richard L. Kravitz, Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects: Sub-
group Analysis, in 1OM, LEARNING HEALTHCARE, supra note 95, at 113, 119; see also
IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED TooLs, supra note 174, at 60 (reporting calls for better inte-
gration of basic sciences and clinical research).
267 See IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED TooLs, supra note 174, at 21-24 (reporting presen-
tation of Dr. Paul Waring) (discussing Herceptin's therapeutic action in patients with
various test results); Annetine Gelijns, Lessons for Genomics from Other Technologies, in
IOM, DIFusION & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 16, 19 (citing Herceptin
as a successful example of drug-test codevelopment).
268 See Ben A. Rich, Prognostication in Clinical Medicine: Prophecy or Professional
Responsibility?, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 297, 299-302 (2002).
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mend measures to ward off future illness.26 ' These last two services-
prediction and prevention-involved prognostic judgment.
The twentieth century brought the first new model of medicine,
spurred by rapid advances in diagnosis and treatment.270 Medicine
embraced a curative model 271 in which clinicians' primary task is to
diagnose and treat illness after it occurs. The twentieth century did
bring notable successes in disease prevention, but these tended to
reflect interventions at the population level (for example, better sew-
erage systems and mass vaccination programs) that can be character-
ized as triumphs of public health rather than of patient-focused
medicine. 272 Prognosis-predicting health outcomes at the level of
individual patients-came to be seen as unscientific and ethically
dubious in light of the uncertainties involved. 273 Prognosis withered
as a branch of medicine and persisted in twentieth century medicine
mainly as an adjective modifying the diagnosis, as in "terminal" cancer
and "end-stage" renal disease.274
Genomic medicine promises further advances in diagnosis and
treatment, continuing a century-old trend. Herceptin is one such
advance. However, the signature feature of genomic medicine is not
just that it will deliver more and better therapies, but that it will place
prediction and prognosis on the scientific footing that they largely
lacked in the twentieth century.275 Predicting how patients will
respond to a given therapy, such as Herceptin, is only a start. The
eventual goal is to use genetic information to predict who is suscepti-
ble to future disease;2 76 to predict which of those individuals actually
may manifest symptoms when exposed to specific, known pathogens
269 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Christakis, The Ellipsis of Prognosis in Modern Medical
Thought, 44 Soc. SCI. & MED. 301, 302-11 (1997) (discussing evolution of care for
pneumonia as an example of how the role of prognosis has been reduced over time in
clinical medicine).
270 Rich, supra note 268, at 300.
271 Christakis, supra note 269, at 301, 312-13; Rich, supra note 268, at 300-01.
272 Califf, supra note 143, at 5.
273 Nicholas A. Christakis & Theodore J. Iwashyna, Attitude and Self-Reported Practice
Regarding Prognostication in a National Sample of Internists, 158 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED.
2389, 2391-92 (1998).
274 Rich, supra note 268, at 302.
275 Gelijns, supra note 267, at 18 ("Genomic interventions may produce diagnostic
technologies that enhance prognostic abilities."); see also Christakis & Iwashyna, supra
note 273, at 2389 (citing genetic testing as a factor giving prognosis renewed vitality as
a branch of medicine); Francis S. Collins et al., A Vision for the Future of Genomics
Research, 422 NATURE 835 (2003) (discussing future research priorities to translate
achievements of the Human Genome Project into clinical use).
276 See IOM, DwFUSION & GENOMIC INNOVATIONs, supra note 143, at 1 (noting the
availability of genetic markers of increased risk for various chronic diseases).
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or environmental stimuli;27 7 to develop preventive interventions that
arrest development of disease before it becomes manifest278 or, failing
that, to explain disease progression and recurrence in ways that let
sickness and the burdens of treatment be minimized.279 These latter
capabilities-all of which involve predictive judgments-are the
promise of genomic medicine.
In the past, genetic information often was seen as an end in
itself-"an endpoint that did not improve health care outcome."280
The goal of genetic testing was to inform patients whether they had a
genetic condition281 rather than to guide interventions aimed at
changing the condition. Historically, medical genetics dealt with con-
ditions where little could be done and, often, the point was simply to
aid decisions on reproduction or abortion.28 2 Genetic tests could
diagnose rare genetic conditions like cystic fibrosis and they could
reveal predisposition to certain chronic diseases,283 but few interven-
tions were available. 28 4 A transformation is now underway.28 5 Geno-
mic medicine aims to harness genetic knowledge to improve health
outcomes.28 6 The goal is not simply diagnosis, prediction, and prog-
nosis; the goal is to intervene in ways that alter the prognosis.
277 See Gelijns, supra note 267, at 18 (commenting that positive tests for disease
susceptibility do not always imply disease will occur because ultimate outcomes are
affected by other factors such as environment); see also Wylie Burke & Bruce M. Psaty,
Personalized Medicine in the Era of Genomics, 298 JAMA 1682 (2007) (discussing how
improved understanding of interactions between genetic and environmental factors
will lead to better prognostic capability).
278 See, e.g., Wylie Burke, Integrating Genetic Technology into a Health Care System, in
IOM, DIFFUsION & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 33, 33-34 (noting
increasing potential to intervene to improve health outcomes after susceptibilities
have been identified).
279 See, e.g., Gelijns, supra note 267, at 18 (discussing possibility of using genetic
tests to identify breast cancer patients at high risk of recurrence who need adjuvant
chemotherapy); Sean Tunis, Translating Medical Innovations with Appropriate Evidence,
in IOM, DwrusIoN & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 25, 27 (discussing
evidentiary review of Onco type Dx gene-expression profiling for prediction of risk of
breast cancer recurrence).
280 Burke, supra note 278, at 33.
281 Id. at 33-34.
282 Id. at 34.
283 See, e.g., IOM, DIfFusIoN & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 1 (noting
such tests' ability to discover conditions like cystic fibrosis and Huntington's disease
and to reveal predisposition to diabetes and coronary artery disease).
284 Burke, supra note 278, at 33-34; Gelijns, supra note 267, at 20 (noting that
identifiable diseases often have "no cures, only treatments with limited effectiveness
and major side effects").
285 See IOM, DIFFUsioN & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 1.
286 Id.
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"When new technologies are introduced into health care they
may be relatively primitive . . . ."287 Presently we are in the Stone Age
of genomic medicine. For example, genetic tests can identify women
whose genes predispose them to breast cancer, but today's preventive
interventions have the technological sophistication of a stone axe:
"l[T]here are no known measures to substantially reduce the risk of
breast cancer in women who test positive for these mutations short of
prophylactic mastectomies . . . ."288 Hope is for the day when people
who test positive for genes associated with cancer susceptibility can
receive medicines that supply the tumor-suppressing proteins their
genes are unable to manufacture, or that cancel the tumor-promoting
proteins with which defective genes are flooding their bodies. That is
the promise of genomic medicine.
This interventional focus of genomic medicine will, in some
respects, make genetic information less exceptional than it once was.
Like any other medical information, it will become a regular part of
day-to-day clinical decisions.289 The Department of Health and
Human Services' Personalized Health Care Initiative290 aims to foster
wider integration of genetic data into routine clinical practice. Yet
this trend presents challenges distinct from those encountered in reg-
ulating twentieth century medical products. The sheer futurity of
benefits from predictive and preventive products will strain FDA's
existing systems for evaluating effectiveness. Such products, by
design, will deliver benefits and risks over prolonged time frames (ten
to sixty years), far beyond the duration of clinical trials as we now
know them.
Another problem is that genomic medicine combines technolo-
gies in ways that cut across FDA's traditional regulatory categories
(device, drug, biologic).291 In particular, drugs will be used in con-
287 Gelijns, supra note 267, at 18.
288 IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED TooLs, supra note 174, at 69 (reporting presentation
of Dr. Scott Ramsey).
289 Burke, supra note 278, at 34.
290 IOM, DIFFUSION & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 1; see also U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Personalized Health Care, http://www.hhs.gov/my
healthcare (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) (detailing the Initiative's goal of using genetic
information in personalized healthcare).
291 See 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e) (2009) (defining "[c]ombination product"). Future
products that combine drugs, devices, and/or biologics may or may not fit within this
formal definition which requires cross-referencing of specifically named products. See
id. Either way, combined use of products poses a number of special regulatory
problems. See Evans, supra note 222, at 786-87. A special office has been established
within FDA to address issues raised by such products. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
Office of Combination Products, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/
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junction with in vitro diagnostic devices (genetic tests and tests for
other biomarkerS292 ). Tests will predict patient response to specific
drugs. Drugs may be taken preventively by people who have nothing
presently wrong with them other than a bad predictive test result. In
these situations, the safety and efficacy of the test and drug may not be
cleanly separable. 29 3 If a test predicts a person safely can take a drug,
but the person nevertheless sustains a drug-related injury, which was
unsafe: the drug, the test, or both?294 Suppose a drug is designed to
reduce incidence of a certain type of cancer in patients with positive
tests for susceptibility. If, after many years, a test subject does not get
the cancer, does that mean the preventive intervention worked, that
the cancer-susceptibility test was inaccurate, or that the test correctly
identified a susceptibility that failed to express itself as fully-blown dis-
ease for reasons that had nothing to do with the preventive interven-
tion? What will efficacy mean in this context and how-and over how
long-must it be assessed?
There is a risk that preventive interventions may enter clinical use
with no FDA review of their safety and effectiveness. This will be possi-
ble when a preventive intervention is an off-label use of a drug already
approved for treating manifest disease. Thus, cholesterol-lowering sta-
tins are a candidate to become one of the first widely used preventive
interventions.295 Statins already are approved for use in treating high
cholesterol. It is thought by some that they may have potential for
reducing long-term health risks in patients who would not, based on
their current status, be seen as needing treatment for high choles-
terol.296 This latter use would amount to a preventive intervention.
Its risks and benefits are unknown. The American Society of Clinical
Oncology and the American Urological Association stated that off-
OC/OfficeofScientificandMedicalPrograms/OfficeofCombinationProducts/default.
htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
292 A biological marker (biomarker) is a measurable property-such as a gene, a
protein circulating in the blood, or a metabolite (a chemical formed as the body
metabolizes a drug)-that, by its presence, reveals information about clinically rele-
vant conditions such as disease, disease susceptibility, or a person's potential to bene-
fit from or be harmed by a particular therapy. FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at
61.
293 B.J. Evans, Distinguishing Product and Practice Regulation in Personalized Medicine,
81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTIcs 288, 290 (2007).
294 Evans, supra note 222, at 771.
295 C. Thomas Caskey, Dir. & C.E.O., Brown Found. Inst. of Molecular Med., Pres-
entation at Cambridge Healthtech Inst. R&D Risk Mitigation Conference, at slide 14
(Mar. 26, 2008) (on file with author) (showing presymptomatic use of statins as part
of a new paradigm for coronary artery disease).
296 Id.
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label use of finasteride, a drug used to treat male pattern baldness and
urological problems, may reduce the risk of developing prostate can-
cer. 297 In the case of finasteride, there is some clinical trial evidence
supporting this use although the preventive use has not been
approved by FDA. Since off-label prescribing of drugs is lawful,2 98
approved drugs can be prescribed for preventive purposes even with-
out prior clinical trials. Even if FDA had authority to require such
trials, they might be difficult to carry out. There are well-known
problems in accruing subjects for clinical trials of drugs that already
are on the market, since patients who want the drug can gain access to
it without enrolling in a trial.2 99 Subjects' unwillingness to accept
randomization in this situation contributes to low completion rates for
postmarket clinical trials.300
Preventive interventions pose regulatory challenges far more
complex than the drug safety problems FDA faced earlier this decade.
With drug safety, the central problem is that safety is uncertain at the
point of FDA approval. However, FDA traditionally has been able to
assess the efficacy of drugs before they are approved (at least with
respect to the drugs' indicated uses and, admittedly, sometimes
through the use of surrogate efficacy endpoints30 1). For future medi-
cal products that have long-term disease prevention as the endpoint,
the uncertainties will go to both efficacy and safety. To establish true
efficacy of these products in premarket trials would entail long-
delayed access for patients and long-deferred cash flow for product
sponsors. The economics, in many cases, would be fatal to product
development. Predictive and preventive technologies seemingly will
have to be approved based on surrogate endpoints of efficacy or on a
showing that there is a plausible scientific basis to expect long-term
efficacy. There may be decades of uncertainty before efficacy can be
confirmed. This implies a need for ongoing postmarket surveillance
of efficacy as well as of safety.3 0 2 Yet FDA's traditional systems for
297 Shankar Vedantam, More Men Are Urged to Take Drug Against Prostate Cancer,
WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2009, at A14.
298 See supra notes 222, 224 and accompanying text (discussing off-label use of
drugs).
299 See IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED TOOLS, supra note 174, at 71 (reporting presenta-
tion of Dr. Scott Ramsey); see also FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 7-10 (discussing
logistical and ethical problems of recruiting subjects for trials of drugs that already are
clinically available).
300 Weisman et al., supra note 95, at 132.
301 See supra note 240 (defining surrogate endpoints); infra Part V.B.1.
302 See IOM, DIFFUSION & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 24 (discussing
the need for evidence with respect to unexpected benefits as well as unexpected
risks).
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postmarket surveillance have focused on safety, not efficacy. Predic-
tive and preventive products of the future will amplify strains on
FDA's 1962 evidentiary paradigm, which already were apparent as
applied to twentieth century medical products.303
Another challenge is that preventive interventions imply giving
drugs to healthy people-people who are susceptible to future illness
but are currently asymptomatic. Risks that are acceptable in treating
manifest disease may be unacceptable when drugs are used in healthy
people who will receive only remote, future benefits. Moreover, if dis-
ease susceptibility is misjudged, exposure to any risk is needless.
Safety and effectiveness of predictive tests are major concerns. There
have been calls for prospective RCTs to assess risks and benefits of
tests that will be used to guide decisions about treatment and
prevention.304
At present, most such tests do not go through clinical trials
before they enter clinical use. Over 90% of genetic tests currently on
the market are lab-developed tests (LDTs) regulated under CLIA 05
and not regulated by FDA.3 0 6 Even when FDA does regulate a test,
prospective clinical trials of safety and effectiveness are not necessarily
required.307 CLIA does not require a data-driven regulatory review to
confirm safety and efficacy before a test moves into clinical use.308 Yet
people rely on LDTs when making important medical decisions. For
example, CLIA-regulated LDTs include the widely used BRCA tests for
breast cancer susceptibility309 and the Onco type Dx test which is some-
times used to aid decisions whether women with node-negative Stage
1 breast cancer can forego chemotherapy.3 1 0 Off-label use of tests will
303 See discussion supra Parts II-III.
304 See, e.g., IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED Toots, supra note 174, at 70-71 (reporting
Dr. Scott Ramsey's concern that "[s]tudies should clearly define the risk/benefit ratio
of a biomarker test prior to its use in the clinic").
305 Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578,
102 Stat. 2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2006)); see also 42 C.F.R. pt.
493 (2009) (outlining laboratory requirements).
306 SACGHS, U.S. OVERSIGHT, supra note 223, at 39 (noting that over 1500 genetic
tests are currently offered in the United States, of which only several dozen have been
cleared or approved by FDA).
307 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
308 Evans, supra note 222, at 768.
309 INsT. OF MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SAVING WOMEN'S LIVEs 225 (2005),
available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=11016.
310 See sources cited supra note 279 (discussing use of prognostic biomarkers for
breast cancer recurrence); see also Steven Shak, Introducing a Genomic Innovation to
Clinical Practice, in IOM, DIFFusION & CENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 53,
55-60 (discussing CLIA-regulated status of the Onco type Dx test).
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also be an issue. It is not uncommon for doctors to press old tests into
new uses for which they were not intended. Thus, the prostate-spe-
cific antigen (PSA) test was intended for surveillance and prognostic
use in men already diagnosed with prostate cancer, but has been
widely used off-label to screen healthy men for possible prostate can-
cer-a use for which its safety and effectiveness are unconfirmed.31'
In the same way, existing tests could be diverted into (unvalidated)
use as tests for disease susceptibility.3 1 2
It is appealing to demand prospective RCTs of all such tests, but
such a policy appears unrealistic. There are fundamental barriers to
imposing drug-like premarket study requirements on tests. Unlike
drugs, many tests have short product life cycles.313 While a drug may
remain on the market for twenty to fifty years, a test may be replaced
by a new-generation test in as little as twelve to eighteen months.3 14
Development costs and timelines also differ: 1-2 years and $1-2 mil-
lion to develop a device, versus 10-13 years and $1 billion for a
drug.31 5 When medical technology is rapidly evolving, RCTs may be
inappropriate;316 results would come too late to be of relevance.
There are also logistical problems. The needed clinical trials would
be "extremely large, lengthy, and costly. In some cases they may not
be feasible because of difficulties in accruing enough patients ....
How to fund such trials is also a major question.318 The genetic test-
ing industry is structurally different from the drug industry. Tests
often serve niche markets; there has not yet been a "blockbuster"
genetic test. Test developers may be small, thinly capitalized enti-
ties3 19 that lack the financing capacity that has enabled large drug
manufacturers to endure the cash outlays and deferred sales revenues
311 IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED Toots, supra note 174, at 70 (reporting presentation
of Dr. Scott Ramsey).
312 Id.
313 Id. at 77 ("Because the technologies for genomics and proteomics assays are
rapidly evolving, . . . standards have to be adaptable to the changes in technology that
are continually occurring.").
314 Evans, supra note 222, at 781.
315 Rebecca Henderson & Cate Reavis, Eli Lilly: Recreating Drug Discovery for the 21st
Century 16 (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Doc. No. 07-043, Mar. 13, 2008), available at
https://mitsloan.mit.edu/MSTIR/IndustryEvolution/RecreatingDrugDiscovery/Doc-
uments/07-043-Recreating-Drug-Discovery.pdf.
316 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 8.
317 IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED Toots, supra note 174, at 71 (reporting presentation
of Dr. Scott Ramsey).
318 Id. at 71-72.
319 Evans, supra note 222, at 789-90 (discussing role of academic scientists and
small-test developers in discovery and development of new tests).
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associated with long premarket RCTs. There have been calls for pub-
lic funding of trials to validate tests,320 but the cautious assumption is
that it may not be forthcoming.
Two governmental advisory panels, in 1997 and 2000, examined
the question of regulatory oversight of tests; both called for rigorous,
data-driven review of tests before they move into clinical use. 321 In
2007, a successor advisory panel3 22 revisited this issue and, and in light
of the many issues surrounding premarket validation of tests, edged
away from that recommendation. This last panel instead suggested a
risk-stratified approach that would focus a more rigorous review on
higher-risk tests. 3 23 Criteria for risk stratification and regulatory
mechanics have not, as yet, been worked out.324
To be fair, FDA's existing evidentiary paradigms (for drugs and
devices) may be adequate for many of the products that will flow out
of the Human Genome Project. This will be true when risks and ben-
efits can be ascertained, with reasonable accuracy, using FDA's tradi-
tional premarket study mechanisms. This was the case with Herceptin
and its related first-generation test, which were approved by FDA in
separate, coordinated biologics licensing and device approvals on the
same day.3 25
The problem will lie with products intended for long-term predic-
tive or preventive uses. Here, premarket gathering of data may be
320 IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED TooLs, supra note 174, at 73 (reporting presentation
of Dr. Charles L. Sawyers) (noting that some observers believe that because
biomarkers that predict adverse drug reactions protect the public, they should there-
fore be publicly funded).
321 See NIH-DOE, SAFE GENE TESTING, supra note 223, at ch. 2; SACGT, ENHANCING
OVERSIGHT, supra note 223, at ix-x.
322 See SACGHS, U.S. OVERSIGHT, supra note 223, at i.
323 Id. at 10-11 (providing recommendations concerning oversight of clinical util-
ity of tests without calling for data-driven review of clinical utility before tests go into
clinical use, as had earlier reports).
324 Id. at 136 (listing elements that should be included in a risk-stratification classi-
fication algorithm).
325 See Genentech, Herceptin Development Timeline, http://www.gene.com/
gene/products/information/oncology/herceptin/timeline.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2009); see also Letter from Jay P. Siegel, Dir., Office of Therapeutics Research &
Review, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation, to Robert L. Garnick, Genentech, Inc., Sept. 25,
1998, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalPro-
cess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBio-
logicApplications/ucm091360.pdf (granting FDA's approval of the biologics license
application for Herceptin); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., September 1998 PMA Approv-
als, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/Device
ApprovalsandClearances/PMAApprovals/ucml15106.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2009)
(showing approval of Dako HercepTest on the same day Herceptin was approved).
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infeasible or less-than-fully informative. The likely reality is that many
predictive and preventive medical products will be moving into
clinical use with substantial uncertainty about their risks and benefits.
Off-label use of drugs and tests, and CLIA regulation of LDTs, afford
wide pathways for this to occur. These lingering uncertainties imply a
need for ongoing postmarket evidence development (focusing on effi-
cacy as well as safety) and expanded regulatory powers in the period
after products are in clinical use. The 1962 evidentiary paradigm,
with its heavy concentration of research and regulatory effort in the
premarket period, is weak in both these areas and therefore poorly
suited to the task ahead.
B. The Challenge of Heterogeneous Drug Response
Other recent developments cast doubt on FDA's assessments of
efficacy and safety, even as these apply to traditional medical products.
"As scientific knowledge advances, ability to classify is improved.
Today's homogeneous group may be considered heterogeneous
tomorrow."3 2 6 The Human Genome Project has had this effect. It
sparked advances in basic sciences such as genetics, proteomics, 327
and metabolomics. 2 8 These sciences reveal that people who look
alike in terms of traditional trial selection criteria may differ greatly at
the genetic, molecular, cellular, and tissue levels, and these differ-
ences affect how people respond to drugs.329 Subjects in a phase III
drug trial are characterized in terms of a set of trial selection criteria
326 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 34.
327 See Mayo Clinic, Understanding Genomics and Proteomics, http://
www.mayoclinic.org/mayo-magazine/2006-spr-glossary.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2009) (defining proteomics as the study of the structure and function of the various
proteins that are manufactured by people's genes); Princeton Univ., WordNet
Search-Proteomics, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=proteomics
(last visited Oct. 27, 2009) (defining proteomics as a branch of genetics that studies
"the full set of proteins encoded by a genome").
328 See The Human Metabolome Project, Metabolomics Overview, http://
www.metabolomics.ca/about/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009) (defining
metabolomics as the study of metabolites found in the human body). Metabolites
include chemicals and molecules that the body makes as it metabolizes a drug, and
these can differ from one person to the next.
329 See Greenfield & Kravitz, supra note 266, at 113 (discussing genotypic and phe-
notypic characteristics that affect drug response and risk of adverse reactions); see also
Tommy Andersson et al., Drug-Metabolizing Enzymes: Evidence for Clinical Utility of
Pharmacogenomic Tests, 78 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 559 (2005) (dis-
cussing use of genetic markers to predict drug metabolism); LawrenceJ. Lesko et al.,
Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics in Drug Development and Regulatory Decision Mak-
ing: Report of the First FDA-PWG-PhRMA-DruSafe Workshop, 43 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY
342 (2003) (discussing regulatory use of pharmacogenetic information).
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such as age, gender, severity or duration of underlying disease, pres-
ence or absence of other medical conditions, and whether they use
drugs other than the one being tested. Subjects who are alike in
terms of those variables are presumed to be "comparable"3 3 0 to one
another. Unfortunately, no compact set of demographic and clinical
variables captures the true extent of individual variability. Phase III
drug trials misperceive their human research subjects, presuming dis-
similar individuals to be alike.331
By analogy, we all are familiar with pixilated facial photos such as
the ones used by investigative reporters to conceal the identities of
whistleblowers. At a very rough level of pixilation, people's facial
photos are reduced to assemblages of colored squares and everybody
looks more or less alike. A human is a creature with shoulders and a
head; some inferences about gender can be drawn based on hairstyle
and facial hair. Suppose a sample of six photos is drawn from a group
of sixty such photos. At a rough level of pixilation, photos in this sam-
ple may seem comparable to one another and representative of the
larger group. That may no longer be true once the pictures are
brought into full, sharp focus. Suppose three of the six selected
photos depict people with melanomas on their noses, while all fifty-
seven of the other photos display people with clear complexions. The
six selected photos are neither comparable to one another nor repre-
sentative of the larger group, at least for purposes of skin-cancer
research.
If blurry, pixilated photos were the only means available for
observing human beings, it would be reasonable to rely on them and
try to do the best research one could do at that level of pixilation. As
clearer photos became available, it would be time to augment or
replace those old research techniques. That is precisely what is hap-
pening to FDA's clinical trial process. The traditional phase III drug
trial "pixilated" its participants in terms of a rough set of trial selection
criteria (such as age, gender, comorbidities) and baseline measure-
ments (such as blood pressure readings at the start of the study).332
People who shared these characteristics were presumed to be alike, in
the sense of having an equal ex ante probability of being helped or
330 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b) (4) (2009) (discussing selection of human partici-
pants and variables pertinent in ensuring comparability of test subjects and control
groups).
331 FDA, March 7 Proceedings, supra note 227, at 10 (statement of Dr. Janet
Woodcock) (discussing failure of trials to differentiate subpopulations using today's
available science).
332 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 130-39 (discussing baseline assessment in
clinical trials).
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harmed by the test drug. Now, basic scientific advances are making it
possible to bring research subjects into a sharper focus. What will be
the impacts of this change?
Here, it is helpful to distinguish the concept of generalizability
and two different aspects of comparability. Generalizability, discussed
earlier,333 concerns whether trial subjects are representative of people
not involved in the trial For example, are the subjects (on average)
sufficiently like real patients (on average) to allow the trial results to
be extrapolated to the routine clinical setting? Comparability con-
cerns whether people in the trial are similar to one another. There are
two aspects to this. First, is the control group comparable to the inter-
vention group? If not, then observed differences in their health out-
comes may reflect differences between the two groups, rather than the
effects of taking versus not taking the drug. Second, are people within
the interventional group comparable to one another? If not, then the
average effects of the drug within that group may be quite different
from the effects experienced by particular individuals. This last phe-
nomenon is the one that is causing concern.
Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects (HTE), defined as variation
of results produced by the same treatment in different patients,3 3 4 has
always been observed in clinical drug trials.335 Figure 1336 is a sche-
matic of variable responses that might be observed in the interven-
tional group of a phase III drug trial-that is, among the subjects who
were exposed to the hypothetical drug.
The horizontal axis shows the frequency of various responses
within the interventional group. The vertical axis records the magni-
tude of benefits and harms to various people. In this hypothetical
trial, 10% of the interventional subjects, seen at left, reacted very
badly. They experienced harms (shown in black) and got no benefits
at all. Many of the subjects (the 40% in the middle) were "non-
responders," experiencing neither benefits nor harms from the drug.
In the remaining half of the intervention group, subjects experienced
varying degrees of benefit (shown in gray) and harm. Moving left to
right, some people got a mix of harms and benefits; others got a small
benefit, while some benefited greatly with no adverse effects.
These variations occur for many reasons including mundane
ones (for example, failure by some subjects to follow the instructions).
333 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
334 Greenfield & Kravitz, supra note 266, at 114.
335 Id.
336 Figure 1 is used with permission of the Food and Drug Law JournaL See also
Evans, supra note 222, at 763 fig. 2 (discussing a conceptually similar diagram).
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FIGURE 1. HETEROGENEOUS RESPONSE WITHIN THE INTERVENTIONAL
GROUP IN A CLINICAL TRIAL
Mixed benefits and harms for
20% of interventional subjects.
Small benefit for 20%.
Large benefit for 10%.




V b e nefi 
t for 10%
Frequency of response in the population
As noted earlier, subjects may get bigger benefits from a drug if they
are more severely ill or at higher risk for the condition the drug is
designed to treat (for example, the risk of heart attack).m Recent
scientific advances have shed light on a host of additional factors-
genetic, biological, and metabolic-that also help explain the varia-
tions in response.3 3 8 For example, people have different genes that
cause their livers to make different enzymes, and those enzymes affect
how patients metabolize drugs.33 9 Tumors express different genes
that may make a tumor more or less susceptible to destruction by a
particular drug.34 0 Two people with the same illness may have been
infected by genetically different germs, which are more or less suscep-
337 See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
338 Greenfield & Kravitz, supra note 266, at 113.
339 Letter from Steven I. Gutman, Dir., Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evalua-
tion & Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, to James F. Kelly, Regulatory
Affairs, Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. (Dec. 23, 2004), available at http://
www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrhdocs/pdf4/k042259.pdf (approving a drug-metabo-
lizing enzyme genotyping system to detect variations in liver enzymes that have been
shown, in peer-reviewed literature, to have an impact on drug response).
340 See, e.g., Genentech, Full Prescribing Information for Trastuzumab (Hercep-
tin) (2009), available at http://www.gene.com/gene/products/information/oncol-
ogy/herceptin/insert.jsp (describing a breast cancer therapy targeted to tumors
expressing a particular gene).
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tible to a particular course of treatment. "Within clinical trials, these
markers have the potential for identifying a patient's potential for
responsiveness ....
This new understanding of individual variability does not cast
doubt on the basic validity of comparisons between the interventional
and control groups in a randomized clinical trial. The advantage of
randomization, always, has been that it helps ensure comparability of
these two groups.3 42 If subjects are randomly assigned to be in either
the intervention or the control group, then each group will receive a
mix of people with various characteristics. Variations among the sub-
jects (both the known variations that have been measured, and
unknown ones such as hidden genetic or metabolic differences) will
tend to be spread evenly between the two groups.3 4 3 Recent advances
highlight how many factors were unknown and thus ignored in the
past. However, this was not "news." When conducting trials, scientists
always knew it was impossible to identify and measure all the factors
that affect drug response. 3 4 4 By randomly assigning subjects to the
two groups, it could safely be assumed that the unknown factors would
exert similar impacts on both groups .345 When this is true, intergroup
comparisons still are meaningful. Unknown factors tend to exert the
same impact on health outcomes observed in both groups of a large
clinical trial. One does not need to know what the unknown factors
are, so long they affect both groups similarly. Thus, individual varia-
bility does not undermine the basic validity of large, randomized
clinical trials.
What these discoveries have undercut is FDA's reliance on aver-
age statistics to characterize the safety and effectiveness of drugs. As
noted by a senior FDA official, "[t]he clinical trial process has been
highly observational in its conduct, primarily because we don't have
the tools to look at the basis for individual response so we look at
population responses."3 46 In other words, clinical trials simply observe
how individual subjects respond and compile average statistics based
341 Greenfield & Kravitz, supra note 266, at 113.
342 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 43.
343 Id. at 37, 43; see also id. at 38 (noting that the "investigator can only describe to
a limited extent the kinds of participants in whom an intervention was evaluated").
344 Id. at 118 (noting that, at the start of a trial, "all important prognostic factors
have probably not been identified, nor can all of them be measured").
345 Id. at 43, 138 (noting that, while it is possible by chance to end up with inter-
vention and control groups that differ with respect to some unknown prognostic fac-
tor, this is unlikely in a large, randomized trial).
346 IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED TooLs, supra note 174, at 31 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Dr. Janet Woodcock).
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on those observations, but do not inquire why the subjects responded
the way they did. It is assumed that "despite such diversity, the effect
of the intervention is more similar among the various types of partici-
pants than not."3 4 7 This assumes that average responses are meaning-
ful indicators of a drug's safety and effectiveness for individuals.
FDA's 1962 drug approval criteria only require that a drug be safe
and effective at the level of the average person who took it during
premarket trials.348  If the drug delivered any therapeutic benefit
(that is, if the gray area in Figure 1 is larger than the corresponding
gray area observed in the control group), the average benefits are pos-
itive and the drug can be deemed effective. A few patients who have
dramatic effects may account for much of the average result of a
trial.349 Trial results can be overwhelmed by few patients who get a
big benefit.350 A drug is "safe" if it has a favorable ratio of benefits to
risks.351 If the collective benefits in the interventional group (the
total gray area) are judged to outweigh the collective harms (the black
area) in that same group, then that ratio is favorable. The drug can
be deemed safe. Both of these determinations, safety and efficacy, are
based on average effects within the group.
Obviously, for many of the trial subjects in Figure 1, the drug was
neither safe nor effective. After approval, this drug is destined to have
ongoing problems with safety and efficacy due to variations in individ-
ual response. Labeling must disclose the safety risks that were
observed among subjects who took the drug. What is not disclosed is
the maldistribution of risks and benefits. Labeling does not disclose
the percentage of subjects who received nothing but harm, nor does it
disclose the non-response rate, nor the varying degrees of benefit and
variable severity of harms. In short, drug labeling does not disclose
most of the information depicted in Figure 1. In analyzing and
presenting trial data, it is assumed that subjects who took the drug
were comparable to one another, such that each could expect a
347 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 34.
348 See Evans, supra note 222, at 764.
349 Kent & Hayward, supra note 217, at 1210 (citingJohn P.A. Ioannidis &Joseph
Lau, The Impact ofHigh-Risk Patients on the Results of Clinical Tials, 50J. CLINICAL EPIDE-
MIOLOGY 1089 (1997) and discussing the fact that, frequently, trial outcomes depend
on results seen in relatively small number of subjects who were in a position to gain
large benefits from the drug).
350 See id. at 1209.
351 See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text (discussing FDA's concept of
safety).
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response similar to the population average.352 The fact that their
responses differed is attributed to chance.
This last point has become highly contestable in the years after
the Human Genome Project. Among carefully screened test subjects
who look alike in terms of measured characteristics, individual drug
response is heterogeneous. Some of this heterogeneity really does
reflect random chance, but scientists now know that much of it does
not. If there are a priori reasons to expect differences, "analyses of
means would give the wrong answer." 3 53 These a priori reasons could
include genetic and metabolic differences that affect drug response 3 5 4
or unmeasured differences in patients' true health risks and hence
their potential to benefit from a drug.3 5 5 Averaging responses across
dissimilar individuals may produce average data that are relevant to
no one. 3 5 6 "When [average] statistics dominate the entire drug regu-
latory approval process ... the end result is distorted because it does
not account for individual variability."3 5 7 In this situation, "the effort
to assess risks and benefits breaks down."3 5 8 "[E]rror infects the
entire process. At the outset the FDA uses the wrong standards inso-
far as it evaluates the usefulness and risk of drugs on the assumption
that all parties are like the median user." 35 9 These errors affect both
efficacy and safety. Already by 1979, Congress was hearing testimony
that most FDA-approved drugs only work in 35% to 70% of patients
who take them.3 60 The science of that day could not explain or pre-
dict the observed variations in individual response. Thus, there was
no scientific basis to do anything other than continue framing safety
and efficacy in average terms. Now, there is.
By ignoring important inter-individual variations, FDA's eviden-
tiary requirements after 1962 cast safety and efficacy as attributes of
352 Greenfield & Kravitz, supra note 266, at 115.
353 IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 50 (reporting presentation of
Dr. Brian L. Strom).
354 See supra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
355 See Kent & Hayward, supra note 217, at 1209.
356 See id. at 1210 (noting that average risk and average treatment effect can differ
from that in a typical patient if baseline risk is skewed).
357 IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 50 (reporting presentation of
Peter Barton Hutt).
358 Id. at 16.
359 Epstein, supra note 43, at 32.
360 The Food and Drug Administration's Process for Approving New Drugs: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Research, & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 96th Cong.
211 (1979) (statement of Dr. Gilbert McMahon).
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the medical product itself.3 6 ' In reality, a product's safety and efficacy
have meaning only at the level of particular individuals or subgroups
for which response-determining factors are understood. 62 Absent
such knowledge, product-level assurances of safety and effectiveness
are not meaningful and may be dangerously misleading to the public.
Science is far from having a complete understanding of the many fac-
tors that affect drug response; only a few such factors are known.363
Still, individual variations in treatment response have gone from
being an "unknown unknown," as they were in the 1960s, to a "known
unknown." Scientists know enough to know that the hypothetical
average trial participant-that pixilated patient for whom FDA
declares products to be safe and effective-is a fiction.
What is the right policy response to this knowledge? In theory it
would be possible, at great expense, to expand trial populations to
include multiple subgroups stratified according to every known factor
thought to be capable of driving variations in treatment response.
These subtrials would assess which subgroups safely and effectively can
consume a drug, and that information could be reflected in drug
labeling. This obviously is impractical. The stratified subgroups
would offer, at best, a partial "depixilation" of the overall trial popula-
tion. The trial would assess the impact of known factors, but there still
would be unknown factors and these would continue to generate
unexpected variability in response to approved drugs. The required
trial populations would be vast, raising the same practical and ethical
issues discussed above in connection with rare risks. Trials for some
subgroups might be overtly unethical since it is a fair inference, even
before a trial is conducted, that people with certain genotypes may
face higher-than-average risk of adverse events. While this cannot be
known for certain before doing the trial, is it ethical even to include
these subgroups in clinical trials? Yet if these subgroups are routinely
excluded from trials, they ultimately will lack an adequate supply of
drugs approved for their use.
361 More precisely, safety and efficacy were framed as attributes of the product and
the indication for which it is labeled, for example, drug Xis safe and effective for use
in treating headache pain. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1) (2006) (requiring drugs to be
'safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
proposed labeling thereof"). However, FDA's permissive policy on off-label use has
contributed to widespread public perception that safety and effectiveness are attrib-
utes of the product, irrespective of the indication for which it ultimately is used. See
supra notes 222, 224.
362 See 1IM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 16.
363 See id. at 25 (citing the need to "[a]cknowledge that genetic polymorphisms
exist and that most have not been characterized" and that they are responsible for
multiple dose-response curves for some drugs).
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This new understanding about variable treatment response needs
to be woven into FDA's evidentiary base. It "does not fit into the tradi-
tional models for running clinical trials and developing therapeutics
or diagnostics."3 6 4 A year before Congress passed FDAAA, the case for
a new paradigm was clear:
The post-genomic revolution will increase the pressure on the sys-
tem to produce irrefutable evidence about which technologies are
effective and which are ineffective or even dangerous. Knowledge
of genes, proteins, and metabolites, along with functional imaging,
will divide populations into multiple "phenotypes," creating both an
unprecedented opportunity to improve clinical outcomes as well as
an enormous subgroup issue that will require many more trials in
larger numbers of human subjects. As the market becomes flooded
with inadequately studied tests used to stratify treatment, the
demand for adequate comparative studies will understandably
increase. With current regulations, however, the cost of the
required increase in clinical trials enrollment will be prohibitive. 65
V. SEVEN PILLARS OF THE NEW EVIDENTIARY PARADIGM
FDAAA sets seven pillars of a new evidentiary paradigm. The first
is to expand postmarket evidence development and diversify its
sources. The second is to take a flexible view of the best evidence,
making case-by-case determinations of the best methodology for
assessing benefits and risks in the postmarket period. The third is to
regard the risk-benefit ratio as dynamic and subject to successive
improvement throughout a drug's commercial life. The fourth is to
recognize that many of these improvements will be made by parties
other than the drug manufacturer and to address entry barriers that
block wider participation in research and development. The fifth is to
regard efficacy failure as a safety problem in its own right. The sixth is
to direct attention to safety and efficacy at the individual/subgroup
level as well as at the average level. The seventh pillar is to expand
postmarket decisional authority, so that emerging risk-benefit infor-
mation is not idle knowledge but drives actions to improve the pub-
lic's health.
A. Postmarket Evidence Development
FDAAA rejects the notion that drugs can be made safe and effec-
tive by directing ever-increasing research and regulatory effort into
364 IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED Toots, supra note 174, at 60 (reporting presentation
of Dr. Stephen Friend).
365 Califf, supra note 25, at 498 (writing in 2006).
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the premarket period. Under FDAAA, FDA's premarket evidence
requirements continue in force but they are not statutorily expanded.
FDAAA responds to calls for FDA to expand its evidentiary base and
harness multiple, new sources of data, including observational stud-
ies3 6 6 and genetic and other biomarkers that help explain safety and
effectiveness.3 67
The 1962 Amendments conceived drug regulation as a gatekeep-
ing function. The regulator's key decision was whether to open the
gate and let new products onto the market. FDAAA retains the gate-
keeper but adds capability to detect and manage risks after products
pass through the gate. This approach may strike some as compromis-
ing safety, since it implies an acceptance that the gatekeeper will let
some unsafe products slip through the gate. This is not compromise;
it is realism.368 The gate is intrinsically porous, and safety cannot be
achieved by fighting that fact but rather by responding to it. In
Melmon's view, key constituencies such as the medical profession and
academics overestimated the power of premarket testing and conse-
quently showed "little, if any, leadership" in developing and using
postmarket risk-benefit data.3 69 In FDAAA, Congress has supplied the
missing leadership.
1. Power to Require Evidence Generation
FDAAA expands FDA's authority to require postmarket clinical
trials.37 0 Even as it does so, it diminishes the relative dependence on
clinical trial data (both pre- and postmarket) by supplementing them
with additional forms of evidence during the postmarket period.
366 See, e.g., IOM, FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 23, at 105-06; Greenfield &
Kravitz, supra note 266, at 120.
367 See generally FDA, INNOVATION OR STAGNATION, supra note 143, at 16-25 (calling
for increased use of safety and efficacy biomarkers); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Criti-
cal Path Initiative, http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPath
Initiative/default.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2009) [hereinafter FDA, Critical Path Initi-
ative] (describing FDA's Critical Path Initiative, one of the goals of which is to
increase the use of biomarkers in ascertaining the safety and effectiveness of drugs),
368 See discussion supra Parts II-III (discussing the methodological, practical, and
ethical limitations of premarket drug trials).
369 Melmon, supra note 37, at 144.
370 FDAAA § 901(a), 21. U.S.C.A. § 355(o)(3) (West Supp. 2009) (letting FDA
require postmarket studies or clinical trials of drugs with known or suspected safety
problems); id. § 902(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(z) (West Supp. 2009) (letting drugs be
regarded as misbranded if the manufacturer fails to carry out required postmarket
studies).
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Observational studies appear set to become the main workhorse of
postmarket evidence development after FDAAA.3 7 ,
In the past, FDA claimed that it already possessed statutory
authority to order postmarket studies, including clinical trials.37 2 This
authority was not expressly stated, so FDA exercised it gingerly.373
FDA's accelerated approval regulations,37 4 issued in 1992, let the
agency require postmarket studies375 in one special circumstance:
when surrogate endpoints37 6 of effectiveness are used to speed the
approval of drugs that address unmet needs for treating serious and
life-threatening conditions. For example, a cancer drug might be
approved based on proof that it shrinks tumor size (a surrogate
endpoint), without proof that it actually improves patients' overall
health and survival (which are the clinically meaningful measures of
effectiveness) .37 For drugs so approved, FDA could require
postmarket studies to confirm efficacy but not safety.3 78 FDA declined
to set specific timetables for completion of these studies379 and many
371 See id. § 901(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(o)(3)(D) (requiring alternatives such as
observational studies and studies with Sentinel System data to be rejected before a
postmarket clinical trial can be ordered).
372 See New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Acceler-
ated Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,953-54 (Dec. 11, 1992) (discussing, in pream-
bles to FDA's proposed and final rulemaking on accelerated approval, statutory
provisions that imply a power for FDA to order postmarket studies); Expanded Availa-
bility of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track Mechanism for People
with AIDS and Other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,234, 13,236-58 (Apr. 15,
1992); see also Levitt et al., supra note 20, at 179 ("Although the FDA historically had
no specific authority to require postmarketing studies as a condition of approval, the
agency cited sections 505(k) and 701(a) of the FDCA in support of this practice. Sec-
tion 505(k) grants the FDA authority over the establishment and maintenance of
records necessary to determine whether there are grounds for withdrawing a [previ-
ously granted approval], while section 701 (a) gives the agency the authority to pro-
mulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of the FDCA.").
373 See id.; see also New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations;
Accelerated Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. at 58,954 (noting past cases in which FDA condi-
tioned new drug approvals on postmarketing studies).
374 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.500-.560 (2009) (for drugs); id. §§ 601.40-.46 (for biologics).
375 Id. §§ 314.510, 601.41.
376 See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
377 See CTR. FOR DRuc EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUc ADMIN., Gut-
DANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CLINICAL TRIAL ENDPOINTS FOR THE APPROVAL OF CANCER DRUGS
AND BIOLOGICS 3-5 (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Gui-
danceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucm 7l590.pdf.
378 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.510, 601.41.
379 New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated
Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. at 58,954 (describing FDA's rationale for declining to impose
sanctions for failure to complete postmarket studies).
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of them were never completed.3 0 The Food and Drug Administra-
tion Modernization Act of 1997381 (FDAMA) contained Fast Track
provisions confirming authorities similar to those FDA had claimed in
its 1992 accelerated approval regulations.382
FDAAA expands FDA's authority to require postmarket safety
studies irrespective of whether a drug was approved on an expedited
basis (accelerated approval/Fast Track) or under FDA's regular pro-
cedures.38 3 Such studies can be ordered after approval if new safety
information comes to light.384 These studies can include clinical trials
or alternatives including observational studies; the alternatives must
be considered first and found insufficient before a clinical trial can be
ordered.385 FDA can require studies to be completed on a definite
timetable386 although there is a "good cause" defense if the timetable
is not met.38 7 These provisions remove one barrier-vague statutory
authority-that previously blocked efforts to improve the quality of
evidence available in the postmarket period. However, there is a sec-
ond major barrier: lack of infrastructure.
2. Shared Infrastructure for Evidence Development
FDAAA treats evidence generation as a vast, shared enterprise.
FDAAA rejects the idea that it is enough simply to order individual
drug manufacturers to conduct discrete, isolated studies of the risks
and benefits of their drugs. Making drugs safe and effective requires
shared informational infrastructure, cooperative efforts, and inputs
from the public and from diverse stakeholders throughout the health-
care industry.
In the past, large-scale observational studies have tended to be
infeasible because there was little infrastructure in place to support
them.3 8 8 Systems to support one postmarket drug study often would
380 See Susan Okie, What Ails the FDA ?, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1063, 1065 (2005).
381 Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified at scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
382 21 U.S.C. § 356(b) (2) (2006).
383 See FDAAA § 901(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(o) (3) (West Supp. 2009) (allowing
FDA to require studies to assess known risks, unexpected risks, and risk signals-that
is, potential new risks that are suspected based on observed clinical outcomes in
patients using the drug).
384 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (o) (3) (C).
385 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (o) (3) (D) (ii).
386 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (o) (3) (E) (ii).
387 Id.; see also Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 11, at 489 (noting that the require-
ments for a showing of good cause are not yet clear).
388 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Proceedings,
Sentinel Network Public Meeting 85 (Mar. 8, 2007) [hereinafter FDA, March 8 Pro-
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have potential use in other studies. For example, software capable of
aggregating Vioxx adverse events across ten large insurance databases
also could be used to study adverse events with other drugs. As with
many other types of networked infrastructure (pipelines, telecommu-
nication systems, power grids), the efficient solution is to develop a
common system that reduces duplicative capital investment.38 9 Coor-
dinating such an effort requires regulatory powers that FDA did not
have in the past.
To the extent FDA had the power to order a postmarket study
under the 1962 paradigm, this was a power to order a particular man-
ufacturer to conduct a study of a specific drug. There was no statutory
basis to require cooperative efforts or sharing of infrastructure among
manufacturers, and FDA lacked jurisdiction over many of the entities
(physicians, pharmacists, insurers, health-care providers) that hold
relevant data. Drug manufacturers were responsible for conducting
and financing postmarket studies.390 To do an observational study, a
manufacturer first would have to construct suitable information sys-
tems. By analogy, it was as if each time a merchant wished to ship a
product from New York to California, she had to factor the cost of
constructing the interstate highway network into the cost of the ship-
ment. Observational studies, when used at all, tended to be small in
scale because of this problem.391 Proposals to offer reductions in tort
liability as an inducement for manufacturers to provide better infor-
mation about postmarket drug safety392 generally have not addressed
the feasibility of their doing so, in the absence of appropriate infra-
structure. Even if the spirit were made willing (through offers of pre-
emption or other new defenses), the infrastructure was weak.
The centerpiece of FDAAA is a program to create a nationally
scaled health data network393 to support postmarket observational
studies.394 This network, known as the Sentinel System,3 95 has been
ceedings], available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/07n0016/07n-
0016-tr0002.pdf (statement of Dr. Tom Gross).
389 CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., RECULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES 51-54 (3d ed. 1993).
390 FDA, March 8 Proceedings, supra note 388, at 85 (statement of Dr. Tom
Gross).
391 Id.
392 See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 3, at 45 (proposing to induce drug manufactur-
ers to provide information about drug safety risks by offering them the prospect of
preemption from tort lawsuits as they do so).
393 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(k)(3)-(4) (West Supp. 2009).
394 Though ostensibly a safety network, safety is defined in FDAAA in a way that
will let efficacy failure be treated as a safety issue. See id. §§ 901(b), 905(a), 21
U.S.C.A. 355-1(b) (1) (West Supp. 2009), 355(k) (3) (C) (i) (II). Thus, Sentinel System
data can be used for both safety and efficacy studies. Evans, supra note 6, at 601.
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described elsewhere3 96 and only summary information is provided
here. The network is to be populated with patients' Medicare, mili-
tary, and private insurance claims data, health records, and pharma-
ceutical purchase data.39 7 Congress's goal is to include data for
twenty-five million people by July 2010 and one hundred million peo-
ple byJuly 2012.398 Steps already have been taken to facilitate FDA's
access to Medicare data3 99 and data from the Veterans' Health Admin-
istration, 400 which will suffice to reach the twenty-five-million-person
level. 401 FDA is pursuing voluntary arrangements with private health
insurers and could reach the one-hundred-million-person level with
data from about ten large insurers. 402 An even larger system is techni-
cally feasible over the longer term4 03 and would produce better evi-
dence of variable drug response among population subgroups. 404
Crucially, FDA's access to these data does not require individual
consent of the persons whose data are involved. 405 Congress rejected
a consent-based model and instead drew on legal traditions allowing
unconsented use of data for public health purposes such as tracking
epidemics. FDAAA orders FDA to carry out certain public health
responsibilities, including specific, enumerated types of postmarket
studies. 406 As a governmental body carrying out a statutory public
health mandate, FDA can obtain data without individual privacy
395 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA's Sentinel Initiative, http://www.fda.gov/
Safety/FDAsSentinellnitiative/default.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009); see also FDA,
SENTINEL INITIATIVE, supra note 137 (describing the purpose and structure of the Sen-
tinel Initiative).
396 FDA, SENTINEL INITIATIVE, supra note 137; see also Evans, supra note 6, at 588,
601-04 (discussing various features of the proposed Sentinel network).
397 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(k) (3) (C) (i) (III) (aa)-(cc).
398 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (k) (3) (B) (ii).
399 Medicare Program; Medicare Part D Claims Data, 73 Fed. Reg. 30,664, 30,664
(May 28, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 423).
400 FDA, SENTINEL INITIATIVE, supra note 137, at 18.
401 HHS, New Efforts, supra note 7.
402 See FDA, March 7 Proceedings, supra note 227, at 73 (statement of Dr. Richard
Platt).
403 Id.
404 See id. at 72-73 (statement of Dr. Miles Braun).
405 See Evans, supra note 6, at 602-03, 610-26 (discussing privacy authorization
requirements for release of Sentinel data); id. at 626-31 -(discussing informed con-
sent requirements); see also KRISTEN RosATI, AN ANALYsIs OF LEGAL ISSUEs RELATED TO
STRUCTURING FDA SENTINEL INITIATIVE AcrIVITIEs 86-87 (2009), available at http://
www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectld=090000648098bad2&
disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (concluding also that individualized
informed consent and privacy authorizations are not required).
406 See infra notes 414-22 and accompanying text.
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authorizations, invoking an exception to the HIPAA Privacy Rule's
authorization requirements. 407 Moreover, FDA's informed consent
regulation applies only to clinical trial subjects and would not apply,
unless amended, to persons whose data are used in observational stud-
ies. 408 Even if FDA were to place the system under the ethical norms
of the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical Research (Common Rule),409 these norms afford various
avenues to use Sentinel System data in studies without individual
consent.410
The complex ethical and privacy issues this presents have been
explored at length elsewhere. 4 11 In effect, Congress determined that
the public health benefits of having this system are weighty enough to
override individuals' interest in keeping their data out of it. A con-
sent-based model would have rendered a system of this scale infeasible
and would have undercut its evidentiary value. For example, a con-
sent-based model invites selection biases, since it produces a data set
of self-selected consenters. It fails to produce the broad inclusiveness
required to support timely, valid conclusions about how patients are
reacting to a particular drug. It lacks the scale to detect rare reactions
in population subgroups and may lack the continuity to detect long-
term risks and benefits. Under FDAAA and federal privacy law, it will
be lawful for FDA to use people's data in postmarket drug safety sur-
veillance without individual authorization or consent provided the
data are used in ways that fit within the scope of uses Congress author-
ized in section 905 of FDAAA.412
These allowed uses are broad but not unlimited.413 They include
identifying and reporting drug safety risks;414 conducting safety sur-
veillance 415 (that is, monitoring how products are performing in
actual clinical use to detect signals that may suggest emerging safety
problems); identifying trends and preparing regular reports on
adverse event trends;416 and exporting data for further analysis.4 17
407 See 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2009); id. § 164.512(b) (1) (i) (providing an excep-
tion to privacy authorization requirements for governmental public health authorities
collecting data pursuant to statutory mandates); see also Evans, supra note 6, at 597
n.73 (summarizing other potentially applicable exceptions).
408 See Evans, supra note 6, at 626-27.
409 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-124 (2009).
410 Evans, supra note 6, at 629-31.
411 See id. at 622-31.
412 See id. at 601-02.
413 Id. at 612-13.
414 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(k) (3) (C) (i) (I)-(l) (West Supp. 2009).
415 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (k) (3) (C) (i) (III).
416 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(k) (3) (C) (i) (IV)-(V).
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FDA is authorized to collaborate with public, private, and academic
entities to conduct advanced analyses of drug safety data418 which
could include methodological studies (for example, to develop better
analytical tools) and substantive studies of "advanced safety ques-
tions."419 This last term is broadly defined and would encompass stud-
ies of drug efficacy as well as of safety.4 20 Advanced drug safety studies
potentially include research uses of Sentinel System data as well as
studies that fit within the concept of public health studies.421 Con-
gress delegated wide discretion for FDA to determine whether pro-
posed studies do or do not fit within the authorized categories of
use. 422
The Sentinel System's heavy reliance on administrative data (such
as insurance and Medicare claims) has advantages and disadvantages.
Administrative data increasingly are used in observational studies
because they are widely available and relatively inexpensive to ana-
lyze. 423 They cover large, diverse groups of real people, for example,
everybody who is enrolled with a particular insurer.424 This minimizes
selection biases, since the effects of taking a particular drug can be
observed in a wide variety of old, young, high- and low-risk patients.425
Administrative data reflect actual clinical effectiveness rather than the-
oretical efficacy in the artificial conditions of clinical trial.4 26 How-
ever, these data have known weaknesses. Entities, such as healthcare
providers and insurers, that maintain these databases generally "lack
motivation to record information that does not have an immediate
impact on reimbursement." 427 Thus, insurance claims data may
record that a person had a laboratory test performed on a certain date
but fail to include the test result.4 2 8 There are coding inconsistencies
(the same medical condition may be recorded differently in different
databases) 429 and biases (such as upcoding, where the severity of a
patient's illness is overstated in order to qualify for higher reimburse-
417 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (3) (C) (i) (VI).
418 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4) (A).
419 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4) (A) (ii).
420 Evans, supra note 6, at 601.
421 Id. at 622-23.
422 Id. at 601, 612.
423 Roos et al., supra note 107, at 47.
424 Id. at 48.
425 Id. at 52.
426 Id. at 50-51.
427 Id. at 48.
428 Id. at 56.
429 FDA, March 7 Proceedings, supra note 227, at 31 (statement of Dr. Jeffrey
Hill).
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ment) .43o Insured people generally tend to be healthier than unin-
sured people, and this can cause administrative data to understate
poor health outcomes.431
Observational studies of drug safety will require linking data
across separate administrative databases (for example, linking insur-
ance claims data with clinical data from various sources to follow the
entire course of a patient's illness, treatment, and outcome; or linking
data across insurers to follow patients through changes in their health
plans). Linkage is technically difficult43 2 and greater degrees of
linkage increase privacy concerns.433 In response, FDA has stated
that, at least initially, it will not adopt a centralized architecture for
the system and will leave raw data where they currently reside (for
example, with an insurer). "Questions would be sent to appropriate,
participating data sources, who in turn would, in accordance with
existing privacy and security safeguards, evaluate their data and send
results for Agency review." 434 This approach aids privacy protection
but may produce lower-quality evidence than could be achieved at a
higher level of data integration.4 3 5 To achieve Congress's objectives,
FDA will need to embrace high levels of data linkage at some point
and, when it does so, the privacy and data security arrangements will
become a topic of crucial public interest.
Administrative data alone cannot resolve questions about risks
and benefits of drugs. Administrative data can reveal, for example,
that a patient was treated for a stroke after having purchased a certain
drug. On average, about 80% of these coincidences turn out to be
something other than a drug-related adverse event.436 Establishing
whether the drug may have caused the stroke requires follow-up analy-
sis, often including a review of the patient's full medical record.437
Thus, FDAAA envisions that FDA may obtain other types of data, if the
430 Roos et al., supra note 107, at 57.
431 Id.
432 Evans, supra note 6, at 594-95.
433 See Mark A. Rothstein, Health Privacy in the Electronic Age, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 487,
489 (2007); Nicholas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidential-
ity of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 700.
434 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Solicitation
No. HHS-FDA-RFI-09-002, FDA Sentinel Initiative: Request for Information (Feb. 20,
2009), [hereinafter FDA, Request for Information], available at https://www.fbo.gov/
index?id=5182af215e556265fde72a8e969fa46e.
435 Evans, supra note 6, at 606.
436 FDA, March 7 Proceedings, supra note 227, at 57 (statement of Dr. Marc
Overhage).
437 See id. at 57-58; id. at 66-68 (statement of Dr. Richard Platt).
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Secretary of HHS deems the data necessary.438 In theory this could
entail access to patients' whole medical records or previously stored
tissue specimens. 439 FDA has indicated it does not plan to invoke this
power on a routine basis. At least during the system's early years, the
plan seems to be to perform observational studies using available
administrative data, with access to full health records only occasionally
and selectively, to clarify the causes of specific observed events.
Large-scale observational studies have enormous potential as an
evidentiary tool. In 2008, the Institute of Medicine noted the need, in
an age of genomic medicine, for follow-up studies to detect unknown
benefits as well as unknown risks.440 The Sentinel System can help
detect both. In addition to speeding the detection of drug safety
problems, it will offer, for the first time, a workable tool to resolve
nagging questions about efficacy. Today, these questions include the
uncertain efficacy of drugs prescribed off-label and drugs approved
based on surrogate endpoints-questions that, in practice, often are
deemed not worth the cost of a clinical trial. In the future, these ques-
tions increasingly will include uncertainties about the long-term effi-
cacy of predictive and preventive medicines which deliver benefits too
remote in time to be observed in traditional clinical trials.
B. The Flexible Best Evidence
The second pillar of FDA's new evidentiary paradigm is that there
is no best evidence-at least, there is no single source of evidence or
methodological "gold standard" that is best for all seasons and all
medical products. The Sentinel System will make it possible to do
observational studies that were not feasible in the past. This means
that, for many questions, more than one study methodology will now
be available, necessitating choices about when to answer questions
and which methodology to use. The routine choices FDA will be mak-
ing for specific drugs in specific contexts will have important ramifica-
tions for the public's health and also may have major commercial
impacts on drug manufacturers. These respective interests may be in
conflict. Appropriate administrative procedures for making these
choices are not yet resolved. This is a matter with which legal scholars
need to engage to ensure that FDA's decisional processes adequately
protect the public's interests.
438 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(k) (3) (C) (i) (III) (aa)-(cc) (West Supp.
2009).
439 Evans, supra note 6, at 588.
440 IOM, DIFrusION & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 24.
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1. Deciding When to Generate Evidence
One of FDA's most crucial determinations under FDAAA will be
when to resolve uncertainty about safety and effectiveness. The key
decision here is whether to answer questions premarket or
postmarket.441 FDA already makes these types of determinations
today, whenever it approves a premarket clinical trial design that
relies on surrogate endpointS442 or intermediate clinical endpoints4 4 3
which, while reflecting some degree of meaningful health improve-
ment, do not ensure a good ultimate outcome. Even before 1992,
when FDA's regulations first addressed the use of surrogate
endpoints, FDA had been using them to approve new drugs.444 "Reli-
ance on a surrogate endpoint almost always introduces some uncer-
tainty into the risk/benefit assessment"445 and defers questions for
later resolution. Clinical trial endpoints set the bar of what must be
known before a product moves into clinical use. For example, will the
manufacturer only have to prove that the drug reduces patients'
blood cholesterol levels, or must they show that the drug reduces
actual accumulations of plaque in their arteries, or that it reduces the
number of strokes and heart attacks they suffer, or that it actually
increases longevity and health?
FDA has insisted that "this judgment does not represent either a
'lower standard' or one inconsistent with section 505(d) of the act
[that is, with the statutory requirement for proof of safety and effi-
441 Id. at 62.
442 See Janet Woodcock, Acting Deputy Comm'r for Operations, Food & Drug
Admin., Presentation, A Framework for Biomarker and Surrogate Endpoint Use in Drug
Development, at slide 6 (Nov. 4, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dock-
ets/ac/04/slides/2004-4079S2_03_Woodcock.ppt (defining surrogate endpoint as a
"biomarker intended to substitute for a clinical endpoint" and noting that a surrogate
endpoint "is expected to predict clinical benefit (or harm, or lack of benefit) based
on epidemiologic, therapeutic, pathophysiological or other scientific evidence");
supra note 240 (discussing surrogate endpoints).
443 See Woodcock, supra note 442, at slide 5 (defining a clinical endpoint as a
"characteristic or variable that reflects how a patient feels, functions, or survives").
444 New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated
Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,944 (Dec. 11, 1992) (discussing, in the preamble to
the accelerated approval rulemaking, the history of FDA's use of surrogate
biomarkers). Under its traditional approval regulations, FDA can approve a product
based on surrogate endpoints if the surrogate is already known to be a good predictor
of favorable clinical outcomes (morbidity and mortality). Under accelerated
approval, FDA can use surrogate endpoints even if the surrogate is only "reasonably
likely" to predict good clinical outcomes. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.510, 601.41
(1992) (detailing criteria for approval based on surrogate endpoints for efficacy).
445 New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated
Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. at 58,944.
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cacy] ."446 Even if one accepts that assertion, it is undeniable that
using surrogate endpoints punts uncertainties into the postmarket
period. FDA's Critical Path Initiative envisions that, in the future,
FDA's approval process will make greater use of surrogate endpoints
for both safety and efficacy.447
There is much to be said on both sides of this issue. Some of the
potential concerns, after FDAAA, are these: As postmarket evidence
development improves, will the sheer availability of postmarket study
options create temptation to defer more and more questions to be
resolved after drug approval? What is the irreducible minimum of
information that must be known about a drug before it goes on the
market? How much residual risk is too much to defer for postmarket
evaluation? Congress delegated these questions to FDA's discretion.
It is not clear how that discretion will be constrained and insulated
from commercial influences.
On the plus side, the use of surrogate endpoints may make it pos-
sible for FDA to address a longstanding problem that Congress was
unwilling to confront. For many years, the 1962 Drug Amendments
have been criticized 448 as a costly (over $800 million per drug) way to
generate dubious evidence of safety and efficacy (see Parts II and III
above) while delaying patients' access to desired therapeutic possibili-
ties (as in Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach449) and deterring innova-
tion to develop new therapies (as reflected in the declining number of
new drugs put forward for approval450). FDAAA does not directly
address whether the 1962 Amendments were fundamentally ill con-
ceived. For those who believe they were, FDAAA merely spreads an
additional layer of regulation-postmarket evidence development-
over the failed edifice of the 1962 evidentiary paradigm (a remedia-
tion concept akin to the Chernobyl sarcophagus), as if more regula-
tion can solve the problems of defective regulation. The right
approach, all along, may have been to allow drugs onto the market
based on evidence of basic safety plus plausible grounds to expect effi-
446 Id.
447 See FDA, INNOVATION OR STAGNATION, supra note 143, at 16-25.
448 See, e.g., Roberts & Bodenheimer, supra note 14; Lechter, supra note 90; Califf,
supra note 25 (criticizing impacts of the 1962 Amendments on drug access, drug
development costs, and pharmaceutical innovation).
449 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008); see also supra
note 201 and related text (discussing Abigail Alliance).
450 FDA, INNOVATION OR STAGNATION, supra note 143, at 2 fig. 2 (showing a declin-
ing ten-year trend in innovative therapies submitted for FDA approval); see also
Epstein, supra note 43, at 32 ("The pace of innovation was without question greater in
the era of less regulation.").
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cacy, subject to rigorous postmarket studies to assess-quickly-
whether the expectations at approval are borne out, with decisive
actions taken when they are not. FDAAA creates infrastructure that
would support rapid postmarket assessments of this type. However,
Congress did not make corresponding adjustments to reduce the cost,
access delays, and other problems of FDA's existing premarket eviden-
tiary requirements.
Statutory reform of these requirements likely was seen as politi-
cally infeasible, particularly in the post-Vioxx environment. The pub-
lic likes the idea of FDA's premarket clinical trial process, whatever its
methodological limitations may be (and these are poorly under-
stood). Reforming the threshold requirements for drug approval,
overtly via statute, would have been a recipe for public outrage. Con-
gress avoided the issue. This implicitly delegated to FDA the task of
determining how FDA's premarket evidence requirements might be
adapted in the post-FDAAA world where postmarket studies are a real-
istic option. FDA already has the power to make this determination
through its routine, day-to-day decisions concerning suitable
endpoints for premarket clinical trials. As a science-based, discretion-
ary determination, these decisions will be virtually unreviewable. Yet
they will be a fulcrum of public protection after FDAAA. The process
through which they are made and their impacts need to be
transparent.
2. Choices Among Study Methodologies
Once a drug has been approved, the critical issue will be which
study methodology to use to resolve lingering uncertainties and, in
particular, when to insist on postmarket RCTs. 451 Pharmacogenomics
often is described as "the right drug, at the right dose, for the right
patient."452 FDAAA takes a similar view of regulatory evidence during
the postmarket period: getting the best evidence of benefits and risks
requires the right methodology, at the right time, for the right prod-
uct. FDA's traditional premarket study requirements continue in
effect and will provide a certain "floor" of risk-benefit information
that will be available for all approved drugs (although, as has been the
case before FDAAA, this floor will be somewhat moveable based on
the choice of clinical trial endpoints). After approval, the situation
grows even more fluid. FDAAA does not establish any generally appli-
cable requirements for postmarket study methodologies.
451 IOM, DwFusIoN & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 62.
452 This phrase has been so endlessly repeated that it is difficult to determine who
first said it.
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FDAAA recognizes that different study methodologies may supply
the best evidence at different points in a drug's life cycle. After
approval, the preferred methodology for further studies may vary
from drug to drug and may depend on the type of risk being studied
(for example, how rare the risk is, or how serious). Data from pro-
spective RCTs are not always the best evidence. 453 Clinical trials study
a proxy for reality-a small trial population-rather than the large,
diverse population that is actually consuming a drug. Clinical trials
make sense in the premarket period, when no other clinical data
exist. However, large observational studies of people who actually
took the drug may be the best way to study safety after approval.454
Postmarket observational studies may reveal a risk faster than a phase
IV clinical trial could have done. 455 Clinical trials and observational
studies both may be needed during the postmarket period to get a full
picture of a drug's risks and benefits.456 Observational studies offer
advantages for studying long-term outcomes in the real-world clinical
setting457 and they may be superior if the risk being studied would
make an RCT unethical.458 Postmarket RCTs do offer advantages for
certain questions, '4 5 9 but they are not always feasible.4 60 In 2008, an
Institute of Medicine workshop on genomic innovation noted the
need for flexible evidentiary standards that employ a combination of
methodologies.461 FDAAA embraces this view.
FDA has discretion to decide the best way to clarify risks and ben-
efits after drugs are approved. FDAAA calls for FDA's Drug Safety and
Risk Management Advisory Committee (or its successor) to provide
guidance to the agency on priority safety questions and the best ways
453 IOM, DIFFUsION & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 64.
454 FDA, March 7 Proceedings, supra note 227, at 4 (statement of Dr. Andrew von
Eschenbach).
455 See supra notes 250-51 and related text (discussing speed with which Vioxx
risks could have been detected using large-scale observational techniques).
456 See IOM, FUTURE OF DRUc SAFETY, supra note 23, at 105-06; FURBERG &
FURBERc, supra note 60, at 17 .
457 Weisman et al., supra note 95, at 129.
458 FURBERG & FURBERG, supra note 60, at 29.
459 IOM, FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 23, at 105-06 (discussing advantages
of postmarket trials to confirm efficacy of drugs approved using surrogate efficacy
biomarkers and to assess causation of common adverse events (such as a heart attack)
which might have been caused either by the drug or by the patients' underlying
condition).
460 Wylie Burke, General Observations, in IOM, DIvUSIoN & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS,
supra note 143, at 81, 82; see also IOM, DIFFUSION & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note
143, at 64 ("Not everything will be tested.").
461 Burke, supra note 460, at 82.
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to study them. 4 6 2 The options may include studies using Sentinel Sys-
tem data, other post-approval studies, or postmarket clinical trials.463
FDAAA calls for these decisions to be made in a "public process." 4 6 4
What this means is unclear. These decisions will involve complex sci-
entificjudgments that few members of the public can wield. It may be
hard to enlist public involvement when, as noted earlier, many mem-
bers of the public are under the impression that FDA-approved drugs
have no risks.4 65
Before FDAAA, the public has shown very little interest in the
related decisions FDA makes about the choice of endpoints in
premarket trials. Is it plausible that the public will engage with deci-
sions about the timing and methodology for postmarket studies?
Even if the public does engage, its involvement may be ill-informed
and unconstructive. Caskey has noted a tendency of patient advocacy
groups to view evidence generation with suspicion, seeing evidence as
a tool for denial of insurance reimbursement rather than as a tool for
making treatments safer and more effective. 466 This phenomenon
was seen again recently when patient advocacy groups protested provi-
sions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009467
(ARRA) that would fund studies of the comparative effectiveness of
drugs. 4 68 Such studies aim to protect patients by assessing which
drugs work and which do not work, but there was alarm that these
data might justify denial of insurance coverage for the underperform-
ing drugs. Why the protestors desired to protect their access to badly
performing drugs was not explained.469
If the public will not or cannot engage, then what is an appropri-
ate regulatory response? Should the government appoint-and pay
462 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4) (C) (West Supp. 2009).
463 Id.
464 Id.
465 See IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 1, 7.
466 C. Thomas Caskey, The Drug Development Crisis: Efficiency and Safety, 58 ANN.
REV. MED. 1, 10 (2006).
467 Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
468 See, e.g., Alicia Mundy, Drug Makers Fight Stimulus Provision, WALL ST.J., Feb. 10,
2009, at A4 (describing concerns that comparative effectiveness research may lead to
rationing of health care); Betsy McCaughey, Ruin Your Health With the Obama Stimulus
Plan, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206700
01&refer=columnist mccaughey&sid=aLzfDxfbwhzs (expressing concern that com-
parative effectiveness provisions of ARRA will enforce excessive uniformity and erode
patient care).
469 But see Mundy, supra note 468 (pointing out that some advocacy groups whose
names may suggest they are patient advocacy organizations actually are lobbying arms
of the drug, device, and biotechnology industries).
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for-a scientific panel with a specific duty to represent the public's
interests in these discussions? The pharmaceutical industry will be
represented by well qualified scientists of its own. FDA, as regulator,
ordinarily would be responsible for protecting the public's interest;
however, it may be some years before the agency regains sufficient
public trust to serve credibly in this role.
If meaningful public representation is not possible, can the
impact of FDA's choices at least be made more transparent? For
example, FDA could disclose more clearly what is not known about
the safety and effectiveness of drugs when they are approved, and
what FDA has decided to leave unknown by not ordering particular
types of study. Today's drug labeling tells only what is known about a
drug's risks and benefits but does not give a sense of all that is still
unknown. This has contributed to a culture of mass drug marketing
and consumption in which people are eager to get the latest drug,
often believing that it must be better and safer than older drugs when
in fact, such comparative data rarely exist.470 FDA's regulatory pro-
cess, to date, has failed to convey a proper sense of its own uncer-
tainty. "Humility about the limits of science is critical to enjoy the
trust and respect of the public."4 7 1 There are still large gaps in knowl-
edge. 4 7 2 FDAAA aims to reduce those gaps through postmarket evi-
dence development. As it does so, the effort needs to embrace
procedures that improve public awareness of the gaps still there.
C. Successive Improvement of the Risk-Benefit Ratio
FDAAA rejects the notion that the risk-benefit ratio is a fixed
attribute of the drug product itself. The risk-benefit ratio is dynamic
and can be successively improved throughout a drug's commercial
life. 4 7 3 Safety and efficacy are no longer attributes of the drug itself,
but of the drug and the decisional process through which it is pre-
scribed. In principle, almost any drug can be made safer and more
effective by using biomarker tests to screen patients and predict which
people will respond favorably to that drug.4 7 4 Obviously, some drugs
are more promising candidates for these strategies than other
470 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFEcTIVENESS OF MEDI-
cAL TREATMENTs 4 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/
12-18-ComparativeEffectiveness.pdf.
471 IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 24 (reporting presentation of
Dr. DennisJ. Paustenbach).
472 Id. at 25.
473 Evans, supra note 222, at 791-92.
474 George W. Sledge, What is Targeted Therapy?, 23 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1614
(2005).
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drugs.47 5 When a drug is teamed with a screening test that accurately
predicts safety and/or effectiveness, the result is a successor product
(the drug-test hybrid) that offers a new risk-benefit ratio superior to
that of the stand-alone drug.
FDAAA recognizes that successive improvement requires contri-
butions from parties other than the drug manufacturer. FDA's 1962
evidentiary paradigm relied on drug manufacturers to conduct
research to establish drugs as safe and effective.47 6 Their work was
seen as substantially complete at the point of FDA approval477 when
they had produced a drug with a passable average risk-benefit ratio.
Unfortunately, manufacturers' incentives to make successive improve-
ments are rather weak after drug approval. 478 Sales of drugs to non-
responders are highly remunerative, accounting for an estimated 40%
of overall pharmaceutical industry revenues at present.479 A rational
manufacturer would tend not to invest in research to cut its own reve-
nues. Such research bestows positive externalities on other parties,
such as sellers of screening tests and doctors whose drug-injury liabili-
ties might be reduced if adverse responders were screened out.4 80
FDA's regulations have not had-and even after FDAAA will not
have-an effective cost-spreading mechanism to let drug manufactur-
ers recover the costs of postmarket research from all the other parties
who stand to gain from an improved risk-benefit ratio.48'
475 See Lawrence J. Lesko & Janet Woodcock, Translation of Pharmacogenomics and
Pharmacogenetics: A Regulatory Perspective, 3 NATURE REvs. 763, 767 (2004) (noting that
screening strategies are most promising for drugs that have a narrow therapeutic
range, large individual variability of response, and serious safety problems).
476 FURBERG& FURBERG, supra note 60, at 7.
477 Evans, supra note 222, at 791-92.
478 For discussion of incentives for pharmacogenomic research by drug manufac-
turers, see generally, Peakman & Arlington, supra note 224, at 35-40 (discussing
future marketing challenges and legal liability issues that may confront pharmaceuti-
cal companies that do not provide tailored medicines); Lembit Rgo, Pharmacoge-
nomics and Existing Therapies, 17 WHO DRUG INFO. 84 (2003) (noting a trend by
regulatory authorities to require pharmaceutical companies to identify which patients
are most likely to benefit from a drug); Michael Dickson et al., Survey of
Pharmacoeconomic Assessment Activity in Eleven Countries (Org. for Econ. Co-operation &
Dev., Working Paper No. 4, 2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/
25/2955828.pdf (discussing the use of pharmacoeconomic assessment by OECD in
determining which drugs are reimbursed through public health programs).
479 BarbaraJ. Evans et al., Creating Incentives for Genomic Research to Improve Targeting
of Therapies, 10 NATURE MED. 1289, 1289 (2004) (basing weighted average estimate
over all classes of drugs on Peakman & Arlington statistics for non-response rates and
HHS estimates for annual prescription drug expenditures).
480 See Evans & Flockhart, supra note 81, at 56.
481 Id.
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FDAAA seeks to engage parties other than the drug manufacturer
in the process of improving the safety and effectiveness of FDA-
approved drugs. Such parties include, for example, academic
researchers; clinical laboratories and test manufacturers; developers
of screening strategies, bioinformatics algorithms, and software; and
health care providers. 48 2 In the past decade, academic researchers
and other third parties (such as genetic test developers) have played
key roles in identifying genetic and molecular screening strategies to
use with preexisting drugs.48 3 Discovery of biomarkers and tests to
predict drug response "is often undertaken outside of the company
developing the drug."48 4 This pattern of third-party discovery is
expected to continue.4 85 "Networked discovery"48 6 also is common
and involves cooperative work among test developers, drug compa-
nies, academic and clinical laboratories, health care providers and
payers, and other entities.487
Third-party discovery requires policies to "bridge the gap
between the basic and clinical world, as well as to connect academic
and industrial realms."488 The Institute of Medicine has noted a need
for greater coordination to accelerate progress in biomarker discov-
ery8 9 and has called for new models of cooperation. 49 0 FDA's ability
to foster the required cooperation has been a concern. Many of the
parties just discussed are not subject to FDA regulation. FDAAA does
not change FDA's jurisdiction or extend it to new entities not already
regulated by FDA. However, without regulating the parties them-
selves, FDA still can take steps to remove barriers that stand in their
way. FDAAA contains provisions aimed at encouraging cooperative
activities, including the access provisions discussed in Part V.D and the
risk management provisions discussed in Part V.G.
482 Evans, supra note 222, at 787-88.
483 See Lesko & Woodcock, supra note 475, at 767 (citing example); Sledge, supra
note 474, at 1614 (discussing the discovery of new strategies for targeting older breast
cancer therapies).
484 IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED TooLs, supra note 174, at 21 (reporting presentation
of Dr. Paul Waring).
485 Evans, supra note 222, at 757.
486 Id. at 788 fig. 5.
487 Id.; see also IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED Tools, supra note 174, at 24-26 (reporting
presentation of Dr. Paul Waring) (discussing challenges of cooperation between drug
and test developers).
488 IOM, BIOMARKER-BASED TootS, supra note 174, at 60 (reporting remarks of Dr.
Michael E. Phelps).
489 Id. at 57-58 (reporting presentation of Dr. Stephen Friend).
490 IOM, DIFFUSION & GENOMIC INNOVATIONS, supra note 143, at 21.
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D. Putting Evidence Into the Hands of Innovators
Problems with data access have been a major barrier to successive
improvement of drugs by third parties (parties other than the drug
manufacturer) .491 Data on clinical experience with drugs are neces-
sary to detect variations in response and to explore reasons for the
variations. FDA's old evidentiary paradigm relied heavily on drug
manufacturers to collect data and conduct postmarket studies.4 92 As a
result, much of what is known about the clinical performance of drugs
is in proprietary data sets not available to other researchers. Even
when data theoretically are available (for example, by collecting
adverse event statistics directly from health care providers) the cost of
assembling them can be prohibitive, especially for thinly capitalized
test developers and academic researchers. Investment in duplicative
data sets wastes funds that otherwise could be spent validating new
screening strategies and developing new tests.
A crucial feature of the Sentinel network is its access provisions.
FDAAA lets FDA engage outside entities to help establish the Sentinel
network.4 93 FDAAA also lets FDA involve public, academic, and pri-
vate entities in various functions that use Sentinel data, such as classi-
fying, analyzing, or aggregating Sentinel data; investigating priority
drug safety questions; and performing advanced studies and analysis
of safety risk.494 The entities involved in establishing the network can
be, but need not be, the same entities engaged to analyze the data.
Thus, FDA could collaborate with insurers or other holders of large
datasets to establish the system and engage those same entities to per-
form studies and analytical functions with the data. However, FDA
also could engage entirely different entities to conduct studies and
analysis. FDA has wide discretion to determine which entities are
appropriate partners for which functions.
FDA has expressed its intent to adopt a decentralized phase I net-
work architecture in which organizations that possess data would
respond to queries from FDA and return responses to the agency in
491 Id. (noting that "the system prevents open exchange of information and cre-
ates many barriers to communication among affected parties"); see also IOM,
BIOMARKER-BASED TooLs, supra note 174, at 57 (reporting presentation of Dr. Ste-
phen Friend) (calling for more access to patient materials and data); Evans, supra
note 222, at 788 (discussing various legal and regulatory barriers to cooperation).
492 FDA, March 8 Proceedings, supra note 388, at 85 (statement of Dr. Tom
Gross).
493 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k)(3)(C)(v) (West Supp. 2009).
494 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4) (A), 355 (k) (4) (D) (i).
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aggregated, de-identified form.495 Under this design, FDA would be
engaging these organizations to provide both data access and analyti-
cal services to respond to FDA's queries. However, FDA also has legal
authority to approve use of the Sentinel network to respond to queries
submitted by outside entities, so long as their queries fit within the
scope of authorized uses of Sentinel data described in FDAAA. 496
From a legal standpoint, it would be lawful for FDA to approve release
of Sentinel data either to the agency itself or to outside users that FDA
has engaged to do analytical work.4 97 These users could be parties
other than the organizations that possess the data. However, the
agency is keenly aware of the privacy issues this presents and has indi-
cated it does not plan to move data away from their current loca-
tions.498 The more likely scenario would be for outside users to work
with FDA to define queries which, if approved by the agency, would be
submitted for analysis behind the privacy firewalls of organizations
that possess the data, with answers returned in an aggregated,
anonymized form.499 FDA is still in the process of developing Sentinel
System governance arrangements, including the framework for
approving outside data uses (or queries) and the terms and condi-
tions of such uses.500 These arrangements obviously are critical to the
tasks of protecting privacy, ensuring that data are used ethically, and
maintaining public acceptability of all data uses.5 0
The effect of these provisions is to empower FDA to engage enti-
ties other than those that now possess data to perform drug safety
studies and research that use the data. It is fairly easy to criticize these
495 See, e.g., JANET M. MARCHIBRODA, EHEALTH INITIATIVE FOUND., DEVELOPING A
GovERNANCE AND OPERATIONS STRUCTURE FOR THE SENTINEL INITIATIVE 4, 8 (2009),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?
R=09000064809a82f0 (discussing FDA's phase I network architecture in which organi-
zations that now process data would keep the data behind their respective privacy
firewalls and respond to queries sent by FDA).
496 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(k) (4)(A) (i)-(iii); see also FDA, SENTINEL
INITIATIVE, supra note 137, at 16 (showing a research component as part of the sys-
tem's organizational structure).
497 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(VI) (authorizing "export" of
data for further aggregation, statistical analysis, or reporting).
498 Evans, supra note 6, at 621, 626.
499 See FDA, Request for Information, supra note 434.
500 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin. et al., Sentinel Initiative: Structure, Function,
and Scope (Dec. 16, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathnitiative/PastEventsonCPl/UCM11346
9.pdf) (exploring Sentinel System governance and privacy issues at a day-long public
workshop in Washington, D.C.).
501 Evans, supra note 6, at 639-53 (discussing Sentinel System governance
arrangements).
2010] 495
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
access provisions on ethical or privacy grounds. It is perhaps harder
to understand why Congress saw them as a necessary part of the new
evidentiary paradigm. Making drugs safer and more effective requires
making evidence accessible to the parties most likely to pursue that
goal. FDAAA breaks FDA's sole dependence on the drug manufac-
turer as a source of discovery and innovation in response to emerging
evidence. It does not compel third parties to innovate, but enables
them to do so. If drug manufacturers lack incentives to improve the
risk-benefit ratio of their approved drugs, then FDA can arrange third-
party access to Sentinel data for uses that serve that goal. Under
FDA's phase I architecture, this "access" likely would take the form of
approving queries from qualified third parties with which FDA is col-
laborating. The possibility of engaging outside parties to help
improve drug safety may, in itself, help improve incentives for drug
manufacturers to do so, knowing that others may enter the field if
they fail.
Frankly, the concern is not whether FDA will over-share access to
Sentinel data. The concern is that FDA may fail to ensure the level of
access Congress envisioned. In recent years FDA has tended to favor a
consensual model of regulation, a sort of regulation by consent of the
regulated, and has shown a certain reluctance to flex compulsory
power.50 2 In line with this preference, FDA has been pursuing volun-
tary arrangements to get private holders of data (such as large insur-
ers, healthcare providers, and pharmaceutical companies) to
participate in the Sentinel network.503 This approach may place FDA
under pressure to agree to terms that restrict third-party queries. For
example, data holders might agree to run queries only for other data
holders that have contributed data; they may wish to exclude queries
by entities that have not contributed data of their own. Such restric-
tions would perpetuate access barriers for test developers and other
502 See, e.g., id. at 631-33 (discussing FDA's traditional reliance on voluntary regu-
latory compliance); infra Part V.G.1 (discussing FDA's voluntary approach to cross-
labeling issues).
503 See, e.g., MARCHIBRODA, supra note 495, at 6-7, 13 (asserting that FDA lacks
authority to compel data access); FDA, Request for Information, supra note 434
("Data will continue to be managed by its owners, and only data or organizations who
agree to participate in this system will be included."). But see BarbaraJ. Evans, Author-
ity of the Food and Drug Administration to Require Data Access and Control Rights in the
Sentinel Data Network, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. (forthcoming Feb. 2010) (manuscript at
7-46, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1508672) (analyzing FDA's statutory
power to require data access and concluding that FDAAA gives FDA authority to
require access to data, even if the agency may prefer, for policy reasons, to pursue
consensual approaches).
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third parties that may have little data to contribute, but who could
make productive use of drug-related data if granted access.
FDA must resist pressure to accept terms that thwart Congress's
purpose, which was to provide data access to those best able to
improve drug safety. FDA may need to flex the full array of compul-
sory powers available to it. The quest for regulation by consensus is a
laudable one unless it thwarts achievement of Congress's public
health objectives. Appropriate access to Sentinel data was an essential
feature of Congress's overall postmarket regulatory design.
Sentinel data access appears set to emerge as a fruitful subject of
scholarship and litigation once the system is up and running. Given
the breadth of FDA's discretion to approve or disapprove proposed
uses of Sentinel data (i.e., to approve which queries can be run), will
access be nondiscriminatory and will the access procedures be clearly
enunciated? What recourse will be available if the agency fails to
implement appropriate third-party access? In the tort litigation con-
text, there will be questions about the discoverability of the underly-
ing Sentinel System data themselves, in situations where FDA has used
these data to generate risk-benefit information that is publicly
reported in summary form.504 These and many other access-related
issues are ripe for study as is the problem of protecting individual pri-
vacy in various contexts of access and disclosure.
E. Making Efficacy Regulation Effective
FDAAA's handling of efficacy is revolutionary. The revolution is
in a definitional section where it is easy to overlook. For the first time
in history,50 5 Congress has instructed FDA to concern itself with indi-
vidual variations in a drug's effectiveness and to treat these variations
as a potential safety issue in their own right. This aspect of FDAAA
has significant potential to influence broader legal norms surround-
ing the sale and consumption of drugs. For example, if FDA regards
efficacy failure as a safety problem, will courts eventually recognize it
as a basis for tort liability?
504 See FDAAA § 915, 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(r)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2009) (calling for
summaries of Sentinel System findings to be published on FDA's Internet-based com-
munication system described infra Part V.G.1); see also Mark A. Hall et al., Measuring
Medical Practice Patterns: Sources of Evidence from Health Services Research, 37 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 779 (2002) (discussing the related problem of tapping large databases used in
health services research for use as evidence of the standard of care in malpractice
cases).
505 See discussion infra Part V.F.
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FDAAA achieves this change through a subtle, three-step sleight
of definition.506 The change is almost invisible in the text. First, Con-
gress defines a new term, "adverse drug experience,"507 which
includes the usual things FDA traditionally counted as drug-related
adverse events plus "any failure of expected pharmacological action of
the drug."50 8 This last prong would let non-responders509 be counted
as having had an adverse drug experience. Non-responders are
neither hurt nor helped by a drug. Because they are unhurt, they
traditionally were not seen as having suffered an adverse event. Yet,
obviously, it is an adverse experience to take a drug and still be sick.
Moreover, it is a common experience: efficacy failure is estimated to
occur with 30-60% of the prescriptions written in the United
States. 510 Second, Congress defined a "serious" adverse drug experi-
ence as one that kills or places the patient at immediate risk of death,
results in persistent or significant incapacity or substantial disruption
of ability to conduct normal life functions, or which may require med-
ical or surgical intervention to prevent such outcomes.51' Third, Con-
gress closed the definitional loop by equating "serious risk" to risk of a
serious adverse drug experience.5 1 2
These little changes give FDA big new powers. The agency can
tackle the problem of non-response with the same tools it has availa-
ble for managing drug safety problems. These tools include, for
example, the power to order postmarket studies, labeling changes,
and risk mitigation steps described infra.5 1 3  In situations where
patients' non-response to a drug entails potentially serious conse-
quences, such as death or significant incapacity, FDA can address the
506 FDAAA §§ 901(b), 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355-1(b)(1), 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(II).
507 Id. § 901(b), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(b) (1).
508 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(b) (1) (E).
509 See supra fig. 1 (schematically depicting non-responders as the 40% of patients
in the center of the chart who received neither benefits nor harms from the drug).
510 See Peakman & Arlington, supra note 224; see also Kenneth R. Evans, Ontario
Cancer Biomarker Network, Presentation, Challenges and Potential in Biomarker Discov-
ery and Development, at slide 3 (on file with author) (reporting a non-response rate of
40-60% for depression drugs; a 4-75% non-response rate for asthma drugs; a
50-75% non-response rate for certain diabetes drugs (sulfonurea, biguanides, and
glitazones), and a 70-90% non-response rate for various drugs used in treating breast,
lung, and brain cancers); Henderson & Reavis, supra note 315, at 2 fig. 1 (showing
non-response rates for fourteen major classes of drugs and reporting that non-
response rates vary from 20% to around 75%, with most drugs having non-response
rates in the 40-60% range).
511 FDAAA § 901(b), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1 (b) (4) (A).
512 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1 (b) (5).
513 See discussion infra Part V.G.2.
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problem of non-response just as it would address any other safety
issue. This empowers FDA to conduct postmarket surveillance of effi-
cacy-a crucial power in the age of genomic medicine, when many
products will be entering the market with unresolved questions about
their long-term efficacy.
Historically, FDA has viewed non-response as an efficacy issue but
not a safety issue in its own right. This view is imbedded in the risk-
benefit methodology FDA uses to assess safety when approving new
drugs. This methodology (which still is in effect as of today) requires
reviewers to distinguish two types of adverse events: (1) those that are
attributable to progression of the underlying disease (that is, to non-
response), and (2) those that are caused by the drug itself.5 1 4 Only
the latter events are counted in the risk-benefit ratio FDA uses to
assess whether the drug is safe enough to approve.5 15 Injuries caused
by non-response are deliberately ignored. Yet these harms are poten-
tially serious. Though not directly poisoned by the drug, non-
responders may suffer "lost-chance"5 16 injuries (opportunity costs),
including profound ones. Cancer patients may die. Diabetes patients
may suffer kidney failure, loss of eyesight, or amputations. The poten-
tial for lost-chance injuries exists whenever a patient has a progressive
disease and multiple treatment options are available. Taking an inef-
fective drug implies foregoing other therapies that might have halted
or slowed the disease progression.
FDAAA may or may not lead to changes in the risk-benefit meth-
odology FDA applies during drug approval, but it will change the way
non-response is handled after approval. This approach (waiting until
the postmarket period to address the safety impacts of non-response)
makes sense. These impacts arise when a drug is effective on average
(and hence approvable) but fails to work in some patients. In other
words, the potential for harm reflects individual variability in response
to the drug. Data on individual variability often are of poor quality at
the point when drugs are first approved. Clinical trials, with their
small sample sizes and short duration, may spot some instances of
non-response and may provide some insight into the health conse-
quences. However, much larger sample sizes are needed to under-
514 See CDER, MAPP 6010.3, supra note 216, §§ 7.1, 7.1.5.5; FDA, CONDUCTING A
CLINICAL SAFELY REVIEW, supra note 142, at 5-6, 8, 12-14.
515 See id.; see also Evans, supra note 222, at 762-64 (discussing this problem).
516 "Lost-chance" doctrine, which is recognized in some states, lets patients bring
tort suits when they have suffered irreversible disease progression as a result of a neg-
ligent error or delay in treating or diagnosing their disease. See, e.g., Martin J. McMa-
hon, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Measure and Elements of Damages in Actions Based
on Loss of Chance, 81 A.L.R. 4th 485 (1990).
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stand the full range of variability, and longer follow-up is needed to
assess how non-response ultimately affects health outcomes. This
problem lends itself to large postmarket observational studies. In all
likelihood, FDA will continue to approve drugs with significant rates
of non-response, just as it has done in the past. However, FDAAA
adds non-response to the list of issues to be monitored and managed
in the postmarket period. That is the right time to address this prob-
lem, since that is when high-quality regulatory evidence first becomes
available.
F. Piercing the Veil of Average Safety and Efficacy
In the twentieth century, FDA restricted its focus to average safety
and efficacy.5 17 This was driven partly by scientific limitations of the
day, but another factor was at work: There was legislative intent for
FDA not to concern itself with individual variations in drug response.
Congress expressed this intent clearly when enacting the 1962 amend-
ments. By authorizing FDA to concern itself with variability of treat-
ment response,5 18 FDAAA redraws a forty-five-year-old jurisdictional
boundary.
The scope of FDA's power to regulate medical practice, a tradi-
tional area of state regulation, was a "hot-button" issue as Congress
debated passage of the 1938 Act.519 Congress disclaimed intent for
FDA's regulation of medical products to entail broad regulation of
medical practice.520 As a matter of policy, FDA subsequently sought to
avoid regulating physicians' activities.5 21 This policy may account for
FDA's failure to address the safety impacts of non-response between
1938 and 1962. The 1938 Act authorized FDA to oversee drug safety
but not drug efficacy.522 This would have let FDA address non-
response, but only to the extent that it was viewed as a safety problem.
517 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
518 See discussion supra Part V.E.
519 SeeJoel E. Hoffman, Administrative Procedures of the Food and Drug Administration,
in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 20, at 13, 17-24; Evans &
Flockhart, supra note 81, at 50-51 (discussing legislative debate in the late 1930s).
520 Legal Status of Approved Labeling of Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses
Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503 (Aug. 15,
1972) (discussing, in the preamble to a proposed rulemaking, Congress's legislative
intent in passing the FDCA).
521 Id.; see also David G. Adams, The Food and Drug Administration's Regulation of
Health Care Professionals, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 20,
at 423 ("FDA has traditionally taken the position that it does not regulate the practice
of medicine or pharmacy and has generally avoided regulatory actions that would
directly restrict or interfere with professional service to patients.").
522 See discussion supra Introduction.
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It was indeed a safety problem then as now. However, non-response
was (and still is) primarily an efficacy issue. From the early twentieth
century up until the 1962 amendments went into effect, questions of
efficacy were regarded as the province of physicians and the medical
profession.5 23 Nongovernmental bodies such as the American Medi-
cal Association operated programs to assess drug efficacy and dissemi-
nate this information to their members.524 To have addressed safety
impacts of non-response, FDA would have had to intrude on "efficacy
space" already occupied by physicians. FDA declined to do so.
The 1962 amendments at last authorized FDA to address ques-
tions of efficacy. Before these amendments were passed, however,
there was a legislative struggle over what "efficacy" means. During this
struggle, Congress parsed efficacy into two aspects, only one of which
would be subject to federal oversight. In 1962, legislators understood
that efficacy assessments involve subjective judgments5 25 and that
unambiguous proof of efficacy rarely exists. Senators Dirksen and
Hruska sought assurance that FDA would not require unanimous or
even preponderant evidence of efficacy before approving a drug.52"
In response, the 1962 amendments required only "substantial" evi-
dence of efficacy52 7-a position advocated by the pharmaceutical
industry.528 Congress expressed its intent that: (1) this standard
should not imply "identical results for different patients"5 29 and (2)
physicians, rather than FDA, should be the ultimate arbiters of what is
effective for a particular patient.530 Thus, Congress was fully aware of
individual variability of drug response but steered FDA away from
engaging with this problem.
In effect, Congress deemed average efficacy to be a product regu-
latory issue subject to federal regulation, but left individual efficacy in
the realm of state medical practice regulation. Two factors explain
523 See Lechter, supra note 90, at 144 (citing PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 131-33 (1982)).
524 Id.
525 Id. at 156.
526 Id.
527 S. REP. No. 1744, supra note 14, at 2921.
528 SeeJulie A. Grow, The Legislative History of the 1962 Drug Amendments 32
(May 1, 1997) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://leda.aw.harvard.edu/
leda/data/189/jgrow.pdf (citing Hearings before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, pursuant to S. Res. 52 and S. 1552, Pt. 4, 87th Cong.
1997 (1961) (statement of Eugene N. Beesley, President, Eli Lilly & Co.), reprinted in
19 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG,
AND COSMETIC AcT AND ITs AMENDMENTs 810-11 (1979)).
529 S. REP. No. 1744, supra note 14, at 2921.
530 Id. at 2920-21.
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Congress's decision. The first was the primitive state of mid-twentieth-
century science, which saw variable response as a chance event,
beyond human control and, therefore, not something that could be
improved through regulatory oversight.531 Second, the scope of fed-
eral power to regulate medical practice was a concern in 1962 just as it
had been in 1938.532 The American Medical Association opposed the
1962 amendments. 533 Making drugs effective at the level of individual
patients requires physician involvement.534 Even if FDA could
describe specific types of people likely to respond badly or favorably to
a drug, physicians still would need to assess whether patients met
those criteria and they would need to prescribe drugs appropriately in
light of that information.535 To ensure individual efficacy, the agency
seemingly would need a mechanism for enforcing physicians' compli-
ance with its approved product labeling. In 1962, Congress was
unwilling to assert that federal jurisdiction extended that far. In fair-
ness, Congress's decision did not significantly diminish public health
or safety: The science of that day would not have supported meaning-
ful regulation of individual effects, even if Congress had been com-
fortable with the jurisdictional issues it presented.536
Twentieth-century law meekly accepted science's incapacity to
predict whether drugs will or will not be effective for particular
patients. This resignation was seen in Congress's parsing of efficacy in
1962, and it is reflected in the risk-benefit methodology FDA still uses
today to approve new drugs. It has influenced broader legal doctrine
(such as tort liability standards that presently impose few duties to
ensure the efficacy of health care) and commercial norms in the
health care industry (such as payment and insurance reimbursement
531 Evans & Flockhart, supra note 81, at 47.
532 S. REP. No. 1744, supra note 14, at 2920-21.
533 Lechter, supra note 90, at 148; see also Grow, supra note 528, at 15-17 (recount-
ing testimony given on behalf of AMA during hearings before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary as the 1962 amend-
ments were considered).
534 See Hearings before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, pursuant to S. Res. 52 and 5. 1552, pt. 1, 87th Cong. 37 (1961) (statement
of Dr. Hugh H. Hussey, Chairman, Bd. of Trustees, Am. Med. Ass'n), reprinted in 17
U.S. FooD & DRUG ADMIN., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND
COSMETIC Acr AND ITS AMENDMENTS 608 (1979).
535 See IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 16-17 ("Accurately identi-
fying such populations involves significant physician involvement, over which .. . FDA
has little control. While .. . FDA can define benefits and risks for different popula-
tions, it cannot prevent the inappropriate prescribing by physicians once a drug is on
the market.").
536 See Evans & Flockhart, supra note 81, at 47.
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standards that require no refunds when treatments fail). FDAAA
asserts that it is time to do something about treatment failure. This is
revolutionary; the revolution was timely if not overdue. It remains to
be seen whether, how, and when FDAAA's new view of therapeutic
non-response may rub off on other areas of health law. The immedi-
ate impact is that efficacy failure is now, at least for postmarket regula-
tory purposes, a legitimate drug safety issue and Congress, for the first
time, sees individual/subgroup variability as a legitimate concern of
federal regulation.
G. Making Evidence Consequential
The seventh pillar of the new paradigm is expanded regulatory
decisionmaking authority in the postmarket period. The postmarket
evidence FDA was gathering before FDAAA was "seriously flawed"5 3 7
and has been criticized as giving an incomplete picture of the safety of
approved drugs.538 It deserves an even harsher criticism: it was largely
inconsequential. Congress had given FDA very little power to order
action in response to emerging postmarket evidence. Without such
power, postmarket evidence is idle knowledge. FDAAA grants FDA a
bundle of new powers to apply postmarket evidence to improve the
public's health.
1. Communicating Evidence to the Public and Physicians
FDAAA lets FDA require safety-related labeling changes at any
point in a drug's life cycle. 53 9 Before FDAAA, FDA had control over
initial product labeling, but if new risks emerged after product
537 IOM, UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 52.
538 See IOM EMERGING SAFETY SCIENCE, supra note 80, at 79 (reporting presenta-
tion of Dr. William DuMouchel) (pointing out that FDA's MedWatch postmarket
drug safety database relies on voluntary reports by patients and physicians and thus
includes only an inaccurate "numerator" (how many incidents were voluntarily
reported) and no "denominator" (the total number of people who took the drug));
Duh et al., supra note 63, at 31 (pointing out that when FDA tried to supplement
physician-reported data through voluntary agreements to access data from Health
Maintenance Organization databases, the resulting data had the customary limita-
tions seen with administrative datasets); see also Pillans, supra note 62, at 697 (pointing
out that the "numerator" was susceptible to underreporting); id. at 698 (discussing
voluntary adverse-drug-reaction reporting systems in various nations).
539 See FDAAA § 901(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(o) (4) (West Supp. 2009) (letting FDA
notify manufacturers of safety information it believes should be included in drug
labeling and order the change following a period for response and discussions with
the manufacturer).
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approval, FDA could only encourage voluntary540 labeling changes by
threatening to withdraw its previously-granted approval.54 ' This
threat rang hollow for risks that were not serious enough to justify
removing a drug from the market. Even for serious risks, this
approach was problematic if the drug was providing therapeutic bene-
fits for at least one patient subgroup.5 42 The situation shown schemat-
ically in Figure 1 is actually quite common. A drug may be delivering
benefits to some patient subgroups even while endangering others. If
a late-discovered risk affects only a subset of patients taking the drug,
withdrawing the approval would protect some patients at the cost of
denying therapeutic benefits to others who have come to rely on the
drug.54 3 Withdrawal would not necessarily improve the public's
health, so FDA's threats had little credibility if manufacturers declined
to make requested labeling changes.
FDA now has authority to order safety-related labeling changes.
Since FDAAA views efficacy failure as a potential safety problem, this
seemingly could include labeling changes to address emerging
problems with individual or average efficacy. During the first six
months after these provisions went into effect, FDA ordered four
safety-related labeling changes. 544 While helpful, this new power is
only a partial solution.
Traditional labeling is not an ideal medium for communicating
the information doctors will need in the twenty-first century.5 45 For
540 Levitt et al., supra note 20, at 178; see also I. Scott Bass, Enforcement Powers of the
Food and Drug Administration: Drugs and Devices, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGU-
LATION, supra note 20, at 55, 70-74 (discussing the scope and limits of FDA's recall
authority).
541 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2006). A complete list of grounds for withdrawal is set
forth in 21 C.F.R. § 314.150 (2004).
542 See Epstein, supra note 43, at 25 (calling it "utterly indefensible" to remove a
drug from the market in situations where there is a way to distinguish in advance the
portion of the total population that is at risk for an adverse reaction, and noting that
in these situations the "key question is to develop some protocol that allows for the
identification of these high risk users, usually a minority").
543 See, e.g., John Leland, Pain Pills Withdrawn, Many Renew Search for Relief N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at A30 (describing hardships for patients for whom Cox-2 painkil-
lers had been effective, when some of these products were removed from the market
due to cardiovascular risks).
544 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDAAA
IMPLEMENTATION-HIGHLIGHTS ONE YEAR AFTER ENACTMENT 5 (2008) [hereinafter




545 Evans, supra note 222, at 780-82.
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example, doctors increasingly are being asked to apply complex
genetic and biomarker screening strategies to predict which patients
are suitable candidates for particular drugs. To succeed, they need
detailed, application-specific, up-to-date information about the best
screening strategies and tests to use with particular drugs.5 46 In recent
years, this led to calls for cross labeling of tests and drugs. Cross label-
ing exists when a drug's labeling identifies specific screening tests and
provides information on how to vary doses in response to test results,
or when a test's labeling describes how to use the test to screen
patients for a specific drug.547 Cross labeling is what most of us would
like to have, when a drug is being given to us or to our loved ones, yet
very few cross-labeled products exist.548 It is more common for drug
labeling-if it includes any information about screening strategies at
all-simply to note that patient response may vary based on certain
genetic or other factors, without recommending specific tests to use
or explaining how to vary dosing in response to the test results.549
As of 2005, FDA seemed unsure of its authority to force drug and
test manufacturers to cross label their products, if either party
objected to doing so.550 Segments of the industry voiced strong oppo-
sition to mandatory cross labeling, citing problems with apportion-
546 FDA, March 7 Proceedings, supra note 227, at 7-8 (statement of Dr. Janet
Woodcock) (discussing the need for the full weight of scientific advances to be
brought to bear on treatment decisions and the need for up-to-date, accurate infor-
mation at the point of patient care).
547 Evans, supra note 222, at 785-87.
548 Id. at 780. But see, e.g., Genentech, Full Prescribing Information for Herceptin
(2009), available at http://www.gene.com/gene/products/information/oncology/
herceptin/insertjsp (cross-referencing specific, named tests to use with the drug).
549 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co., Full Prescribing Information for Strattera, §§ 12.3, 17.7
(2009), available at http://pi.illy.com/us/strattera-pi.pdf (noting that the drug is
metabolized primarily through the cytochrome P450 2D6 enzymatic pathway and
commenting that dose may need to be adjusted when the drug is used along with
certain other drugs that inhibit this pathway, but not naming a specific test); see also
Lesko & Woodcock, supra note 475, at 766 (discussing factors FDA considered in
deciding how to address gene-drug interactions in atomoxetine (Strattera) labeling).
550 See Evans, supra note 222, at 785-86; see also Drug Info. Ass'n & U.S. Food &
Drug Admin., Proceedings, Combination Products and Mutually Conforming Label-
ing Workshop (May 10, 2005) [hereinafter DIA & FDA, May 10 Proceedings], tran-
scipt available at http://www.fda.gov/CombinationProducts/MeetingsConferences
Workshops/ucml35152.htm (statements of Nancy Stade, Office of the Chief Counsel,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., and Suzanne O'Shea, Office of Combination Products,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin.) (discussing whether FDA can approve one company's
product without voluntary conformity by another company).
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ment of product liability and various commercial concerns.5 5 ' Even if
FDA did have such authority (or if the parties voluntarily agreed to
work together), there are evidentiary barriers to cross labeling. Most
of the available screening tests are CLIA-regulated LDTs.5 52 Because
these tests do not pass through a rigorous, data-driven regulatory
review before they go on the market, many of them are unable to
meet FDA's evidentiary standards for including information in drug
labeling. Another concern is whether drug labeling can be revised
quickly enough to keep pace with the rapid evolution of new, better
screening tests.5 53 Continual revisions would be required, and label-
ing changes are not free.5 54
FDA indicated in 2005 that it would encourage voluntary cooper-
ation among drug and test manufacturers555 but would stop short of
forcing them to cross label their products. Whatever the merits of this
policy, it poses obstacles to commercialization of third-party screening
tests for use with preexisting drugs5 5 6 and has been a barrier to third-
party participation in efforts to make drugs safer and more effec-
tive.557 It also leaves doctors groping for information about which test
is best to use with which drug. In FDAAA, Congress could have
granted FDA authority to require compulsory cross labeling. Con-
gress did not do so. It instead pursued a multifaceted solution that
acknowledges: (1) the underlying gaps in evidence about screening
strategies and tests for use with drugs, (2) the need for timely commu-
nication of rapidly evolving advice.
By improving postmarket evidence development generally,558
FDAAA creates infrastructure that can be used to develop new screen-
ing strategies and to validate specific tests (including CLIA-regulated
LDTs) for use with particular drugs. By doing postmarket observa-
tional studies, FDA will spot drugs that have high rates of adverse- or
non-responders. People in these subgroups could be approached to
obtain their consent for follow-up studies to identify genetic and other
551 See DIA & FDA, May 10 Proceedings, supra note 550 (statements of Drs. Anna
Longwell, Combination Prods. Coalition, & David Eveleth, Exec. Dir, of Med. &
Developmental Scis., Pfizer, Inc.).
552 SACGHS, U.S. OVERSIGHT, supra note 223, at 39.
553 Evans, supra note 222, at 781.
554 Prescription Drug User Fee Rates For Fiscal Year 2009, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,017,
45,022 (Aug. 1, 2008) (quoting a fee of $623,600 in fiscal year 2009 for a supplemen-
tal application to amend an existing new drug application, if the supplemental appli-
cation requires review of clinical data).
555 Evans, supra note 222, at 781.
556 Id. at 786.
557 See discussion supra Part V.C.
558 See discussion supra Part V.A.
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factors that may explain their responses to the drug. Such studies
would fit under the rubric of "advanced drug safety studies" envi-
sioned by FDAAA. Thus FDA has power to authorize the use of Senti-
nel System data in these studies, although individual consents still
would be required to collect new specimens for genetic analysis.
When there is insufficient evidence about the clinical utility of
existing screening tests, the Sentinel System could be used to conduct
observational studies comparing outcomes in patients who were and
were not screened with particular tests. These and other follow-up
studies could help develop hard evidence to support better risk man-
agement techniques and, in some cases, labeling changes.
To make communication more timely, FDAAA orders FDA to
establish an Internet-based system559 for disseminating risk informa-
tion to patients and health care providers.5 60 The system is to provide
an easily searchable,561 one-stop source of information on drug-
related risks and how best to manage them. It already includes infor-
mation that previously has been available in paper form, such as label-
ing, package inserts, Medication Guides,5 6 2 and safety alerts (product
recalls and warning letters).*563 However, a key purpose of this system
is to provide continuous, close-to-real-time feedback of emerging
safety data, including early signals of potential problems that are not
yet well enough verified to warrant labeling changes or warnings. 564
Already, the system has begun reporting potential new risks identified
using FDA's pre-FDAAA adverse event reporting system.565 Congress
has authorized public access to anonymized summaries of Sentinel
System safety findings as these become available.5 66 For all newly
approved drugs, risk information will be updated within eighteen
months or at such time as the drug has been used by 10,000 people.5 67
The system also will provide information on how to manage a drug's
risks, including pre-FDAAA risk management plans that already were
559 The system's early implementation can be viewed at U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
Postmarket Drug Safety Information for Patients and Providers, http://www.fda.gov/
cder/drugSafety.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
560 FDAAA § 915, 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(r) (West Supp. 2009).
561 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(r) (2) (A).
562 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(r) (2) (B) (i)-(ii), 355(r) (3).
563 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(r) (2) (B) (iv).
564 Id.
565 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Potential Signals of Serious Risks/New Safety Infor-
mation Identified from the Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), http://
wvw.fda.gov/cder/aers/potential-signals (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
566 FDAAA § 915, 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(r) (2) (C).
567 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(r)(2)(D).
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in place for some drugs and the new Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategies568 envisioned by FDAAA. 56 9
FDAAA has not changed FDA's traditional labeling requirements.
They will continue in effect and the new Internet-based communica-
tion system will exist alongside them. FDA has met its statutory dead-
line (one year from enactment of FDAAA5 70) to get the system started,
but its functionality will be evolving over a period of years. It is still
too early to tell how it may evolve. When fully developed, it eventually
could supplant traditional labeling as the primary medium patients
and physicians rely on for risk-benefit information about drugs.
2. Applying the Evidence
Communicating risk-benefit information will not improve public
health, unless the information actually is applied at the point when
physicians prescribe drugs. Labeling changes repeatedly have been
shown, in empirical studies, to have little impact on physicians' pre-
scribing behavior.57' Changing FDA's communication medium is
unlikely to change that fact, without a workable mechanism to pro-
mote physician compliance with warnings, instructions, and risk man-
agement strategies. The physician assistant who administered the
drug that cost the patient an arm in Wyeth v. Levine was prescribing it
directly at odds with warnings stated in labeling572 and presumably
would have been equally unimpressed by a warning delivered over the
Internet.
568 See discussion infra Part V.G.2; see also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Approved
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Drug
Safety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm 11 1350.htm
(last visited Nov. 22, 2009) [hereinafter FDA, REMS] (listing approved REMS plans).
569 FDAAA § 915, 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(r) (2) (B) (v).
570 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(r) (1).
571 See, e.g., Walter Smalley et al., Contraindicated Use of Cisapride: Impact of Food and
Drug Administration Regulatory Action, 284 JAMA 3036, 3038 (2000) (finding that label-
ing revisions and efforts to communicate contraindications of the drug cisapride
(Propulsid) had little impact on prescribing behavior); Raymond L. Woosley & Glenn
Rice, A New System for Moving Drugs to the Market, ISSUES SCI. & TECH. ONLINE, Winter
2005, http://www.issues.org/21.2/woosley.html (relating how physician noncompli-
ance with warnings and contraindications in drug labeling ultimately forced manufac-
turers to remove cisapride (Propulsid), terfenadine (Seldane), astemizole
(Hismanal), troglitazone (Rezulin), bromfenac (Duract), and trovafloxacin (Trovan)
from the market, even though these drugs would have been safe if instructions in
labeling had been heeded).
572 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1217-18 (2008) (AlitoJ., dissenting).
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During the twentieth century, FDA pursued a policy of not regu-
lating physicians.5 7 3 This was embodied in the agency's permissive
policy on off-label use.5 74 This policy let physicians choose to disre-
gard instructions and warnings in drug labeling. FDA took the posi-
tion that "labeling is not intended either to preclude the physician
from using his best judgment in the interest of his patient, or to
impose liability if he does not follow the package insert."575 This pol-
icy made a certain amount of sense under the 1962 regulatory para-
digm, which focused FDA's attention on average safety and efficacy.
Unable to provide meaningful guidance about individual safety and
efficacy, FDA left this determination to physicians. FDA understood
the limitations of its average statistics and this policy, arguably, was as
good a solution as any.
FDA's permissive policy on off-label use loses this rationale in a
world where FDA is able to provide more nuanced information about
benefits and risks. In coming years, FDA will be providing informa-
tion at the individual/subgroup level for some (not all) drugs. For
such drugs, a permissive policy on off-label use is hard tojustify. Some
off-label uses may be beneficial or at least innocuous (for example,
trying out a drug for a new indicated use in patients who, based on
screening tests, are at low risk of adverse reactions). Other off-label
uses may be overtly dangerous or wasteful (for example, giving it to
patients who, based on screening tests, are known to be at high risk of
adverse reactions or non-response). Off-label policy itself needs to be
nuanced, varying with the specific drug and use.5 76 Certain "bad" off-
label uses may need to be banned.5 7 7
One of the unanticipated outcomes of the Human Genome Pro-
ject has been to blur the line between medical product and medical
practice regulation.578 If safety and efficacy are conceived in individ-
ual, rather than average, terms, product regulation necessarily
touches matters traditionally seen as medical-practice issues.57 9 Prod-
573 See discussion supra Parts V.D-V.E.
574 Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses
Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504 (Aug.
15, 1972) (stating that labeling is not intended to impede the physician's exercise of
judgment concerning what is best for the patient or to impose liability for prescribing
decisions that are at odds with drug labeling).
575 Id.
576 See Evans, supra note 222, at 784.
577 Id. at 785.
578 See Evans, supra note 293, at 288-93 (discussing how personalized medicine
blurs the line between product regulation and practice regulation); see also IOM,
UNDERSTANDING BENEFITS, supra note 16, at 16-17.
579 Evans, supra note 293, at 290, 292.
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uct and practice regulation cease to be as cleanly separable as the
1938 Act and the 1962 amendments conceived them to be. Personal-
ized medicine-the use of screening tests to inform individual pre-
scribing decisions-makes FDA a purveyor of information that bears
on clinical decisions. The problem is how to ensure this information
is put to use.
Despite Congress's delicacy about the matter, courts have never
found constitutional limits on FDA's power to regulate physicians.58 0
"There is little doubt under modern law that Congress has ample
power to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and use of drugs and
medical devices."58' The jurisdictional lines Congress posited in 1938
and 1962 were the product of intense lobbying by the medical profes-
sion582 and may have been unduly timid. Nonetheless, FDA actions
that influence medical practice remain controversial. The 1976 Medi-
cal Device Amendments expressly authorized FDA to approve medical
devices subject to restrictions on their use and distribution.58 3 The
older provisions of FDCA, dealing with drugs and biologics, lacked
similar provisions. Since 1990, FDA has struggled with how to ensure
safe prescribing of drugs for which there are known strategies that
could reduce risks.584
In 1992, FDA interpreted the FDCA as allowing use restrictions
for drugs and biologics.5 85 FDA issued regulations586 letting new
drugs and biologics be approved subject to "restrictions to ensure safe
use"5 87 if FDA found that the product was effective but not safe with-
out restrictions.588 These regulations were part of FDA's accelerated
approval program (in 21 C.F.R. part 314, subpart H). Unlike FDA's
580 See Adams, supra note 521, at 424-25.
581 Epstein, supra note 43, at 7.
582 See Adams, supra note 521, at 423; Grow, supra note 528, at 15-17.
583 Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 2, 90 Stat. 539, 565
(adding Section 520(e) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) (2006)).
584 Scott Gottlieb, Drug Safety Proposals and The Intrusion of Federal Regulation Into
Patient Freedom and Medical Practice, 26 HEALTH AFFAiRS 664, 665-68 (2007).
585 See New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Acceler-
ated Approval 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,951 (Dec. 11, 1992) (interpreting existing statu-
tory authority and judicial rulings as allowing FDA to impose postmarketing
restrictions on drugs); New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regula-
tions; Accelerated Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,234, 13,237 (Apr. 15, 1992) (same).
586 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.520, 601.42 (2009).
587 Id. §§ 314.520 (a), 601.42(a) (allowing use restrictions, such as limiting distri-
bution to certain facilities or to physicians with special training, or conditioning distri-
bution on the performance of specific medical procedures).
588 Id.
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authority to require postmarket studies under subpart H, FDA could
impose use restrictions regardless whether a drug was approved based
on surrogate or clinical endpoints. 589 FDA expressed its intention to
invoke this authority only rarely590 and, in subsequent years, has
stayed true to this promise. Outside its subpart H authority, FDA also
worked with drug sponsors to implement use restrictions as part of
voluntary risk management plans for some drugs.5 91 In 2005, FDA
issued three guidance documents clarifying the correct design of
these plans and the circumstances when sponsors should consider
putting a plan in place. 592 These plans have tended to be confined to
relatively few products with serious, known side effects. 59 3
FDA's authority to restrict the use of drugs under subpart H was
questioned and criticized as an intrusion on the practice of
medicine.5 9 4 Nevertheless, drug sponsors tended not to challenge
restrictions FDA imposed when approving new drugs. Faced with the
alternative of not having their product approved at all, sponsors gen-
erally were willing to agree to proposed restrictions. FDA has tremen-
dous bargaining power at that moment in a drug's life. What was
missing, however, was a mechanism to impose restrictions later in a
drug's life to manage new risks discovered in the postmarket period.
FDAAA gives FDA clear statutory authority to condition the sale
of drugs on specific measures to manage their risks.59 5 The vehicle
589 Under the accelerated approval program, FDA could order postmarket studies
only when it approved a product based on surrogate endpoints of effectiveness. See
supra Part V.B.1. However, the authority to restrict distribution and use was not so
restricted. Thus, for example, FDA used this regulation to restrict distribution of the
abortion drug mifepristone (RU-486) even though the approval was based on a
clinical endpoint (effectiveness in producing an abortion). See Memorandum from
Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research to NDA 20-687 MIFEPREX (mifepristone) Popu-
lation Council at 1 (September 28, 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/down
loads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetylnformationforPatientsandProviders
/ucm111366.pdf.
590 New Drug Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated
Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942-43 (Dec. 11, 1992).
591 Gottlieb, supra note 584, at 666.
592 See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Final Risk Minimiza-
tion Guidances (March 24, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/News-
room/PressAnnouncements/2005/ucml08425.htm.
593 Gottlieb, supra note 584, at 669-70.
594 See New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Acceler-
ated Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. at 58,951 (discussing public comments disputing FDA's
claimed authority to impose restrictions).
595 See FDAAA § 901(b), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355-1(a) (1)-(2) (West Supp. 2009) (let-
ting FDA require risk evaluation and mitigation strategies for newly- and already-
approved drugs). FDA may require such strategies to include conditions for market-
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for imposing restrictions is called a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategy (REMS) .596 FDA can require a REMS either when a drug ini-
tially is approved597 or subsequently if FDA determines, based on
emerging evidence, that a REMS is needed to ensure that the drug's
benefits outweigh its risks.5 9 8 If FDA requires a drug to have a REMS
and the drug sponsor fails to maintain compliance with its terms, sale
of the drug will be unlawful.59 9 All REMS must include a program for
ongoing evaluation of the risk.60t Additional elements may be
included.6 0 1 Some of these are simple, familiar measures FDA already
has been using, such as requiring Medication Guides, patient package
inserts, or warning letters to advise healthcare providers of a risk.602
However, more draconian measures can be imposed on drugs that are
effective but have known risks so serious that the drug otherwise
would be unavailable.603 That is, the risk would block approval of a
new drug or cause approval of an existing drug to be withdrawn. For
such drugs, FDA can condition sale on specific restrictions known as
"elements to ensure safe use."60 4
The REMS use restrictions are not a novel concept, since they
resemble measures already in effect under subpart H and voluntary
risk management programs.605 FDAAA elaborates six potential ele-
ments of risk management programs606 and, importantly, gives spe-
ing and sales, such as restrictions on how, where, and by what type of professional the
drug may be prescribed or requirements that patients receive monitoring or testing to
manage risks. Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(f) (3); see also id. § 901(a), 21 U.S.C.A. §355(p)
(West Supp. 2009) (making it unlawful for a person to introduce a new drug into
interstate commerce if the drug requires a REMS and the person does not maintain
compliance with the REMS); id.§ 902(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(y) (West Supp. 2009) (let-
ting drugs be regarded as misbranded if manufacturers fail to comply with such
restrictions).
596 Id. §§ 901(a)-(b), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 3 5 5 (p), 355-1.
597 Id. § 901(b), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1 (a) (1).
598 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1 (a) (2) (A).
599 Id. § 901(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (p) (1) (B).
600 Id. § 901(b), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(d).
601 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(e).
602 Id.
603 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1 (f).
604 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355-1 (f) (1) (B), (3).
605 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 11, at 491.
606 See FDAAA § 901(b), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(f) (3) (describing six elements of safe
use: (1) FDA can limit who can prescribe a drug, for example, limiting it to health
care providers with special training or experience; (2) FDA can require special certifi-
cation of entities that dispense the drug; (3) FDA can restrict a drug for use in partic-
ular health-care settings, for example, requiring drugs that can have sudden, life-
threatening reactions to be administered in hospitals where immediate emergency
care would be available; (4) FDA can require that patients have complied with safe-
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cific authorization to require the use of modern biomarker screening
strategies and pharmacogenetic tests. A REMS can require that
patients meet safe-use conditions, which can include laboratory test-
ing before the drug is prescribed.607 For example, pregnancy testing
could be required to make sure drugs that cause birth defects are not
given to pregnant women, or a pharmacogenetic test could be
required to assess whether a patient is a suitable candidate for the
drug. This provision, in effect, lets a REMS be used to achieve func-
tional cross labeling of a drug and a test, without actually altering the
labeling of either product. This may help address the evidentiary
problems that have blocked cross labeling of drugs with CLIA-regu-
lated LDTs. Evidentiary standards for a REMS are presently less for-
malized, and thus may be more flexible, than the standards for
including information in labeling. This requirement could be but-
tressed by another allowed element-inclusion of patients taking a
drug in a registry,60 so that their outcomes can be followed to con-
firm the test's utility and develop evidence to support a later change
in the drug's labeling.
Use restrictions offer a much-needed alternative to pulling a drug
from the market when it is beneficial to some patients but poses seri-
ous risks for others. When patient populations are segmented by pre-
dictable variations in response, "it [is] utterly indefensible to remove
the drug from the market altogether so long as warnings can enforce
the proper rules for market segmentation."609 Unfortunately, warn-
ings alone cannot enforce the needed segmentation. A number of
beneficial drugs have had to be withdrawn from the market when doc-
tors failed to "'do the right thing' in response to the FDA's warn-
ings."61 o Use restrictions aim to save drugs that are benefiting some
patient subgroups by imposing binding restrictions to protect other
subgroups (adverse or non-responders).
To date, the REMS that have been approved did not involve the
use of pharmacogenetic testing to address variable response. After
the REMS provisions of FDAAA took effect in March, 2008, FDA
use conditions such as testing prior to administration of the drug; (5) FDA can
require specific monitoring of patients to detect adverse events quickly while they still
can be mitigated; (6) FDA can require patients taking the drug to be enrolled in a
registry so that their outcomes can be followed).
607 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1 (f) (3) (D).
608 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1 (f) (3) (F).
609 Epstein, supra note 43, at 25.
610 Gottlieb, supra note 584, at 666 (commenting on, rather than arguing, the
position that doctors are not doing "the right thing" when they ignore drug labeling).
20101 513
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
immediately deemed611 a list of sixteen existing drugs and biologics to
be subject to REMS. 6 12 These products already had been subject to
use restrictions either under the subpart H regulations613 or by volun-
tary agreement of their manufacturers. This initial list of REMS gen-
erally included drugs with abuse or addiction potential or having
severe risks (such as causing birth defects, sudden life-threatening
reactions such as anaphylaxis or cardiac death, or irreversible organ
damage). 614 The list also included mifepristone (RU-486), 615 an abor-
tion drug approved in a politically charged environment; for RU-486,
subpart H was used as an instrument to set abortion policy as well as to
set safety restrictions. 6 16 Beyond this initial group of drugs for which
FDA "deemed" REMS restrictions to be in effect, FDA has been requir-
ing REMS on a case-by-case basis. FDA approved thirteen REMS
between March 2008 (when REMS authority took effect) and the end
of September 2008 (the first anniversary of FDAAA's enactment) and
the agency had approved eighty-nine REMS as of late November
2009.617 In eleven of the thirteen cases reported for FDAAA's first
year, the REMS involved only a Medication Guide or risk communica-
tion plan. 618 Early in 2009, FDA announced plans to use REMS to
restrict distribution of twenty-four popular narcotics that account for a
disproportionate share of drug-related deaths in the United States.6 1 9
611 See id. § 909(b) (1) (allowing FDA to require REMS for products under preex-
isting use restrictions).
612 Identification of Drugs and Biological Products Deemed to Have Risk Evalua-
tion and Mitigation Strategies for Purposes of the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,313, 16,314 (Mar. 27, 2008).
613 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.520, 601.42 (2009).
614 Robert Gliklich & Michelle Bertagna Leavy, Changes in FDA's Approach to Risk,
APPLIED CLINIcAL TRIALS, Oct. 2008, at 44, 46 tbl.2.
615 Identification of Drugs and Biological Products Deemed to Have Risk Evalua-
tion and Mitigation Strategies for Purposes of the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007, 73 Fed. Reg. at 16,314.
616 See discussion infra Part VI.
617 See FDA, FDAAA IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 544, at 6 (reporting thirteen
REMS approved as of September 25, 2008); FDA, REMS, supra note 568 (reporting
eighty-nine REMS approved as of November 22, 2009).
618 FDA, FDAAA IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 544, at 6.
619 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Opioid Drugs and Risk Evaluation Mitigation Strat-
egies, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucml636
47.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2009); see also Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. to Place New Limits on
Prescriptions of Narcotics, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2009, at A13 (describing a proposed pro-
gram to address risks associated with opioid medications); John Gever, FDA to Step Up
Regulation of Extended-Release Opioids, MEDPAGE TODAY, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.med
pagetoday.com/ProductAlert/Prescriptions/12810 (describing proposed measures to
address problems with opioid medications).
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Overprescribing of these drugs and failure of physicians to heed warn-
ings already in labeling were cited as reasons for invoking the REMS
mechanism.62 0 Of the eighty-nine REMS approved by late November
2009, only seven contained any use restrictions.621
Already, there are complaints that REMS will "make drug lifecycle
management more complex, more costly, and resource intensive."6 2 2
Safety advocates fear, and industry representatives hope, that REMS
may amount to little more than a requirement for Medication Guides
and risk communication plans, with the more cumbersome use
restrictions rarely invoked. To those who say REMS are too cumber-
some to get off the ground, a word of caution is in order: It is now just
under two years since the effective date of this statute. Assessing its
impact now is like attempting, in 1964, to assess the ultimate impact of
FDA's clinical trial requirements. Few in 1964 would have imagined
the massive, resource-intensive clinical trial enterprise that grew out of
the 1962 amendments. 623 The fact that clinical trials were cumber-
some did not ultimately deter FDA from requiring them. The same is
likely true of REMS, and the right question is how REMS may evolve
over the next five to forty years.
VI. UNRESOLVED DocrlNAL ISSUES
In FDAAA, Congress declined to speak about two important mat-
ters, leaving them to be considered on a case-by-case basis by courts.
Congress resisted entreaties from the pharmaceutical industry to
insert an express preemption clause into the drug provisions of
FDCA, 624 and Congress left the line between medical product and
medical practice regulation blurrier than it has been at any time since
FDCA was enacted in 1938. Congress's refusal to make general pro-
nouncements about these matters was wholly consistent with the spirit
of FDAAA, which eschews "one-size-fits-all" approaches to drug regula-
tion and embraces nuanced, fact-specific treatment both of evidence
development and of regulatory action in response to the evidence.
A. Preemption of Suits Against Manufacturers After FDAAA and
Wyeth v. Levine
FDAAA explodes once-simple categories of regulatory action into
a multitude of subtly different forms. For example, "drug approval"
620 Harris, supra note 619.
621 FDA, REMS, supra note 568.
622 Gliklich & Leavy, supra note 614, at 48.
623 See discussion supra Introduction.
624 Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 11, at 468 & n.27.
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may mean approval subject only to FDAAA's general requirement to
reevaluate risk after eighteen months or 10,000 prescriptions;
approval subject to postmarket study requirements; approval subject
to a simple REMS that lacks use restrictions; approval subject to REMS
use restrictions; and approval based on surrogate endpoints-a cate-
gory that has existed since 1992 but which is set to become more sali-
ent as FDA incorporates modern biomarker technologies into its drug
approval pathways. Moreover, FDA will be acting in an environment
of continuously accruing postmarket evidence. Suppose FDA deter-
mines, at T(n), that evidence, for the first time, supports posting an
early warning of risk on its Internet-based communication system.
Will this determination preempt state lawsuits alleging that, at the ear-
lier time T(n-1), a manufacturer failed to warn of this risk?62 5
Whether any of FDA's new forms of action have preemptive effect is a
fact-specific inquiry best left to courts, which is where Congress left
the question.
The regulatory actions at issue in Wyeth v. Levine were a drug
approval decision FDA made in 1955, decisions on changes to the
drug's labeling in 1973, 1976, and 1981, and intermittent correspon-
dence in which FDA did not pressure the manufacturer for a labeling
change in subsequent years. 626 The Court rejected Wyeth's argument
that these types of action by FDA establish "both a floor and a ceiling
for drug regulation" 627 such that a state-law verdict that the labeling
was inadequate would thwart Congress's purposes and objectives.628
The Court saw FDA's approval and labeling decisions, such as those at
issue in Wyeth v. Levine, as a scheme of minimal regulation that could
coexist with state tort law.6 2 9 These decisions did not amount to opti-
mal regulation in which a regulator makes delicate risk-risk trade-offs
that might be disrupted if states established higher de facto require-
ments through their tort damage awards.63 0
625 See Nagareda, supra note 3, at 30-31 (discussing the impact, in litigation over
suicide risks with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), of determinations
FDA made at various points in time that there was not yet any credible evidence to
support a labeling change); id. at 28 (noting that "matters of temporal perspective
loom large in the preemption analysis").
626 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1192 (2009).
627 Id. at 1199.
628 See id. at 1193-94, 1199.
629 See id. at 1200-03.
630 See Nagareda, supra note 3, at 39 ("When rules of any sort concerning a given
risk have the potential to increase other kinds of risks, regulators necessarily must
start thinking less in terms of minimal rules and more in terms of optimal ones. But
that move itself undermines the premise of minimal regulation that underlies the
supposed coexistence of tort and administration.")
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Wyeth v. Levine does not foreclose the possibility that some forms
of post-FDAAA regulatory action may support findings of implied pre-
emption. "In such cases, the Court has performed its own conflict
determination, relying on the substance of state and federal law and
not on agency proclamations of pre-emption."6 3 1 The Court has
"given 'some weight' to an agency's views about the impact of tort law
on federal objectives when 'the subject matter is technica[l] and the
relevant history and background are complex and extensive.' 6 32
Some of the decisions FDA will be making after FDAAA may have the
character of optimal regulation. For example, FDA's decisions not to
impose REMS use restrictions may, in some cases, reflect a studied
policy of letting a variety of competing risk management strategies be
tried in clinical practice, to see which one proves best. This decision
very much would have the character of the Department of Transporta-
tion's decision that was at issue in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.633
Discussing this case in Wyeth v. Levine, the Court noted that "state tort
claims premised on Honda's failure to install airbags" were pre-
empted because they "presented an obstacle to achieving 'the variety
and mix of devices that the federal regulation sought."'6 3 4 The Court
held that FDA's decisions at issue in Wyeth v. Levine were not of this
character, but applied an analytical framework that might well find
preemptive effect in some of FDA's future REMS decisions. These
cases will require a fact-based inquiry geared to the specific drug and
the specific circumstances in which particular use restrictions were or
were not imposed. Wyeth v. Levine did not foreclose these inquiries;
indeed, it maps out promising ways to frame the issues in future cases.
B. Federal Intrusion on Medical Practice
FDA long has described its role as determining which medical
products are available, but letting physicians decide how the products
should be used. REMS use requirements conflate availability and use.
Under FDAAA, the agency will be deciding which products are availa-
ble for which use.63 5 This blurs product and practice regulation in a
631 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200-01.
632 Id. at 1201 (alteration in original) (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co. 529
U.S. 861, 883 (2000)).
633 529 U.S. at 861.
634 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1203 (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 881).
635 Marc Wilenzick et al., Interview with Gerald Masoudi, Outgoing Chief Counsel of the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, MEMBER BRIEFING (Am. Health Law. Ass'n, Washing-
ton, D.C.), Feb. 2009, at 1, 2, available at http://www.healthlawyers.org/Members/
PracticeGroups/LS/memberbriefings/Documents/Masoudi%20interview Final.pdf
("[T]he REMS could have the effect of limiting the ability of physicians who might
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way that will raise legal issues at both extremes: when patients are
injured through physicians' undercompliance with REMS, and when
physicians "overcomply" in ways that deny their patients needed
treatments.
1. Denial of Access to FDA-Approved Treatments
REMS already are interfering with patient care. Perhaps the best
example involves extra-REMS use of the drug mifepristone (RU-486).
FDA approved the drug for use as an abortion agent in September,
2000 after a long and storied controversy. 63 6 This drug blocks action
of the female hormone progestin 637 and, therefore, has a wide array
of potential uses to treat conditions influenced by the action of this
hormone, including certain forms of cancer638 as well as benign
tumors and other conditions of the reproductive tract,63 9 and certain
brain tumors.6 40 Mifepristone's labeling states that its only indicated
use is for medical termination of early pregnancy (through the forty-
ninth day). FDA approved the drug subject to subpart H use restric-
tions and, in 2008, deemed these to be converted to a REMS. These
use restrictions are aimed at addressing specific safety risks that can
arise during a drug-induced abortion. 641 Distribution is tightly
use the drug for off-label uses to get their hands on the drug for their patients."
(quoting Gerald Masoudi) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
636 JUDITH A.JOHNSON, ABORTION: TERMINATION OF EARLY PREGNANCY WITH RU-486
(MIFEPRISTONE) (2001), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsre-
ports/crsdocuments/RL30866.pdf; see also Byron C. Calhoun & Donna J. Harrison,
Challenges to the FDA Approval of Mifepristone, 38 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 163 (2004)
(describing shortcomings of the approval process for mifepristone).
637 Div. OF HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION, INST. OF MED., CLINICAL
APPLICATIONS OF MIFEPRISTONE (RU 486) AND OTHER ANTIPROGESTINS 14 (Molla S.
Donaldson et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter IOM, CLINICAL APPLICATIONs], available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=2203.
638 See Aimin Li et al., Effect of Mifepristone on Proliferation and Apoptosis of Ishikawa
Endometrial Adenocarcinoma Cells, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY 202, 207-09 (2005); Nat'l
Insts. of Health, ClinicalTrials.gov, Mifepristone for Patients with Endometrial Cancer
and LGESS, http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT00505739 (reporting the regis-
tration by M.D. Anderson Cancer Center of an eight-year clinical trial, starting in
September 2001, of mifepristone in patients with endometrial cancer); see also Laura
Sussman, Clinical Trial Examines New Treatment for Endometrial Cancer, TEX. MED. CTR.
NEWS, Feb. 1, 2002, http://www.tmc.edu/tmcnews/02_01_02/page-20.html (calling
the NIH study the first clinical trial to study mifepristone as a treatment for specific
types of endometrial cancer).
639 IOM, CLINICAL APPLICATIONS, supra note 637, at 189.
640 JOHNSON, supra note 636, at 4.
641 See Letter from Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research to Sarah P. Arnold, Vice
President, Corporate Affairs, Population Council, (September 28, 2000), available at
518 [VOL. 85:2
A NEW EVIDENTIARY PARADIGM
restricted. 6 4 2 Labeling is silent about use of the drug in patients who
are not pregnant and thus not in pursuit of an abortion. The impact
of the REMS is to make such uses unlawful in the United States.
There is mounting clinical trial evidence that mifepristone, in
small doses of five mg/day for ninety days (as opposed to the 600 mg
one-time dose ordinarily used in conjunction with another drug, mis-
oprostol, to induce an abortion) is highly effective in treating a form
of benign tumor, leiomyomata (uterine fibroids).643 This condition is
variously estimated to affect 30-80% of women of childbearing age,6 4
with an estimated 20-40% of women aged thirty-five or older having
tumors of significant size. 645 In severe cases, the condition creates
major health problems including pressure on other internal organs
and severe anemia that makes patients dependent on repeated blood
transfusions.646 An estimated 15% of off-label uses of drugs in the
United States have no clinical trial evidence whatsoever to back
them. 6 4 7 The quantum of evidence available to support this off-label
use of mifepristone is substantial by comparison. However, off-label
use of mifepristone to treat leiomyomata is unlawful in the United
States. Women of sufficient means may travel to European nations for
treatment, but unless they can remain in Europe for the full ninety-
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda-docs/appletter/2000/20687appltr.pdf.
For example, the drug can be prescribed only by or under the supervision of physi-
cians able to diagnose ectopic pregnancies and able to perform a surgical abortion if
the medical abortion fails. Id.
642 See id. (requiring distribution in accordance with a plan submitted March 30,
2000, including specific requirements for storage, dosing, dosage tracking, and return
of unused product); see also Danco Labs., Mifeprex (mifepristone) Tablets 200mg
Labeling, available at http://www.earlyoptionpill.com/userfiles/file/Mifeprex%20
Labeling%204-22-09_Final-doc.pdf (listing updated warnings for Mifeprex); Danco
Labs. Mifeprex (mifepristone) Tablets 200mg Prescriber's Agreement, available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetylnforma-
tionforPatiencsandProviders/ucmll1364.pdf (stating necessary qualifications for
prescribers of Mifeprex).
643 See Steven H. Eisinger et al., Low-Dose Mifepristone for Uterine Leiomyomata, 101
OBSTETICS AND GYNECOLOGY 243, 245-50 (2003); Jody Steinauer et al., Systematic
Review of Mifepristone for the Treatment of Uterine Leiomyomata, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY 1331, 1332-35 (2004).
644 Rebecca L. Van Court, Uterine Fibroids and Women's Right to Choose, 26 J. LEGAL
MED. 507, 509-10 (2005).
645 Id.
646 Id. at 508-09.
647 Radley et al., supra note 222, at 1023.
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day course of treatment, they run the risk of having their medicine
confiscated upon re-entry to the United States.648
Congress was aware that REMS use restrictions could create
problems of this sort. Accordingly, FDAAA specifies that use restric-
tions must be commensurate with the specific serious risk that is being
addressed.6 4 9 REMS must not unduly burden patient access to the
drug, particularly in the case of patients with serious or life-threaten-
ing conditions.6 50 Congress fashioned a REMS bypass option65' that
would let drugs be supplied for extra-REMS use under Section 561 of
FDCA. 652 Section 561 lets investigational (unapproved) drugs be
used, under certain circumstances, by seriously ill patients who have
run out of other treatment options. Congress instructed FDA to
develop regulations allowing extra-REMS use under Section 561.653
To date, FDA has failed to issue these regulations, leaving no clear way
for physicians to bypass REMS use restrictions when they are interfer-
ing with care of seriously ill patients.
As applied to nonpregnant patients who are not seeking an abor-
tion, the mifepristone REMS violates FDAAA's statutory requirement
of narrow tailoring. These patients have zero risk of the safety
problems (such as incomplete abortion or a ruptured ectopic preg-
nancy) that the REMS use restrictions were designed to address. For
these patients, the REMS use restrictions serve no valid safety purpose
and can only be viewed as an instrument of abortion policy. To be
lawful, laws restricting access to abortion must have an exception for
life or health of the mother. The mifepristone REMS presents a novel
but closely related question: must there also be an exception if laws
restricting abortion endanger the life or health of a person other than
the mother? The mifepristone REMS is doing that. Unable to get
mifepristone, women whose fibroids are seriously symptomatic face an
array of bad options including unnecessary hysterectomies which, in
women of childbearing age, interfere with their fundamental liberty
interest in reproduction.
648 Benten v. Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084 (1992), denying cert. to Benten v. Kessler, 799 F.
Supp. 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (refusing to hear the case of a woman from whom
mifepristone was confiscated as she attempted to bring the product into the U.S. for
her own use to end a pregnancy); see alsoJoHNsoN, supra note 636, at 2-3 (discussing
this case).
649 FDAAA § 901(b), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(f)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2009).
650 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1 (f) (2) (C) (i).
651 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(f)(6).
652 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (2006)
653 FDAAA § 901(b), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(f) (6).
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Because of the tortured approval history of this drug, U.S. phar-
maceutical companies were concerned about boycotts if they pro-
duced it and its French manufacturer ultimately licensed it to a
nonprofit group which sponsored its FDA approval application. 6 5 4 As
a result, there is no commercial sponsor that now has an incentive to
press FDA to allow wider use of the drug in nonpregnant patients.
Patients are left to advocate for themselves. In contrast to the experi-
mental therapy that was at issue in Abigail Alliance, mifepristone is an
FDA-approved drug. The proper question is not whether clinical trial
evidence supports its current approval for use in treating fibroid
tumors, but whether this use has a level of evidentiary support compa-
rable to that of other off-label uses that FDA allows. If FDA fails to
provide a meaningful REMS bypass option, the mifepristone REMS is
ripe for litigation. Exhausting administrative remedies requires only
that a patient file a Citizen's Petition655 with FDA and wait 180 days.
2. Enforcing Physician Compliance with Use Restrictions
Even before Congress had passed FDAAA, the question was raised
whether REMS use restrictions amount to FDA regulation of medical
practice. 65 6 The answer has many implications, not all of which will be
distasteful to physicians. For example, there is a possibility that doc-
tors who comply with a REMS may be able to assert a regulatory com-
pliance defense to medical malpractice suits brought by patients who
suffer drug-related injuries.
FDAAA does not, on its face, grant FDA any new powers to regu-
late doctors or to enforce their compliance with use restrictions in a
REMS. 65 7 Congress, instead, authorized FDA to require drug manu-
facturers to provide a REMS, which ostensibly regulates only the man-
ufacturer while setting conditions for clinical use of the drug. If those
restrictions are violated, the manufacturer, rather than the physician,
would be in violation of federal law658 and would be subject to signifi-
654 JOHNSON, supra note 636, at 4-5.
655 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2009).
656 Wilenzick et al., supra note 635, at 2; see also Michael B. Enzi & Edward M.
Kennedy, Risk Management and Intrusions on Medical Practice: Striking a Balance, 26
HEALTH AFFAIRS 678 (2007) (arguing, prior to passage of FDAAA, that its proposed
REMS provisions strike a realistic balance between managing risks and intruding on
medical practice).
657 See Wilenzick et al., supra note 635, at 2 ("'REMS provisions generally bind the
sponsor of the drug, not physicians.'" (quoting Gerald Masoudi)).
658 FDAAA § 901(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(p) (West Supp. 2009) (making it unlawful
for a person to "introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce a new
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cant civil penalties. 65 9 The drug can be deemed misbranded, which
allows FDA to pursue various sanctions against the manufacturer
including seizure of the drug.660 FDAAA lays the burden of enforcing
physician compliance on drug manufacturers. In 1992, FDA took a
similar view of its subpart H use restrictions: "The burden is on the
[new drug or biologics license] applicant to ensure that the condi-
tions of use under which the applicant's product was approved are
being followed."661 FDAAA purports not to regulate physicians, yet
already there are complaints that physicians bear the burden of imple-
menting and documenting compliance with REMS use restrictions. 662
This REMS enforcement mechanism raises a number of ques-
tions. By what means, precisely, can drug manufacturers control the
behavior of errant physicians? The drug manufacturer may be too
conflicted to be a credible enforcer of patient safety: off-label (or,
more correctly, extra-REMS) use of drugs bolsters sales, and the man-
ufacturer would likely be shielded from tort liability for extra-REMS
prescribing under the learned intermediary doctrine. Does it com-
port with norms of justice for FDA to penalize manufacturers for
REMS violations by physicians? If this seems unjust, will FDA decline
to enforce REMS, so that FDA's policies post-REMS are ultimately lit-
tde different from today's lax policy on off-label use?
It seems implausible that FDA would deem a drug misbranded
and pull it off the market if a few physicians were violating elements of
safe use included in its REMS. State tort actions offer a more selective
approach to deterring extra-REMS prescribing that injures patients.
The 1938 Act left it for states to develop their own approaches to pro-
mote physician compliance with safety information reflected in drug
labeling.6 63 States generally eschewed a direct regulatory approach
drug" that requires a REMS, if the person fails to maintain compliance with the
REMS).
659 Id. § 902, 21 U.S.C.A. § 333(f) (West Supp. 2009) (calling for penalties of
$250,000 per REMS violation, up to $1 million in a single proceeding, with doubling
of penalties for each 30 days of continued violation after the Secretary provides
notice, not to exceed $1 million in a 30-day period and $10 million for all violations
adjudicated in a single proceeding).
660 Id. § 902(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(y) (West Supp. 2009) (permitting drugs to be
regarded as misbranded if a REMS is required and the responsible person (such as
the manufacturer) fails to comply with its terms).
661 New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated
Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,952 (Dec. 11, 1992).
662 See Gever, supra note 619 (discussing paperwork responsibilities previous
REMS have imposed on physicians and requirements to implement pregnancy testing
under the REMS for teratogenic medical products such as Accutane).
663 See Evans & Flockhart, supra note 81, at 51.
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and medical malpractice suits became the de facto compliance mech-
anism at the state level. 664 The result has been an unclear, inconsis-
tent framework of physician compliance with FDA's safety
information. 665 States vary in whether the tort standard of care
requires safety warnings and contraindications in labeling to be
heeded. 666 It remains for the medical profession and individual states
to assess how standards of care (and possible defenses to malpractice
actions) will be affected by REMS and by the Internet-based communi-
cation system that will be feeding continuously updated warnings to
both physicians and patients. There is much work still to be done at
the state level, if REMS are to achieve their promise of improving
patient safety.
CONcLusIoN
Congress has set the pillars of a new evidentiary paradigm, but it
is still unclear what the finished edifice will look like. It appears likely
to have the following contours: Products will move into clinical use
after premarket studies establish a basic level of safety and efficacy (or
a plausible basis for projecting the efficacy of products intended for
long-term predictive and preventive uses). These initial determina-
tions may rely on surrogate endpoints. Evidence development will
continue after approval, with new forms of regulatory action available
in response to emerging evidence of risks and benefits.
FDAAA implies a culture shift both at FDA and among the public.
Today, when FDA announces a new risk with a previously approved
drug, both the agency and the public tend to regard this as a regula-
tory failure: why did FDA not detect the problem before it approved
the drug? This question was rooted in a naive, twentieth-century
belief that clinical trials are, or should be, fully informative. Zero late-
emerging risk was never a realistic goal. The goal should be to detect
risks as quickly as possible, to minimize them using the best available
risk mitigation technologies, and to communicate emerging evidence
swiftly and effectively. By this view, the regulatory failure, in the case
of Vioxx, was not that new cardiovascular risks emerged after the
product was approved. The regulatory failures were: first, that it took
sixty-five months to get the product off the market when, with appro-
priate information infrastructure, the risk might have been detected
664 Id.
665 Id. at 52.
666 Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Malpractice: Physicians' Liability for Injury or Death
Resulting from Side Effects of Drugs Intentionally Administered to or Prescribed for Patient, 47
A.L.R. 5th 433, § 2[a] (1997, updated through 2004).
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in three months; second, that even now-almost five years after the
scandal and ten years after the product was approved-the factors
that predispose a small subset of patients to cardiovascular risks are
still unknown; and, third, that FDA's old evidentiary paradigm failed
to foster cooperative development of technologies to predict and
manage this risk so that patients who respond well to the drug can
have it. A new paradigm was needed and FDAAA has supplied one.
As with any major change in law, there are many unresolved legal
questions with which scholars now need to engage.
